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California Supreme Court Survey
July 1989-December 1989
The California Supreme Court Survey is a synposis of decisions by the
Supreme Court of California. The survey's purpose is to supply the reader
with information and a basic understanding of the issues addressed by the
court, as well as to provide a starting point for research of the topical areas
involved, Toward this end, each summary discusses one recent case before the
court, while analyzing it according to the importance of the holding and the
extent to which the court expands or modifies existing law. The survey treats
death penalty decisions cumulatively every six months in a single article de-
voted to the recurrent issues within each case. Attorney discipline decisions
are omitted from the survey.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. A court may not compel, nor does the Election Code
mandate, a county to implement a plan to deputize
its employees as registrars to stimulate minority
and low-income voter registration: Common Cause v.
Board of Supervisors .................................. 1050
B. Under the Educational Employment Relations Act,
an organizational security fee paid for by a
nonunion member may not be used for any
activities beyond the organization's exclusive
representational obligations; while the service fee
may be collected through involuntary payroll
deductions, the union carries the burden of
accounting for the expenditure of a dissenting
employee's service fee: Cumero v. Public Employment
Relations Bd .......................................... 1052
C. The Agricultural Labor Relations Board may reopen
a case and consider vacating its order in a case that
is not yet final when there has been an intervening
change in the controlling rules of law: George
Arakelian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board.
oo.....................................................
D. The recipient of welfare benefits may assert the
defense of equitable estoppel in an administrative
hearing in which the government seeks recoupment
of overpayment: Lentz v. McMahon ..................
E. An administrative agency may hold hearings,
1056
1059
1045
resolve complaints, and award restitutive damages
without violating the judicial powers clause, so long
as substantive and procedural limitations are
respected, McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control
B oard .................................................
F. The Tanner Act neither repeals nor preempts local
air pollution control district emissions regulations,
and assigning a local air pollution control officer to
draft a proposed list of toxins to be regulated does
not constitute an impermissible delegation of rule-
making authority: Western Oil & Gas Association v.
Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District....
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1061
1065
A. An employer may not assert the fourth or ffth
amendment as a defense to an administrative
subpoena duces tecum for records of a kind which
all employers are required by law to maintain:
Craib v. Bulmash ...................................... 1069
B. A criminal defendant's right to a jury of the
vicinage is satisfied when the jurors are selected
from any portion of the county wherein the crime
was committed, even if that portion excludes
residents of the scene of the crime: Hernandez v.
M unicipal Court ...................................... 1071
C. California Constitution, article I, section 28(d),
mandates the court to lower the prosecution's
standard of proof to "preponderance of the
evidence" when establishing whether a confession is
voluntary: People v. Markham ........................ 1074
D. Judicial districts are appropriate communities to
use when determining the constitutionality of jury
pool composition: Williams v. Superior Court ......... 1076
E. A local court rule transferring the duties of the
superior court clerk from the county clerk to a
court-appointed executive officer is valid under
Government Code section 69898; article VI, section 4
of the California Constitution gives the county clerk
no right to serve as court clerk, but instead creates
an obligation to perform only those duties not
otherwise delegated: Zumwalt v. Superior Court ...... 1078
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Section 667 of the California Penal Code is designed
to increase an existing sentence by five years for
every prior conviction of a serious felony and
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requires a formal division of the convictions,
beginning with the filing: In re Harris ............... 1082
B. In a criminal contempt action for maintaining a
public nuisance in violation of a Red Light
Abatement Law injunction, the owners and
manager of a theater offering live "adult"
entertainment were entitled to a jury trial; the trial
court's alternative order allowing sentencing under
a statute that did not require a jury was invalid,
and each day the lewd conduct occurred constituted
a single violation: Mitchell v. Superior Court ......... 1084
C. The "wanton disregard for human life" definition
of implied malice adequately informs the jury that
second degree murder requires a finding that the
defendant was subjectively aware of the life-
threatening risk created by his or her conduct:
People v. Dellinger .................................... 1090
D. The second degree felony murder doctrine is
applicable to any defendant who commits a felony
which, when considering the specific felony in its
abstract sense, is determined to be inherently
dangerous to human life because it carries with it a
high probability that its commission will result in
death: People v. Patterson ............................. 1092
IV. DEATH PENALTY-SURVEY IV
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases
imposing the death penalty. Rather than a case-by-
case approach, this section focuses on the key issues
under review by the court and identifies trends and
shifts in the court's rationale ....................... 1095
V. EVIDENCE LAW
A. The required affidavit showing "good cause"for the
discovery of peace officer personnel records
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043(b) may be
based on information and belief. City of Santa Cruz
v. M unicipal Court .................................... 1119
B. A psychologist's expert opinion based on
standardized written personality tests regarding the
good character of a criminal defendant need not
satisfy Kelly/Frye requirements for new scientific
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evidence. The opinion is admissible, and its
exclusion possibly prejudicial, if such testimony
meets traditional requirements of expert opinion:
People v. Stoll ........................................ 1124
VI. INSURANCE LAW
When an insurer breaches its duty to make a good
faith settlement attempt, expert witnesses and
attorneys retained by the insurer are not liable as
civil conspirators because the duty applies
exclusively to the insurer, not to its agents: Doctors'
Company v. Superior Court ............................ 1127
VII. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
A. A judge may be removed from office for wilful
misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute. Furthermore, the combination
of investigatory and adjudicative functions of the
Commission on Judicial Performance does not deny
due process, and any delay caused in commencing
disciplinary proceedings does not violate due
process where the judge has prior notice of the
investigation and suffers no actual prejudice:
Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance ...... 1130
B. The supreme court removed a judge for committing
acts of wilful misconduct: McCullough v. Commission
on Judicial Performance ............................... 1132
VIII. PROBATE LAW
California Probate Code section 910 impliedly
empowers courts to award probate attorneys
compensation from the estate for time spent
asserting and defending their own fee claims: In re
Estate of Trynin ...................................... 1135
IX. PROPERTY LAW
The interests of the beneficiaries of a deed of trust
are not affected by the foreclosure of a mechanic's
lien upon the trust property when notice of the suit
to foreclose is given to the trustee but not to the
beneficiaries: Monterey S.P. Partnership v. W.L.
Bangham, Inc ......................................... 1138
X. TAx LAW
A. The test for determining whether improvements are
taxable fixtures is whether, considering
"annexation, adaptation and other objective
manifestations of permanence," a reasonable person
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would find the item to be a permanent part of the
real estate, which is primarily a legal
determination requiring a de novo standard of
review: Crocker Nat'l Bank v. City & County of San
Francisco ............................................. 1140
B. A tax assessor's demand for information is subject
to prepayment judicial review prior to payment of a
tax if the assessee can show that the information
sought is "not reasonably relevant" to the proposed
tax: Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization.
................. .................................... 1143
XI. TORT LAW
Notice to public health care entities of intention to
sue triggers statutes requiring public entities to
notify claimants of claim deficiencies or to waive
all defenses as to such deficiencies: Phillips v. Desert
H ospital District ...................................... 1148
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. A court may not compel, nor does the Election Code
mandate, a county to implement a plan to deputize its
employees as registrars to stimulate minority and low-
income voter registration: Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors.
In Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors,' the court vacated a
preliminary injunction2 requiring the County of Los Angeles Board
of Supervisors (the "County") to implement an employee deputiza-
tion program to register voters.3 The court ruled, as a matter of law,
that the relief sought could not be granted.4
The supreme court rejected two theories advanced in support of
the preliminary injunction.5 The court reasoned that Election Code
sections 302(b), (e), 6 and 3047 give the County discretion to deputize
1. 49 Cal. 3d 432, 777 P.2d 610, 261 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas de-
livered the opinion of the court with Justices Panelli, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Arguel-
les concurring. Justice Broussard dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Mosk.
2. Id. at 447, 777 P.2d at 619, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 583. Courts consider two factors in
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: "(i) the likelihood that the party
seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the
balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative consequences of the issuance and non-
issuance of the injunction." Id. at 441-42, 777 P.2d at 615, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 579. See also
King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1227, 743 P.2d 889, 895, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (1987)
("The more likely it is that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be
the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue.").
3. The injunction required the County Registrar to deputize certain County em-
ployees having regular contact with "those subgroups of the community, including non
whites and low-income persons, who have lower rates of voter registration than the
white and high-income subgroups of the community." Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at
437 n.2, 777 P.2d at 612 n.2, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 576 n.2 (quoting the preliminary injunc-
tion granted by the trial court).
4. Id. at 443, 777 P.2d at 616, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The plaintiff sought both a
mandatory injunction and a writ of mandate. Id. at 442, 77 P.2d at 615, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
579. Because mandamus is the traditional remedy to use in compelling public officials
to perform their duties, and because an injunction in this case would not differ in sub-
stance from a writ of mandate, the court applied mandamus principles of review. Id.
See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 19, 43 (1969); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 3 (1978); 43
CAL. JUR. 3D Mandamus and Prohibition § 36 (1978). For a discussion on the court's
use of the principles of mandamus, see infra note 9 and accompanying text.
5. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at 443-46, 777 P.2d at 616-18, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 580-
82. The court of appeal believed that there was a strong likelihood of success on the
merits at trial based on two theories. First, Election Code sections 302 and 304, see in-
fra notes 6 and 7, if read together, mandate employee deputization provided such a
program maximized voter registration. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at 443-44, 777 P.2d
at 616-17, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81. Second, even if the Election Code did not require
the County to act, a court could compel the County to implement a program as a rem-
edy for violating the statutory scheme. Id. at 438, 777 P.2d at 612, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
6. Section 302 states in pertinent part:
(b) . . . [C]ounty clerks . . . shall deputize as registrars qualified citizens in
such a way as to reach most effectively every resident of the county .... (e)
In furtherance of the purposes of this section, the governing board of any
county . . . may authorize and assign any of its officers or employees to be-
come deputy registrars of voters ....
1050
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employees for the purpose of voter registration.8 Furthermore, even
assuming the County violated the statutory scheme, a court may not
specifically order the County to implement a deputization plan which
simply substitutes its discretion for that of the County's.9
The court's decision does not bar other legal attempts to boost mi-
nority or low-income voter registration. The County remains vulner-
able to suit should it fail to comply with the mandatory duty to
maximize registration of citizens. Io The court also left open chal-
lenges based upon equal protection guarantees."
BARRY J. REAGAN
CAL. ELEc. CODE § 302 (West 1977) (emphasis added).
7. Section 304 provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature that voter registration be maintained at the
highest possible level. The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations requir-
ing each county to design and implement programs intended to identify quali-
fied electors who are not registered voters, and to register such persons to
vote. The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations prescribing minimum re-
quirements for such programs. If the Secretary of State finds that a county
has not designed and implemented a program meeting such prescribed mini-
mum requirements, the Secretary of State shall design a program for such
county and report the violation to the Attorney General.
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 304 (West 1977) (emphasis added).
8. Construing the statutory language, the court reasoned that section 302(b) man-
dates deputization because it uses the word "shall," while section 302(e) merely per-
mits deputization because it uses the word "may." The court concluded that section
302(b) imposes a general duty to deputize "citizens" while section 302(e) imposes a spe-
cific duty to deputize a particular group of citizens, namely "employees." The court
believed that, when read together, the specificity of section 302(e) modifies section
302(b). Thus, the mandatory language in section 302(b) should not be read to override
the discretionary language in section 302(e). Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at 443-45, 777
P.2d at 616-17, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983)
("In the construction of a statute ... when a general and particular provision are in-
consistent, the latter is paramount to the former."). The court also concluded that the
court of appeal's use of section 304 was misplaced because that section imposes duties
only on the secretary of state, not on any particular county. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d
at 444, 777 P.2d at 616-17, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81.
9. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at 445-46, 777 P.2d at 617-18, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 581-
82. Mandamus may compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not a discretion-
ary one, subject to the exception that mandamus will "correct an abuse of discretion by
an official acting in an administrative capacity." Id. at 442, 777 P.2d at 615, 261 Cal.
Rptr. at 579. See 8 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 80 (3d
ed. 1985). In dissent, Justice Broussard argued that the decision to implement a plan is
administrative, and not quasi-legislative as the majority claimed. He asserted that a
court could order the County to act because the County had abused its discretion not
only in failing to implement section 302 but also, and more importantly, in failing to
implement a means of identifying unregistered voters. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at
448-49, 777 P.2d at 619-20, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
10. See supra note 6.
11. Common Cause, 49 Cal. 3d at 447, 777 P.2d at 619, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
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B. Under the Educational Employment Relations Act, an
organizational security fee paid for by a nonunion
member may not be used for any activities beyond the
organization's exclusive representational obligations;
while the service fee may be collected through
involuntary payroll deductions, the union carries the
burden of accounting for the expenditure of a dissenting
employee's service fee: Cumero v. Public Employment
Relations Bd.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd.1 a high school
teacher challenged the organizational security service fee 2 involunta-
rily deducted from each of his paychecks. The case presented the
California Supreme Court with the opportunity to study the limita-
tions of the Educational Employment Relations Act3 ("EERA") and
the manner in which the first and fourteenth amendments impact a
labor organization's expenditure of a nonunion member's service
fee.4
In Cumero, the petitioner filed an unfair practice charge5 with the
1. 49 Cal. 3d 575, 778 P.2d 174, 262 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989). Justice Kaufman wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli and Eagleson
concurred. Justice Mosk dissented separately. Justice Arguelles dissented in a sepa-
rate opinion in which Justice Broussard concurred.
2. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(i) (West Supp. 1990). This section provides:
"Organizational security" means ... (2) An arrangement that requires an em-
ployee, as a condition of continued employment, either to join the recognized
or certified employee organization, or to pay the organization a service fee in
an amount not to exceed the standard initiation fee, periodic dues, and general
assessments of the organization for the duration of the agreement, or a period
of three years from the effective date of the agreement, whichever comes
first.
IM Other provisions require public school employers to negotiate regarding service
fees with the exclusive representative of their employees. See CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1990) and CAL. GOvT. CODE § 3543.3 (West 1980). Further pro-
visions require both parties to agree before the agreement can be considered effective.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3546(a) (West 1980).
3. See GoV'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1990). This section states in part:
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the improvement of personnel
management and employer-employee relations within the public school sys-
tems in the State of California by providing a uniform basis for recognizing
the right of public school employees to join organizations of their own choice,
to be represented by the organizations in their professional and employment
relationships with public school employers, to select one employee organiza-
tion as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit,
and to afford certified employees a voice in the formulation of educational
policy.
Id.; see generally 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations §§ 52, 150 (1989).
4. Cumero, 49 Cal. 3d at 581, 778 P.2d 176, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
5. The petitioner was employed by King City Joint Union High School District
(the "District"), which was represented by the King City High School District Associa-
tion, CTA/NEA (the "Association"). The California Teachers Association ("CTA")
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Public Employment Relations Board ("PERB").6 The PERB hearing
officer decided that some of the union's activities paid for by peti-
tioner's service fee were improper and that the fee could no longer be
involuntarily deducted. The petitioner then appealed this decision to
PERB itself, claiming that the Association's use of his service fee to
pay for organizational activities with which he disagreed violated his
first amendment rights. Displeased with the outcome of this hear-
ing,7 and the ensuing outcome from the appellate court,8 the peti-
tioner appealed to the supreme court. The court reversed the court
of appeal, stating that while the EERA authorizes mandatory payroll
deductions, the EERA does not allow a union to use a nonmember's
service fee toward any activities beyond the organization's exclusive
representative obligations, and the union is the party that carries the
burden of proof regarding the manner in which the service fees are
expended. 9
and the National Education Association ("NEA") are affiliates of the association. Sub-
ject to the EERA, the District and the Association entered into a one-year collective
bargaining agreement. The agreement provided for an organizational security arrange-
ment, see supra note 2, which allowed a union service fee to be involuntarily deducted
from any nonmember teacher's paycheck. As such, the petitioner, who declined to be
a member of the union, was still required to pay the service fee to the union. The peti-
tioner brought the unfair practice charge, alleging the service fee was an EERA viola-
tion because:
it exceeded the association's cost of performing its representational obligations
to him as a nonmember, that he should not be required to contribute any
amount whatsoever to the affiliates because neither of them is the designated
employee representative, and that the district could not lawfully withhold the
fee, without his consent.
Id. at 582-83, 778 P.2d 176-77, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49. The District, the Association, and
the Association's affiliates were joined as respondents in the PERB hearings.
6. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541 (West Supp. 1990) (creating PERB and designat-
ing it an independent state agency). The court reaffirmed its holding that PERB is
specifically empowered to administer the EERA. Cumero, 49 Cal. 3d at 582, 778 P.2d
177, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citing San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Re-
lations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 856, 663 P.2d 523, 526-27, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803-04 (1983)).
7. PERB held, inter alia, that the petitioner should not be required to supple-
ment activities beyond union representation; approved the affiliates use of petitioner's
service fee; declared that the petitioner had the burden of proving improper fee use;
upheld the mandatory payroll deductions; and ruled in the petitioner's favor regarding
campaign fees. Id at 584, 778 P.2d at 178, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
8. Id at 585, 778 P.2d at 178, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The case below is Cumero v.
PERB, 204 Cal. App. 3d 87, 213 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1985). The court of appeal upheld
PERB's decision allowing the application of service fees toward lobbying, ballot pro-
positions, and any benefits provided for by the affiliates. The court reversed on the
matters regarding organization and recruitment. The court further decided that the
district could make mandatory payroll deductions and that dissatisfied employees car-
ried the burden of proving unlawfully spent service fees.
9. Cumero, 49 Cal. 3d at 581-82, 778 P.2d at 176, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 48. The court
1053
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The court began its analysis by examining the union's obligations
when functioning as the exclusive representative of King City Union
High School teachers. The union's primary duties are (1) to convene
and negotiate with the public school employerlO regarding terms and
conditions of employment, and (2) to confer with the employer re-
garding educational and curricular matters that fall within the em-
ployer's discretion." The court emphasized that the union may not
negotiate with the employer about subject matters outside the scope
of representation nor contract proposals in opposition to the Educa-
tion Code.12 The EERA's sole expressed limitation is that a non-
member's service fee may not be in excess of the union's standard
initiation fee, periodic dues, and general assessments.' 3 The court
specified that the EERA authorizes that nonunion member service
fees can be spent only for activities falling within the union's obliga-
tions as an exclusive representative, but "[t]he fact that an expendi-
ture of the union is for a purpose beyond its representational
obligations and therefore not properly chargeable to nonmember ser-
vice fees by no means precludes the expenditure altogether."14 The
court believed that clearly some of the expenditures were a rightful
use of the service fees paid voluntarily by union members.15
The purpose of the EERA provided the rationale behind the
court's decision:
EERA authorizes organizational security arrangements... to assure that non-
members pay their fair share of the labor organization's costs of "performing
the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor management issues," and the nonmembers' residual statu-
tory right not to participate entitles them to refuse payment of more than
their fair share of such expenses.16
remanded to allow the court of appeal to reconsider the teacher's application for attor-
ney fees. Id. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1990).
10. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.1(k) (West Supp. 1990). This section defines "pub-
lic school employer" or "employer" as "the governing board of a school district, a
school district, a county board of education, or a county superintendent of schools." Id
11. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3543.2, 3543.6 (West Supp. 1990). See generally 51 C.J.S.
Labor Relations §§ 212 (1989); 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations §§ 318, 341-48 (1967 & Supp.
1989).
12. Cumero, 49 Cal. 3d at 594, 778 P.2d 185, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (citing San Mateo
City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 864-66, 663 P.2d
523, 532-34, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-11 (1983)). The San Mateo court concluded that
under the EERA, the union may negotiate with the local school employer only about
conditions of employment that fall within the employer's control. In contrast, the em-
ployer may confer with the employee union about any subject, regardless of the scope
of representation. Id.; see 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 212 (1989).
13. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(i)(2) (West Supp. 1990), quoted infra note 2.
14. Cumero, 49 Cal. 3d at 589, 778 P.2d at 182, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
15. Id.
16. Id, at 588, 778 P.2d at 181, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).
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The court pointed out that any employee who wishes to abstain from
participation must affirmatively do so or else be deemed to waive any
objection.17 The court concluded that any uses permitted by the
EERA are constitutional; therefore, the petitioner's constitutional
rights had not been violated.' 8 Furthermore, the court declared that
under the EERA, enforcement of the organizational security agree-
ment was proper.19
Asserting that the EERA had expanded its definition of "employee
organization" to include persons authorized to act on the organiza-
tion's behalf, the court held that the union could permit an affiliate
to conduct its representative obligations, and an affiliate may there-
fore spend a nonmember's service fee.20 As to the burden of proof of
the expenditure, the union must provide an accounting of the non-
member's service fee in order to afford the employee with safeguards
for their constitutional rights.21
In dissent, Justice Mosk interpreted the EERA to allow the appli-
cation of service fees for a broader range of representational activi-
ties.22 He concluded that nonmember fees could be used for lobbying
and ballot proposition campaigns so long as the end result was the
improvement of employee welfare.23 Justice Arguelles also dis-
sented, and reasoned that to preclude a union from collecting non-
member's service fees for lobbying activities is an inaccurate
interpretation of the EERA.24 Rather, he believed that the EERA
does not contain service fee limitations because both members and
nonmembers are benefitted by a union's employment-related legisla-
tive lobbying.25
17. Id, at 590, 778 P.2d at 183, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (citing Teachers v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 310 (1986)) (nonmembers must be given information about union expendi-
tures, an opportunity to challenge the amount of his or her financial obligation to the
union before an impartial decision-maker, and protection in the form of an escrow of
amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending).
18. Id. at 595, 778 P.2d 186, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
19. Id, at 606, 778 P.2d at 194, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
20. Id at 604, 778 P.2d at 192, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
21. Id at 605, 778 P.2d at 193, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (citing Chicago Teachers Union,
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1985)) (union carries the burden of persua-
sion). "The nonmember's burden is simply the obligation to make his objection
known." Teachers, 475 U.S. at 306 n.16.
22. Id, at 609-10, 778 P.2d at 194-95, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
23. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
24. Id, at 610-15, 778 P.2d at 197-99, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 69-71 (Arguelles, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. at 612, 778 P.2d at 197-98, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 69-70 (Arguelles, J., dissenting).
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III. IMPACT
Cumero upholds the legislative intent of the EERA to prevent the
possibility of "free-riders," while maintaining every individual's free-
dom to decide not to join a union because of his own individual be-
liefs. To continue to allow the mandatory service fee deduction is
justified because many of the union's efforts benefit members and
nonmembers alike, to say nothing of collection expenses that would
occur were the union not allowed to take an involuntarily deduction.
The court has left unresolved the potential conflict that future dissat-
isfied nonmember employees will argue arises from the general con-
cept of "within scope of employment." This term is clearly very
broad, thereby permitting a scope of union activities beyond that
-which is strictly for employee welfare. More exact statutory guide-
lines could prevent future litigation in regard to this issue.
CALIFORNIA SURVEY STAFF
C. The Agricultural Labor Relations Board may reopen a
case and consider vacating its order in a case that is not
yet final when there has been an intervening change in
the controlling rules of law: George Arakelian Farms v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Board.
In George Arakelian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1
(Arakelian H), the California Supreme Court2 held that finality for
purposes of appellate review of interlocutory orders decided pursuant
to section 1160.8 of the Labor Code3 is not the same as finality for
1. 49 Cal. 3d 1279, 783 P.2d 749, 265 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1989) [hereinafter Arakelian
I/]. On remand, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board [hereinafter the Board] de-
nied an employer's motion to reopen George Arakelian Farms v. A.L.R.B., 40 Cal. 3d
654, 710 P.2d 288, 221 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1985) [hereinafter Arakelian 1], where the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had previously affirmed the Board order imposing make-whole re-
lief, a compensatory remedy that places employees in the same position that they
would have been in had there not been a bad faith delay in the collective bargaining
process, against the employer due to his "technical" refusal to bargain with the em-
ployee's labor union. In Arakelian II, the employer sought to have the case reopened
in light of Dal Porto v. A.L.R.B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 237 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1987), which
dealt with an employer's failure to reach a contract with the employees' union in the
context of surface bargaining. In Dal Porto, the court of appeals annulled the Board's
order and remanded the case.
2. Justice Mosk authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Panelli and Eagleson concurred. A separate concurring opinion was written
by Justice Kennard, in which Justice Broussard concurred. A dissenting opinion was
written by Justice Agliano, the presiding justice for the Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District.
3. Section 1160.8 of the Labor Code states in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the
court of appeal having jurisdiction over the county wherein the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in.... The court shall
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purposes of res judicata.4 Therefore, the court concluded that the
Board could consider vacating a previous order, that is not final, if
there has been a change in the controlling rule of law.5 However, the
court further held that decisions which apply to surface bargaining
cases6 are not controlling when applied to cases involving a "techni-
cal"7 refusal to bargain.8
In reaching its decision, the court focused on the Board's bifurcated
process for analyzing unfair labor claims, a process which has both a
liability and compliance phase.9 The court determined that the
make-whole order was interlocutory in nature since it established lia-
bility, but the determination as to the amount of liability was post-
poned xo Based upon this foundation, the court then held that its
previous decision in Arakelian 1,11 which affirmed the Board's make-
whole order, was merely an affirmation of an interlocutory order af-
ter the liability phase. Thus, the plaintiff in Arakelian II was not
precluded by res judicata12 from introducing intervening changes in
the controlling rule of law before the compliance phase of the case
have jurisdiction to grant to the board such temporary relief or restraining or-
der it deems just and proper and in like manner to make and enter a decree
enforcing, modifying... or setting aside in whole or in part, the order of the
board.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West 1989). See generally Comment, A Proposal for a Single
Uniform Substantial Evidence Rule in Review of Administrative Decisions, 12 PAC.
L.J. 41 (1980).
4. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1290-91, 783 P.2d at 756, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
5. Id.
6. The employer or union practices "surface bargaining" when it only goes
through the motions of collective bargaining without a real intent to enter into a bind-
ing agreement. See Bertuccio v. A.L.R.B., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1369, 1378, 249 Cal. Rptr.
473, 476-77 (1988).
7. Under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act [hereinafter the Act], an em-
ployer who wants judicial review of union certification can do so only by altogether
refusing to deal with the union. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-52 (West 1989).
8. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1292, 783 P.2d at 757, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
9. Id, at 1289, 783 P.2d at 754-55, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68. In the liability phase of
the procedure, the Board determines whether the employer has violated the Act. Id
In the compliance phase, the Board reviews recommendations of the regional director
to determine the employer's responsibility for back pay damages. Id During this
phase the employer may offer evidence to mitigate damages. Id (citing George Arake-
lian Farms, Inc., 8 A.L.R.B. No. 32 p. 2, n.2 (1982)).
10. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1289, 783 P.2d at 755, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 168. See also
Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Bd., 159 F.2d 952, 954 (1947).
11. Arakelian I, 40 Cal. 3d 654, 710 P.2d 288, 221 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1985).
12. Under the "issue preclusion" effect of res judicata, "when an issue of fact or
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the deter-
mination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
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was completed.i3
However, the court went on to state that agencies are not free to
act inconsistently with court orders and, absent unusual circum-
stances, the decisions of reviewing courts are binding upon such agen-
cies in all further proceedings.14
The court also stated that this holding applies only to situations in
which the controlling rules of law have changed and that not all
changes in the law can act as rationalizations for agencies to disre-
gard the established law in the case. 15 Regarding the case at hand,
the court carefully read Dal Portol6 and determined that it should
not be applied to cases involving a "technical" refusal to bargain be-
cause surface bargaining cases are distinguished17 and require differ-
ent procedures for evaluating the employer's inappropriate conduct
than "technical" refusal cases.'S The court then lauded the Board's
refusal to accept Dal Porto as controlling, when "technical" bargain-
ing violations are considered, and upheld the Board's order which de-
nied Arakelian's motion for reconsideration. 19
The court was correct in characterizing the make-whole order as
interlocutory in nature. As a result, the Board may now set aside an
order if there has been a change in the controlling rule or law with-
out going through another court proceeding. At the same time, the
court has allowed the litigant an opportunity to benefit from a
change in the controlling law before his case is finally decided.
The problem, however, arises in the procedure by which the Board
decides cases. By bifurcating the proceeding, a skillful attorney or li-
tigious party is given ample opportunity to appeal every step of the
13. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1289-90, 783 P.2d at 755-56, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69
(1989). The court also stated that "finality for purposes of appellate review is not the
same as finality for purposes of res judicata." Id. at 1290, 783 P.2d at 756, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 169. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment b (1982) (the
fact that a lower court order may be reviewable by interlocutory appeal does not mean
that the order is final for purposes of res judicata).
14. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1291, 783 P.2d at 756, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The
court stated that "[i]t is inherent in our system of judicial review of agency adjudica-
tion that once a court has passed on a question of law in its review of agency action,
the agency cannot act inconsistently with the court's orders." Id. (citing American
Farm Lines v. Black Ball, 397 U.S. 532, 541 (1970)).
15. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1292-93, 783 P.2d at 757, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
16. Dal Porto v. A.L.R.B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 237 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1987).
17. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d at 1292-93, 783 P.2d at 757, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 170. For
example, in surface bargaining cases, the employer can present evidence of actual ne-
gotiations to show that the collective bargaining would have been futile despite the
employer's wrongful conduct. On the other hand, in "technical" refusal cases, any evi-
dence that the parties would have not entered into an agreement would be speculative
since no collective bargaining took place. Id.
18. See generally 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor § 222 (1978 & Supp. 1989); 48A AM. JUR.
2D Labor and Labor Relations § 1739 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
19. Arakelian II, 49 Cal. 3d 1279, 1293-94, 783 P.2d 749, 757-58, 265 Cal. Rptr. 162,
170-71 (1989).
1058
[Vol. 17: 1045, 1990] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
proceeding several times before a final decision is made. Nowhere is
this more clear than in Arakelian II, a case which has already under-
gone thirteen years of litigation. A possible alternative might be for
the Board to combine the liability and compliance phases into one
proceeding, thereby giving the litigant one chance to appeal the
Board's decision.
DANIEL RHODES
D. The recipient of welfare benefits may assert the defense
of equitable estoppel in an administrative hearing in
which the government seeks recoupment of overpayment:
Lentz v. McMahon.
In Lentz v. McMahon,1 the California Supreme Court unanimously
held that the defense of equitable estoppel may be asserted by a wel-
fare recipient at Department of Social Services ("DSS") hearings.2
The court determined that the defense is available in judicial pro-
ceedings if the circumstances of overpayment meet the four general
requirements of equitable estoppel3 and pass the "application of es-
toppel to government" test set out in City of Long Beach v. Mansell.4
1. 49 Cal. 3d 393, 777 P.2d 83, 261 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas wrote
the unanimous opinion for the court.
2. IdA. at 407, 777 P.2d at 91, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 318. In Lentz, three recipients of
welfare benefits were notified that they had received excess payments. At the hear-
ings, the judge applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel barring the county welfare
department from collecting the overpayment. Prior to 1983, estoppel was generally
imposed to alleviate the harsh results caused by collecting overpayments when such
overpayments were caused by agency error. In 1983, the director of the DSS changed
the policy by stating that "equitable remedies are not appropriate in administrative
hearing decisions." Id, at 397, 777 P.2d at 84, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 311. The director of DSS
changed the decisions of the hearing judge to conform with the new policy. The trial
court held in favor of the welfare recipients, but the court of appeal reversed, holding
that the application of equitable estoppel would violate the "separation of powers"
clause of CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 and the "reservation of judicial powers to the courts"
clause of CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1. Id, at 397-98, 777 P.2d at 85, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
3. Lentz, 49 Cal. 3d at 399, 777 P.2d at 85, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
(1) [T]he party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must in-
tend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party assert-
ing the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party
must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the con-
duct to this injury.
Id, (quoting City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 489, 476 P.2d 423, 442, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 42 (1970)).
4. Id. at 400, 777 P.2d at 86, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 313. In Mansell, the court adopted a
balancing approach to determine the appropriateness of applying equitable estoppel to
actions involving the government. Manse4 3 Cal. 3d at 496-97, 476 P.2d at 449, 91 Cal.
Rptr. at 49. The court will apply estoppel if "the injustice which would result from a
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After determining that estoppel may be appropriately raised against
welfare agencies, 5 the court decided that the defense is also available
during the administrative hearing as opposed to preclusion of the de-
fense prior to resolution at a judicial proceeding. 6 In reaching this
conclusion, the court determined that neither the state constitution
nor the applicable statutes precluded the use of equitable remedies in
administrative hearings.7
In determining that, under certain circumstances, equitable estop-
pel is an appropriate defense against a welfare agency,8 the court
looked to previous decisions in which equitable estoppel was applied
in a variety of contexts to the government, 9 and to the reasoning of
the court of appeal in Canfield v. Prod.'0 Relying on its decision in
Woods v. Superior Court" as well as an analysis of the statutory
scheme of the welfare system,12 the Supreme Court held that a claim
failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public
interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel." Id. For further
discussion of the application of equitable estoppel against the government, see 28 AM.
JUR. 2D Estoppel & Waiver § 133 (1966); 30 CAL. JUR. 3D Estoppel & Waiver § 5 (1987);
Annotation, Application of Doctrine of Estoppel Against Government and its Govern.
mental Agencies, 1 A.L.R. 2D 338 (1948).
5. Lentz,49 Cal. 3d at 401-02, 777 P.2d at 87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
6. Id. at 404, 777 P.2d at 89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
7. Id. at 407, 777 P.2d at 91, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
8. Id. at 401-02, 777 P.2d at 87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Equitable estoppel is appro-
priately asserted against a welfare agency when "a government agent has negligently
or intentionally caused a claimant to fail to comply with a procedural precondition to
eligibility, and the failure to invoke estoppel would cause great hardship to the claim-
ant." Id. (emphasis in original). The court specifically left open the question of sub-
stantive preconditions to eligibility. Id. at 402, 777 P.2d at 87-88, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 314-
15.
9. Id. at 399, 777 P.2d at 86, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (footnote omitted). See Mansell,
3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (doctrine of estoppel applied to city and
state); Lerner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 380 P.2d 97, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1963) (doctrine of estoppel applied to board of education); Farrell v. County of Placer,
23 Cal. 2d 624, 145 P.2d 570 (1944) (doctrine of estoppel applied to county).
10. 67 Cal. App. 3d 722, 137 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1977). Prior to Lentz, the court of appeal
was the highest California court to address the issue of estoppel in the context of pub-
lic assistance. The supreme court adopted the Canfield reasoning for three reasons:
Welfare benefits are intended to provide for basic necessities. A confidential relation-
ship exists between the welfare workers and the welfare recipients. Justifiable reli-
ance by the recipient on a representation of the welfare worker could cause
"compelling hardship." Lentz, 49 Cal. 3d at 400-01, 777 P.2d at 87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
Addressing the policy issue, the court found that applying estoppel against a welfare
agency's assertion that the recipient failed to meet procedural preconditions for eligi-
bility, when such failure was caused by agency error, would not undermine any "un-
derlying statutory policy of safeguarding accurate and orderly administration of the
welfare system." Ld. at 401, 777 P.2d at 87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
11. 28 Cal. 3d 668, 620 P.2d 1032, 170 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1981). In Woods, the court
held that an applicant's challenge to the validity of certain regulations at the DDS
hearings furthered the twin goals of avoiding both delay as well as unnecessary ex-
penses of judicial proceeding. Id. at 680-81, 620 P.2d at 1038-39, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
12. Lentz, 49 Cal. 3d at 402-04, 777 P.2d at 88-89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16 (analyzing
scattered sections within CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10950-11000 (West 1980 & Supp.
1990)).
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of equitable estoppel may be considered at the DSS hearings.' 3
DSS argued that application of equitable estoppel constituted "judi-
cial power" within the meaning of article VI, section 1 and article III,
section 3 of the California Constitution,' 4 and that such power was
reserved to the courts, not to legislatively created administrative
agencies.' 5 The court rejected this contention because it not only ig-
nored the development of administrative law, it also contradicted ap-
plicable case law.' 6
By allowing a welfare recipient to assert equitable estoppel during
a DSS hearing, the court advances two important goals. Addressing
the estoppel issue at the hearing furthers the statutory mandate of a
speedy and informal hearing process.17 This practice in turn pro-
motes judicial economy because it may in fact end the hearing.
JOHN M. BOWERS
E. An administrative agency may hold hearings, resolve
complaints, and award restitutive damages without
violating the judicial powers clause, so long as substantive
and procedural limitations are respected: McHugh v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1939, the California Supreme Court, in Jersey Maid Milk Prod-
ucts Co. v. Brock,' held that the power of an administrative agency to
hear and resolve disputes, and to award damages, violated the judicial
powers clause of the California Constitution.2 Forty years later, the
13. 1& at 404, 777 P.2d at 89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
14. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 1 states in pertinent part: "The judicial power of this
state is vested in the Supreme court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal
courts, and justice courts." CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 states: "The powers of state gov-
ernment are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of
one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
Constitution."
15. Lentz, 49 Cal. 3d at 405, 777 P.2d at 89-90, Cal. Rptr. at 316-17.
16. Id, at 405, 777 P.2d at 90, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 317. See Pittsburgh Unified School
Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence, 146 Cal. App. 3d 964, 194 Cal. Rptr.
672 (1983); Crumpler v. Board of Admin., 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 108 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1973).
17. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10952, 10955.
1. 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
2. Id. at 651-52, 659, 91 P.2d at 594-98. The court ruled against the constitutional-
ity of the Milk Stabilization Act, which permitted the Director of Agriculture to set
minimum prices for milk, to hear and resolve disputes, and to award damages. For the
relevant text of the judicial powers clause see infra note 8.
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City of Santa Monica passed the Santa Monica Rent Control Charter
Amendment (Charter Amendment). 3 This initiative gave the Santa
Monica Rent Control Board (the Board) the authority to set rent
controls, adjudicate complaints, and order relief.4 Recently, in Mc-
Hugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board,5 a landlord-plaintiff re-
lied on Jersey Maid Milk as authority to contend that the Board's
remedial powers violated the judicial powers clause of the California
Constitution.6 The supreme court declined to follow Jersey Maid
Milk,7 holding instead that article VI, section 1, of the California
Constitution s generally permits an agency such as the Board to hear
and resolve disputes and award restitutive damages.9 However, the
court did hold that the Board's power to award treble damages10 and
to authorize the withholding of future rent payments" violated the
3. McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal. 3d 348, 353-54, 777 P.2d 91,
93-94, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320-21 (1989) (setting out relevant provisions of the Charter
Amendment).
4. Id. For general constitutional requirements of rent control ordinances, see 42
CAL. JUR. 3D, Landlord and Tenant, § 141 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
5. 49 Cal. 3d 348, 777 P.2d 91, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Arguelles con-
curred. Justice Panelli authored a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Eagle-
son concurred. Justice Broussard filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
6. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 358, 777 P.2d at 96, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
7. The court justified its decision by noting the cursory treatment the issue re-
ceived from the Jersey Maid Milk court, and reasoned that strict adherence to the
fifty-year-old decision would place California behind in the treatment given to admin-
istrative agencies by other states. Id. at 358, 777 P.2d at 96-97, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24.
8. The judicial powers clause currently provides that: "The judicial power of this
State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal
courts, and justice courts. All ... courts are courts of record." CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 1.
9. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 375, 777 P.2d at 108-09, 361 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36. The
Board found that one tenant had been overcharged in the amount of $816.00 and that
the other tenant was overcharged by $470.50. Id. at 354, 777 P.2d at 94, 261 Cal. Rptr.
at 321. See also McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1238, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 308-09 (1986), which upheld the power of the Director of the Bureau of Mar-
keting Enforcement to condition the suspension of a processor's license upon payment
of restitution.
10. The Charter Amendment provided in pertinent part:
A landlord who [violates the rent control regulation] shall be liable... to the
tenant... for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court,
plus damages in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) or three (3) times
the amount by which the payment... received or retained exceeds the maxi-
mum lawful rent, whichever is the greater.
McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal. 3d 348, 353, 777 P.2d 91, 93, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 318, 320 (1989). This subdivision has since been amended to allow for treble dam-
ages only in a court action, while a penalty is allowed only in an administrative pro-
ceeding. See id. at 354 n.2, 777 P.2d at 93 n.2, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 320 n.2.
11. The Charter Amendment stated: "In lieu of filing a civil action as provided...
the Board shall establish by rule and regulation a hearing procedure [to determine
claimed violations of the regulatory system.] After said determination, the tenant may
deduct the penalty from future rent payments in the manner provided by the Board."
McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 354, 777 P.2d at 93, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
In McHugh, the Board had authorized one of the tenants to withhold rent and ruled
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judicial powers clause.12
II. TREATMENT
To comply with the judicial powers clause, the supreme court, in
McHugh, set forth both substantive and procedural limitations that
an administrative agency exercising remedial powers must respect.' 3
The substantive limitation requires that the powers be "reasonably
necessary to effectuate the administrative agency's primary, legiti-
mate regulatory purposes."14 To this end, the remedial power must
be authorized by legislation or statute and be incidental to the
agency's regulatory purpose.' 5 The procedural limitation requires
that the enforcement scheme respect the "principle of check."'16
That is, "the 'essential' judicial power [must remain] ultimately in
the courts, through review of agency determinations."7 The court
also believed that so long as the substantive limitations required by
the judicial powers clause are met, the remedial powers of an admin-
istrative agency would not violate the constitutional right to a trial by
that the decision would be a defense to an unlawful detainer action by a landlord. The
court held that this violated the "principle of check" by giving power to the tenant to
withhold rent before the court could issue a stay of the Board's order. Id. at 376-77,
777 P.2d at 109-110, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37. See also infra note 16.
12. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 386, 777 P.2d at 116, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
13. Id. at 371-75, 777 P.2d at 106-08, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 333-35.
14. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 372, 777 P.2d at 107, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (emphasis in
original). See also County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp.,
270 Md. 403, 440-43, 312 A.2d 225, 245-46 (1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H.
492, 494-96, 179 A. 344, 345-47 (1935); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION 97 (1965).
15. McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal. 3d 348, 374, 777 P.2d 91,
108, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318, 335 (1989). The Board's regulatory purpose is to ensure en-
forcement of rent levels. Id, Accoiding to the court, the award of treble damages vio-
lated this substantive limitation. Id. at 378, 777 P.2d at 111, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338. It
reasoned that "the power to award treble damages .. .poses a risk of producing arbi-
trary, disproportionate results that magnify, beyond acceptable risks, the possibility of
arbitrariness inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication." Id. at 379, 777
P.2d at 111, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338. Thus, although treble damages would certainly en-
courage compliance with the rent regulations, the court felt that such a power should
be reserved for the judiciary as is now the case. See supra note 10.
16. MCHUGH, 49 Cal. 3d at 362-63, 777 P.2d at 99, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 326. See also 1
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09 at 68-69 (1958). See generally Bixby v.
Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 142-43, 481 P.2d 242, 250-51, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242-43 (1971);
Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 840, 123 P.2d 457, 463 (1942); Drum-
mey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 84-85, 87 P.2d 848, 853-54 (1939);
Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REV. 261,
270-75 (1935).
17. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 32, 777 P.2d at 106, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (emphasis in
original).
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In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Panelli emphasized that
the issue of whether an award of general compensatory damages
would violate the judicial powers clause was not decided.19 He stated,
however, that general compensatory damages would trigger the right
to a jury trial because of the substantial private interest in remunera-
tion involved.20
Justice Broussard agreed with the majority's limitations on an ad-
ministrative agency's power to adjudicate matters.21 Contrary to the
majority, however, he maintained that these limitations should per-
mit the Board to award treble damages because judicial review would
resolve the majority's concern that treble damages present a high
risk of arbitrariness. 22 He also argued that an agency such as the
Board could authorize immediate withholding of rent prior to judicial
review, because immediate withholding of rent is no different than
orders by other administrative agencies which call for immediate
compliance.23
III. CONCLUSION
In McHugh, the court set forth both substantive and procedural
limitations on an administrative agency's power to adjudicate, while
holding that an agency may constitutionally award restitutive, but
not treble, damages. The issue of whether an agency may order pen-
alties or small punitive damages was not considered, but the court did
note that both of these types of damages have been upheld in other
states and in the federal courts.24 By discarding Jersey Maid Milk,
the court in McHugh began to clarify the extent to which administra-
tive agencies may expand their adjudicative powers.
Although far from a total abdication of control, the court relaxed
the strictures governing the constitutional limits of administrative
power. While this is indeed in line with both state and federal princi-
ples concerning such power, Justice Panelli's concerns over the
breadth of the McHugh holding are noteworthy. Whether the court
will uphold broader agency attempts to adjudicate compensatory or
18. Id, at 379-80, 777 P.2d at 111-12, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
19. Id, at 386-87, 777 P.2d at 117, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (Panelli, J., concurring).
20. McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal. 3d 348, 387, 777 P.2d 91,
117-18, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318, 344-45 (1989) (Panelli, J., concurring).
21. 1I at 388, 777 P.2d at 118, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
22. Id. at 390, 777 P.2d at 119, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting). See also supra note 15.
23. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 391-92, 777 P.2d at 120-21, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
24. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 378 nn.45-46, 777 P.2d at 110-11 nn.45-46, 261 Cal. Rptr.
at 337-38 nn.45-46.
1064
[Vol. 17: 1045, 1990] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
punitive claims remains to be seen. State administrative agencies are
likely to extend their power to constitutional limits, resulting in ex-
panded adjudicatory roles. Therefore, though the court departed
from its New Deal-era precedent of Jersey Maid Milk, should admin-
istrative agencies attempt to flex broad adjudicative muscle, the court
can rein in this power.
BARRY J. REAGAN
F. The Tanner Act neither repeals nor preempts local air
pollution control district emissions regulations, and
assigning a local air pollution control officer to draft a
proposed list of toxins to be regulated does not constitute
an impermissible delegation of rule-making authority:
Western Oil & Gas Association v. Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control District.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution
Control Dist.,' the California Supreme Court considered a petroleum
industry charge 2 that the Tanner Act,3 codified as Health and Safety
Code sections 39650-39674,4 had either repealed or preempted an air
pollution control district (APCD) local rule5 regulating stationary
source air pollution.6 The plaintiff also argued that the APCD had
1. 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1989).
2. The plaintiff, a petroleum industry trade association, changed its name during
this litigation from Western Oil & Gas Association to Western States Petroleum Asso-
ciation. Id, at 411 n.1, 777 P.2d at 158 n.1, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.1.
3. 1983 Cal. Stat. 1047.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39650-39674 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1990).
The statutes direct several state agencies to collaborate in a complex procedure for
identifying and regulating toxic air contaminants. See i& Local air pollution control
districts are specifically given the power to establish standards higher than the state
minimums set pursuant to these statutes. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 414, 777 P.2d at
160, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39666(d) (Deering
1986).
5. MONTEREY BAY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DiSTRiCr Rule 1000 (1986).
This rule places a number of pollution restrictions on new or modified nonvehicular
pollution sources. The regulations take effect upon application for a construction or
operation permit. The district adopted its air pollution control officer's list of more
than 148 carcinogens or other toxins, all of which the state considered to be hazardous
work-place substances. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 415, 777 P.2d at 160-61, 261 Cal. Rptr.
at 387-88 (construing MONTEREY BAY VERIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT
Rule 1000).
6. After enactment of the local rule, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandate and
declaratory relief in the superior court. After both parties moved for summary judg-
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impermissibly delegated its rule-making power to the pollution con-
trol officer who drafted the list of controlled emissions.7 Because the
majority of nonvehicular air pollution restrictions are written and en-
forced by APCD's, the defendant's position would have led to a vir-
tual elimination of such controls in California.8 The supreme court
ruled that the Tanner Act did not preclude local air pollution con-
trols, and declared that APCD's could identify and regulate pollu-
tants which were not state-designated toxins under the Act.9 The
court also concluded that the APCD had not improperly given rule-
making authority to its pollution control officer.0
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
In Western Oil, the court asserted that APCD's had been charged
with regulating air pollution since the passage of California's first
broad pollution control act in 1947.11 The plaintiff contended that
the Tanner Act repealed authority by implication.' 2 The court
stressed a strong presumption against implied repeal, particularly
when the original law benefits the public and has been widely under-
stood and followed.13 Implied repeal requires a showing of "no possi-
ment, the court found for the defendant APCD and upheld the local rule. Based upon
the plaintiff's preemption argument, the appellate court reversed, although it did ac-
knowledge the APCD's power to control any toxins recognized by the state under the
Tanner Act. The APCD appealed to the supreme court, which granted review. Id. at
416-17, 777 P.2d at, 161-62, 261 Cal. Rptr. at, 388-89.
7. Id. at 412, 777 P.2d at 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
8. Id.; see also Manaster, Administrative Adjudication of Air Pollution Disputes:
The Work of Air Pollution Control District Hearing Boards in California, 17 U.C. DA-
vis L. REV. 1117 (1984); Comment, Stationary Source Air Pollution Control in Califor-
nia: A Proposed Jurisdictional Reorganization, 26 UCLA L. REV. 893, 900 (1979);
Simmons & Cutting, A Many Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular Air Pollution Control
Law in California, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 109, 125 (1974). See generally 39A C.J.S. Health &
Environment §§ 125-128, 130, 133-145 (1976 & Supp. 1989); 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pollution
Control §§ 52, 55-81 (1981 & Supp. 1989); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Pollution & Conservation
Laws §§ 14-65 (1979 & Supp. 1989); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Real
Property, §§ 71-73 (9th ed. 1987); 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Consti-
tutional Law § 880 (9th ed. 1988).
9. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 426, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
10. Id. at 429, 777 P.2d at 170, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
11. Id. at 417-19, 777 P.2d at 162-63, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90. See 1947 Cal. Stat. 632.
See also Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Air Resources Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 502, 520-21, 691 P.2d
606, 617, 208 Cal. Rptr. 850, 861 (1984) (discussion of long history of local pollution con-
trol); Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 945,
948, 484 P.2d 1361, 1363, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17, 19 (1971) (APCD is "the agency charged with
enforcing both statewide and district emission controls.").
12. Western Oil at 417 & n.13, 777 P.2d at 162 & n.13, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389 & n.13.
13. Id. at 419, 777 P.2d at 163, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 390. This presumption is clear in
California case law. See, e.g., Flores v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 11 Cal.
3d 171, 176, 520 P.2d 1033, 1036, 113 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1974); Penziner v. West Am.
Fin. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 176, 74 P.2d 252, 260 (1937). See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 286-
293 (1953 & Supp. 1989); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 392-417 (1974 & Supp. 1989); 58
CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §§ 62-66 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
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bility of concurrent operation" of the laws, and "undebatable
evidence" of legislative intent to repeal the prior act.14 The court
found no impediment to concurrent operation as long as APCD rules
were not less stringent than state standards.15 Furthermore, the
court's reading of the Tanner Act found a legislative intent to retain,
rather than eliminate local controls. An avowed purpose of the Act
is to "create a program... which complements existing authority."'16
Rapid action to reduce pollution, another of the Act's goals, would be
defeated by dismantling the extensive network of local controls
pending enactment of state regulations.17 The court, therefore, found
no implied repeal. is
The court then turned to the plaintiff's alternative argument that
the Tanner Act preempted local pollution control prior to state iden-
tification and regulation of toxins. 19 As the Act does not expressly
preempt local rules, the court reiterated three tests for implied pre-
emption: (1) the subject has been completely covered by state law
and is clearly a matter for exclusive state control; (2) the subject has
been partially covered by state law in terms that clearly indicate a
paramount state concern that bars additional local action; or (3) the
subject has been partially covered by state law, and the local ordi-
nance places a burden on transient citizens that outweighs any bene-
fit to the locality. 20 The court emphasized that implied preemption is
not easily demonstrated, particularly in light of the "long tradition of
local regulation" to protect public health and safety.2 1 In response to
the plaintiff's claim that state law completely covered the subject
matter, the court acknowledged the Tanner Act's comprehensive
14. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 420, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting
Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 772, 784, 603 P.2d 19, 24, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107 (1979)) (em-
phasis omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 39650(i)(Deering 1986)).
17. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at, 164-65, 261 Cal. Rptr. at, 391-92.
18. Id. at 419-22, 777 P.2d at 163-66, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 390-93. The Act's objective of
using "the best available scientific evidence" does not mandate the elimination of ex-
isting standards prior to achieving this goal. Id. at 422, 771 P.2d at 165, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
392 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39650(d) (Deering 1986)).
19. Id. at 423, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393. Statutes on the same topic
should be harmonized, if possible. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366 (1953 & Supp. 1989); 45
CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 200 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
20. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 423, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 485, 683 P.2d 1150,
1155-56, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902-03 (1984).
21. Id., at 424, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting People ex rel.
Deukmejian, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 484, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902).
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scope. 22 However, in rejecting the preemption claim, the court stated
that the Act was intended to create a "safe minimum level of protec-
tion throughout the state" as quickly as possible.23 Because the Act
contained no provisions for interim regulation during its lengthy pro-
cess of investigating and identifying toxins, the court concluded that
the legislature intended APCD rules to protect the public before, as
well as after, state identification of toxins.24
Finally, the plaintiff accused the APCD of improperly delegating
its rule-making authority to the pollution control officer who had
compiled the local rule's list of toxins.25 The court ruled against this
charge, explaining that the officer had merely helped prepare a pro-
posed rule that was later adopted by the APCD.26 Even if the compi-
lation of the list by the officer had been improper, the APCD
adopted and ratified his acts when the rule was enacted.2 7
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, the court found no repeal or preemption of APCD au-
thority by the Tanner Act, and no improper delegation of the
APCD's rule-making powers. The court upheld the local rule, as
well as the APCD's authority to identify and regulate nonvehicular
air pollution.28
The court's unanimous decision to uphold the local rule reflects
22. Id, at 423, 777 P.2d at, 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at, 393 (1989).
23. I& at 424, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court observed that the
agency charged with administering the Tanner Act, the state Air Resources Board, had
repeatedly asserted that the Act neither repealed nor preempted local controls. The
court also noted that the agency's construction of its principal statute should be given
great deference. Id. at 425, 777 P.2d at 167, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (quoting Western Oil
& Gas Ass'n v. Air Resources Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 502, 520, 691 P.2d 606, 617, 208 Cal. Rptr.
850, 861 (1984)). See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 168 (1974 & Supp. 1989).
24. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 424, 777 P.2d at 166-67, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94. See
Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233, 273 P.2d 5, 9 (1954) (a statute should
not be interpreted to reach an absurd result); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387, 743 P.2d 1323, 1326-27, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1987)
(consider the resulting consequences when interpreting a statute). See also 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 145-160 (1974 & Supp. 1989); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 83 (1980).
25. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 427, 777 P.2d at 168-69, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
26. Id. at 427, 777 P.2d at 169, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 396. The plaintiff accused the pol-
lution control officer of rule-making without public notice. The court dismissed this
theory by pointing out that the list had been attached when the local rule was pro-
posed, and thus had been subject to review when the rule was enacted. Id
27. Id. at 427-28, 777 P.2d at, 169-70, 261 Cal. Rptr. at, 396-97 (1989). See California
School Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Comm'n, 3 Cal. 3d 139, 145, 474 P.2d 436, 439, 89
Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (1970) ("an agency's subsequent approval or ratification of an act
delegated to a subordinate validates the act, which becomes the act of the agency it-
self"). The court did not decide the plaintiff's contention that any future additions by
the officer to the list of toxins would be improper, finding it a premature challenge to
a situation that might never arise. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 428, 777 P.2d at 169-70,
261 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.28. Id. at 429, 777 P.2d at 170, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
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the seriousness of the public health risk created by air pollution. 29
Although the legislature intended the Tanner Act to address this
peril, its procedures are so cumbersome that the state identified only
nine airborne toxins during the six-year period between the Act's
passage and the resolution of this case.3 0 The local rule challenged in
Western Oil listed 139 additional carcinogens or toxins.31 Clearly, an
elimination of APCD regulations statewide would not have advanced
the Tanner Act's goal of reduced emissions. By supporting local pol-
lution regulation, the court voted against changing air quality from
bad to worse.
ROBERT J. MILLS
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. An employer may not assert the fourth or fifth
amendment as a defense to an administrative subpoena
duces tecum for records of a kind which all employers
are required by law to maintain: Craib v. Bulmash.
In Craib v. Bulmash,' the California Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that a subpoena issued by the California Labor Commission
(the "Commission") does not constitute an unreasonable search or
seizure and that the standard of "probable cause" required for crimi-
nal subpoenas is inapplicable. 2 However, by a narrow 4-3 vote,3 the
29. See id. at 426 & n.17, 777 P.2d at 168 & n.17, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395 & n.17. See
generally Slawson, The Right To Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 672
(1986).
30. Western Oil, 49 Cal. 3d at 414, 777 P.2d at 160, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court
pointed to inorganic arsenic as an example of the state program's slow pace: After four
years of work, the state was still unable to identify the substance as a toxin. Id.
31. Id. at 415, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See supra note 5.
1. 49 Cal. 3d 475, 777 P.2d 1120, 261 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1989). Bulmash was served
with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to appear before the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement ("the Division") and to produce time and wage records as well
as names and addresses for all persons employed by a trust for which he was the
trustee. Bulmash failed to appear and the Division sought enforcement of the sub-
poena in superior court. Bulmash contended that the subpoena constituted an unrea-
sonable search and seizure because it was not based on probable cause. The trial court
disagreed and ordered Bulmash to appear. The court of appeal reversed the order stat-
ing that "because 'criminal' sanctions could be imposed for certain wage and hour vio-
lations, the subpoena was a 'search' for criminal 'evidence' which must meet the
standards applicable to search warrants." Id. at 480, 777 P.2d at 1123, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
689.
2. Id, at 485 n.12, 777 P.2d at 1127 n.12, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 693 n.12. See generally
Annotation, The Supreme Court and Administrative Subpoenas, 78 L. Ed. 2d 940
(1985); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Application of Fourth Amendment
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court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
records statutorily required to be kept and maintained by an
employer.4
In deciding the fourth amendment issue, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling,5 which set forth a test to determine the "reasona-
bleness" of an administrative subpoena.6  Under that test
administrative subpoena is reasonable if: (1) the investigation is for a
"lawfully authorized purpose"; (2) the documents sought are relevant
to the investigation; and (3) the documents are reasonably specified
in the subpoena.7 After concluding that the Commission's subpoena
met the requirements of the Oklahoma Press Publishing test, the
California Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does not
protect an employer from an administrative subpoena for the produc-
tion of records lawfully required to be kept and maintained for the
purpose of agency inspection.8
In deciding the fifth amendment issue, the court began its analysis
by noting a line of United States Supreme Court decisions, beginning
with Shapiro v. United States,9 which created the "required records
doctrine."o This doctrine states that the privilege against self-in-
crimination cannot be asserted with respect to records kept pursuant
to law." The doctrine was limited in Marchetti v. United States,12
Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures to Compulsory Production of
Documents, 48 L. Ed. 2d 884 (1977 & Supp. 1989).
3. Justice Eagleson authored the opinion of the court, with Chief Justice Lucas,
and Justices Panelli and Kennard concurring. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in the fourth amendment issue and dissenting on the fifth amendment is-
sue, with Justice Broussard concurring. Justice Kaufman also wrote a separate opin-
ion following the reasoning of Justice Mosk.
4. Craib, 49 Cal. 3d at 490, 777 P.2d at 1130, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Although fed-
eral constitutional law does not protect the contents of documents or the act of produc-
ing those documents under the fifth amendment, the dissenters believed that
California's counterpart, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15, provides greater protection against
self-incrimination and thus, "allows [an individual] to refuse to answer any question or
to produce any material which may reveal potentially incriminating information."
Craib, 49 Cal. 3d at 492, 777 P.2d at 1132, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The dissent also stated
that the traditional way to allow the government to compel production of the records,
consistent with the California Constitution, is to protect the individual by offering use
immunity for the act of production and the contents of the documents. Id.; see Anno-
tation, Supreme Court's Views as to Application of Fifth Amendment Privileges
Against Self-Incrimination to Compulsory Production of Documents, 48 L. Ed. 2d 852
(1977 & Supp. 1989); see also 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence § 477 (1976).
5. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
6. Craib, 49 Cal. 3d at 483, 777 P.2d at 1125, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
7. Id. at 482, 777 P.2d at 1124, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (citing Oklahoma Press Pub-
lishing, 327 U.S. at 209).
8. Id. at 485, 777 P.2d at 1127, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
9. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
10. Craib, 49 Cal. 3d at 487, 777 P.2d at 1128, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
11. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 33.
12. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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where the Court applied a two-prong test to determine whether the
requirement to keep records may be considered compulsion with re-
spect to self-incrimination.13 The Court concluded that a require-
ment for keeping and maintaining records is not compelled self-
incrimination if: (1) it is imposed in an "essentially noncriminal and
regulatory area of inquiry"; and (2) it is not directed at a "selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities."14 In Craib, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that, because the statutory require-
ment directing employers to keep records was an "'appropriate'
subject of a lawful regulatory scheme" and because the statute ap-
plies to all employers who are not inherently suspect of criminal ac-
tivities, the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to a
subpoena for documents required by law to be kept and maintained.15
The court's treatment of the reasonableness of an administrative
subpoena comes as no surprise. Of significant interest, however, is
the court's interpretation of the self-incrimination clause contained
in the California Constitution.16 Traditionally, self-incrimination
under this clause has been afforded greater protection than under its
federal counterpart.17 Whether this practice continues to hold true
appears open to debate.
JOHN M. BOWERS
B. A criminal defendant's right to a jury of the vicinage is
satisfied when the jurors are selected from any portion of
the county wherein the crime was committed, even if that
portion excludes residents of the scene of the crime:
Hernandez v. Municipal Court
The California Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Munici-
pal Court' expressly overruled the sixteen-year precedent of People
13. Id, at 60-61.
14. 1& at 57; see also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (plurality opinion held
that a statute requiring a driver involved in an accident to stop and identify was not
compelled self-incrimination).
15. Craib v. Bulmash, 49 Cal. 3d 475, 489-90, 777 P.2d 1120, 1130, 261 Cal. Rptr. 686,
696; see also Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487
U.S. 99 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
17. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (use immunity provision of a state
statute overturned).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 713, 781 P.2d 547, 263 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1989). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion in which the Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Eagleson, Kaufman
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v. Jones2 which required that jury panels selected in criminal cases
include residents of the superior court judicial district encompassing
the location of the crime.3 The court in Hernandez announced a new
vicinage 4 rule, holding that juries may be drawn from anywhere in
the county in which the crime was committed.5
Defendant Hernandez was convicted by a jury panel summoned
and Arguelles (retired, but assigned to this case by the Judicial Council Chairperson)
concurred. Justices Mosk and Broussard wrote dissenting opinions.
2. 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973). The defendant in Jones
asserted that his sixth amendment right to a jury trial (made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment) included the right to be tried by a jury selected
from residents of the state-drawn district wherein the crime was committed. Id. at
549, 551, 510 P.2d at 707, 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347, 349. Although the court seemed to
mandate that all jurors be drawn from that district, it adhered to the principle that if
the jury were selected from a larger area, such as the county, such selection would not
violate the defendant's constitutional vicinage right provided the selection process did
not systematically exclude residents of the district wherein the crime was committed.
Id. at 551, 553-54, 510 P.2d at 709-11, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349-51.
3. 49 Cal. 3d at 729, 781 P.2d at 557, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing)(explaining Jones, 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351).
4. The concept of vicinage is distinct from the representative cross-section guar-
antee which ensures that jurors will not be systematically excluded on the basis of
race, religion or other association. Id. at 716, 781 P.2d at 548, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 514 n.1.
Rather than such a demographic requirement, vicinage is a geographic requirement
based on the common law right to a jury drawn from the vicinity or neighborhood
wherein the crime occurred. I.; 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 25 (1969); see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1405 (5th ed. 1979). This common law right has been constitutionally pre-
served, but significantly altered, in the wording of the sixth amendment which states
in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law .
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Hernandez, 49 Cal. 3d at 729, 781 P.2d at 557, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 523. The issue
in Hernandez centers around the interpretation of the word "district." The court in
Jones interpreted "district" as necessarily including the location of the crime's commis-
sion. 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The court in Zicarelli v.
Gray, 543 F.2d 466 (1976), and other federal and state courts have interpreted "district"
broadly as the federal judicial district, which in some cases encompasses an entire
state. Id. at 482. The California Supreme Court concluded in Hernandez that "dis-
trict" means "county," including any portion thereof. 49 Cal. 3d at 719, 781 P.2d at 550,
263 Cal. Rptr. at 516; see also 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury § 46 (1978 & Supp. 1989) (Vicinage
is "the county designated by law as the place of trial;" it is a right belonging to both
the defendant and the community). The court reasoned that such a rule better con-
formed to the historical notions of vicinage and decisions made by other state and fed-
eral courts. Id. at 719, 781 P.2d at 550, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
The trial court denied defendant's vicinage motion. The court of appeal reversed,
holding that the defendant's vicinage right had been violated because the statute ex-
cluded from jury selection residents surrounding the area of the crime. Id. at 718, 781
P.2d at 550, 263 Ca. Rptr. at 516.
In sustaining the conviction, the supreme court unnecessarily limited the defend-
ant's vicinage right. The court could simply have stated that a criminal defendant's
vicinage right is not violated when the jurors are selected from within the judicial dis-
trict of the crime even if the selection process excludes residents surrounding the
scene of the crime. Instead, the court expanded the prosecution's freedom to prosecute
the defendant in almost any district within the county. See id. at 731, 781 P.2d at 558,
263 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (Broussard, J., dissenting); see also infra note 9.
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from the superior court judicial district encompassing the scene of
the crime, but no resident was summoned from the exact "location"
or "census tract area" in which the crime occurred.6 The court found
no violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury of the
vicinage 7 by such a jury composition.8 Although the holding in Jones
is consistent with this ruling (since the Hernandez jury came from
the superior court judicial district surrounding the scene of the
crime), the supreme court in Hernandez nonetheless overruled Jones
in finding against the defendant. 9 The court reasoned that the vici-
nage requirement in Jones had been too narrowly construed for three
reasons: (1) jurors are no longer allowed to have personal knowledge
of the case;' 0 (2) they are not required to travel great distances; and
(3) a narrow construction unjustifiably restrains the "orderly admin-
istration of justice.""
6. Hernandez, 49 Cal. 3d at 722, 781 P.2d at 552, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 518. For addi-
tional facts of the case, see supra note 5.
7. U.S. CONST. amend VI; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-96 (1970); see supra
note 4. A right to a jury of the vicinage is implicit in the California Constitution as
well. See People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481 (1891); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 429 (9th ed. 1988).
8. 49 Cal. 3d at 719, 781 P.2d at 550, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
9. Such a broad holding may not have been necessary in view of the facts. The
defendant's case had been transferred from the municipal courthouse closest to the
scene of the crime to a branch courthouse within the same superior court judicial dis-
trict because of repeated continuances probably due to a backlog in the first court-
house. Id. at 717, 781 P.2d at 549, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 515. The San Fernando municipal
court district, from which the Hernandez jurors were drawn, overlapped the Los An-
geles municipal court district, the court in which Hernandez was originally filed.
Hernandez argued that residents at the actual location of the crime should have the
opportunity to serve as jurors in his case; however, a statute then in effect but now
repealed prohibited the court from requiring prospective jurors to travel more than 20
miles from their residences, thereby excluding that possibility. Id. at 717-18, 781 P.2d
at 549-50, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16. Hernandez contended that because the statute ex-
cluded the location of the crime from the permissible scope of the vicinage, he was de-
nied his constitutional right to a fair trial pursuant to the sixth amendment.
In contrast, Jones was convicted by a jury drawn from a superior court judicial dis-
trict other than the one in which he committed the crime. Defendant Hernandez, on
the other hand, was convicted by a jury composed of residents of the Los Angeles su-
perior court judicial district, a superior court district which encompassed the scene of
the crime. Id. Thus, the supreme court could have applied the Jones rule without
finding a violation of the sixth amendment since all jurors in Hernandez were drawn
from the superior court district encompassing the scene of the crime. Nevertheless,
the court unnecessarily used the facts of Hernandez to overrule Jones and create a
new vicinage law.
10. At common law, jurors were drawn from the neighborhood of the crime be-
cause jurors were expected to have firsthand knowledge of the facts of the crime. F.
HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT 95 (1951).
11. Hernandez, 49 Cal. 3d at 722-24, 781 P.2d at 552-53, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
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Thus the supreme court broadened prosecutorial powers by limit-
ing the criminal' defendant's vicinage right. The ruling may permit a
defendant who commits a crime in one superior court district to be
tried by a jury composed entirely of residents of another superior
court district within Los Angeles County even if the two districts
have drastically different racial compositions. 12
DAWN M. SOLHEIM
C. California Constitution, article I, section 28(d), mandates
the court to lower the prosecution's standard of proof to
"preponderance of the evidence" when establishing
whether a conkfession is voluntary: People v. Markham.
In People v. Markham,' the California Supreme Court announced
that the state must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that
a waiver of Miranda 2 rights or any subsequent confession or admis-
sion was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.3 The court reasoned
that Proposition 8,4 when adopted in 1982, abrogated its prior judi-
cially created standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."5
12. Id. at 730-31, 781 P.2d at 558-59, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 524-25 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 63, 775 P.2d, 1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989). Justice Eagleson deliv-
ered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kaufman,
and Kennard concurred. Both Justice Mosk and Justice Broussard filed separate con-
curring opinions.
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278. The defend-
ant was convicted of robbing a drug store. At the time of his arrest and subsequent
interrogation, it appeared that the defendant was under the influence of a depressant
drug. Nevertheless, the police informed him of his Miranda rights, which he waived.
He later confessed to committing the robbery. The defendant argued that because he
was under the influence of a drug, his waiver was involuntary, and the state should
have the burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that his waiver was voluntary.
Id. at 66-67 & n.3, 775 P.2 at 1043-44 & n.3, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 274-76 & n.3.
4. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The court called this the "truth-in-evidence
law." Id. at 65, 775 P.2d at 1043, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 274. This provision, added to the
California Constitution by Proposition 8 in 1982, states:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter en-
acted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature,
relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including
pretrial and postconviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of
a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence re-
lating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782, or 1103.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional
right of the press.
Id.
5. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 775 P.2d at 1046-47, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78. See
People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P. 2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978). The issue in
Jimenez was one of first impression for the court. Notwithstanding knowledge that the
United States Supreme Court embraced the lower standard of preponderance of the
evidence, the court still pronounced the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
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By relying upon two of its earlier decisions interpreting Proposi-
tion 8,6 the supreme court held that the provisions added to the state
constitution abrogate any judicially created remedy that has the ef-
fect of excluding relevant evidence otherwise admissible under the
federal Constitution.7 Thus, because the higher standard of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" results in the exclusion of relevant evidence that
would otherwise be admissible under the lower federal standard of
"preponderance of the evidence", Proposition 8 overturned the
court's previous, stricter rule.8
The Markham holding lowers the standard of proof necessary to
determine the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. Addition-
ally, the court reaffirmed the mandate of Proposition 8 that, absent
express statutory authority, California courts may only exclude rele-
vant evidence that would be excluded by the United States Constitu-
tion.9 If California is ever to retrieve its expanded exclusionary
rules, it must either wait for a rethinking by the United States
Supreme Court, or else wait for two-thirds of the Legislators from
for California. Id. at 608, 580 P.2d at 679, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179 ("we are convinced that
a rule requiring the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a
reasonable doubt reflects sound judicial policy .... ).
6. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985); Peo-
ple v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988).
7. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278. The court in
Lance W. examined California's "vicarious exclusionary rule," which provided for the
exclusion of all evidence seized in violation of state or federal Constitutions even if a
third party's rights were violated. The court held that Proposition 8 abrogated this
rule because the federal Constitution requires that one must have "standing" to invoke
the exclusionary rule, while California had no such requirement. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d
at 881-87, 694 P.2d at 748-752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 636-39. The court in May ruled that
Proposition 8 abrogated People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1976), because that decision did not permit statements obtained in violation of Mi-
randa to be used for impeachment, even though admissible for such a purpose under
federal law. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 318-20, 748 P.2d at 312-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. See
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Mi-
randa may be used for impeachment purposes). See generally Gorman, Proposition 8
Comes of Age: An Introduction, 13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1985); Comment, Proposition 8.
California Law After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
1059 (1985); Comment, Disbrow Confronts Proposition 8: Will Miranda Violative
Statements be Admitted to Trial for Impeachment? 17 PAC. L.J. 1337 (1986).
8. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278. See Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a state-
ment by a "preponderance of the evidence"); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168
(1986) (affirming Lego).
9. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 69-71, 775 P.2d at 1046-47, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78.
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both houseslo to create stricter exclusionary rules-"1
BARRY J. REAGAN
D. Judicial districts are appropriate communities to use
when determining the constitutionality of jury pool
composition: Williams v. Superior Court.
Williams v. Superior Court' involved an appeal to quash venire in
a murder trial held in a Los Angeles County judicial district, wherein
the percentage of blacks was significantly less than in the county as a
whole. The defendant contended that the proportion of black indi-
viduals on jury panels in the judicial district was "unconstitutionally
underrepresentative" of the racial makeup of the county as a whole.2
The supreme court held that the judicial district is an appropriate
community for analysis of a constitutional cross-section representa-
tion in criminal juries.3
The right to a jury composed of a representative cross-section of
the community is established under the Constitutions of both the
United States4 and California.5 According to the court, this right is
10. See supra note 4.
11. Justice Broussard noted that he concurred under compulsion of May, discussed
supra at note 7. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 268
(Broussard, J., concurring). Justice Mosk conceded that Proposition 8 mandated the
new standard, but he expressed concern over the abridgement of individual rights. Id.
at 71-73, 775 P.2d at 1047-49, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278-80 (Mosk, J., concurring).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 736, 781 P.2d 537, 263 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1989). Justice Panelli authored
the opinion of the court, and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Eagleson,
Kaufman, and Arguelles. Justice Broussard concurred and dissented separately, joined
in principle by Justice Mosk. Justice Kaufman wrote separately to rebut the views ex-
pressed in dissent by Justice Broussard.
2. 1d. at 739, 781 P.2d at 538, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 504. The defendant, a black man,
was accused of murdering a white man in the West Superior Court District of Los An-
geles County; trial was scheduled in Santa Monica Superior Court. It was presumed
that 5.6% of the West Superior Court District was comprised of eligible black jurors,
while the county as a whole presumptively contained 11.4% eligible black jurors. Id.
The defendant sought to transfer the case to either the Central or South Central Dis-
trict, both of which had higher percentages of presumptively eligible black jurors. The
motions were denied by the trial court on the basis that jury selection procedures were
"fair and reasonable." Id. at 740, 781 P.2d at 538-39, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. The ap-
pellate court denied the defendant's petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandate on
the grounds that the defendant had not made a prima facie showing of systematic un-
derrepresentation, and further held that the community against which to test for un-
derrepresentation was determined by a 20-mile radius from the appropriate
courthouse. Id at 740, 781 P.2d at 539, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
3. Id at 739, 781 P.2d at 538, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
4. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (sixth amendment guarantees
jury drawn from representative cross-section of community); see also 41 CAL. JUR. 3D
Jury § 50 (1978) ("[Ihe Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution guarantee a criminal defendant in a state trial the right to be tried by an im-
partial jury comprising a representative cross section of, and selected from residents
of, the judicial district where the crime was committed.").
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fulfilled as long as the jury pool is drawn by random selection from
an entire community.6 The test for discriminatory selection, there-
fore, requires comparison to "the community. ' 7 The court recognized
that in the federal system juries may be drawn from subdivisions of
federal districts despite the fact that these subdivisions do not con-
form to the demography of the district as a whole.8 In O'Hare v. Su-
perior Court,9 the California Supreme Court previously held that the
jury need not be drawn from, nor be representative of, the entire
county.O Instead, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) the scene
of the crime must be included in the community;" and (2) no mem-
ber of the local community may be arbitrarily or unnecessarily ex-
cluded.12 The supreme court in Williams refined O'Hare, and held
that judicial districts in the county where the crime occurred were
adequate communities for determining the constitutionality of jury
pool selection.' 3 The court examined the historical pattern of judicial
district development and concluded that the legislature intended to
create just such a definition of "community."'4
This was a sensitive and difficult decision for the court as it recog-
nized both "the practical problems posed by a far-flung megapolis"'5
and the "balkanized" nature of Los Angeles County.' 6 Justice Brous-
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 272, 583 P.2d 748,
757-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 899-900 (1978).
6. Williams v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 736, 741, 781 P.2d 537, 539, 263 Cal. Rptr.
503, 505 (1989) (citing Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 258, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890).
This does not require that the jury pool mirror demographics or even include the de-
fendant's own group. Id.
7. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). In Duren, the United States
Supreme Court held in part, that "to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show . . . that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community . I..." d. The defendant also must
show he is a member of a "distinctive" group that is underrepresented due to "system-
atic exclusion." Id.
8. Williams, 49 Cal. 3d at 743, 781 P.2d at 541, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (citing United
States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Gottfried, 165
F.2d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1948), cert denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948)).
9. 43 Cal. 3d 86, 729 P.2d 766, 233 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1987).
10. Id. at 101, 729 P.2d at 775, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
11. Id.; see also 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury § 46 (1978). At common law, there were two
views to determine the appropriate vicinage from which a jury was to be drawn: (1)
the site of the crime, and (2) the place of the trial. Id.
12. O'Hare, 43 Cal. 3d at 101, 729 P.2d at 775, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
13. Williams, 49 Cal. 3d 736, 746, 781 P.2d 537, 543, 263 Cal. Rptr. 503, 509 (1989).
14. Id. at 744-45, 781 P.2d at 541-42, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08.
15. Id. at 742, 781 P.2d at 540, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
16. Id. at 743, 781 P.2d at 541, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Balkanization makes county-
wide statistical data deceptive. Id.
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sard, in a particularly sharp dissent, accused the majority of lacking
an awareness of the practical impact on jury venires in this and other
recent cases addressing representative juries.17 Justice Kaufman re-
sented Justice Broussard's personal attack on the majority's motives
and, instead, indicated that the court was striving to achieve a worka-
ble practice of jury selection wholly devoid of preference to any de-
finable group.18 There is truth to Justice Kaufman's statement that
"justice is not achieved by rules and procedures which sound perfect
in theory but are unworkable in practice."19 The difficulty remains,
however, that racism, while neither admired nor encouraged, may yet
be practiced, and it is this possibility against which the court must
fashion its decisions.
CALIFORNIA SURVEY STAFF
E. A local court rule transferring the duties of the superior
court clerk from the county clerk to a court-appointed
executive officer is valid under Government Code section
69898; article VI, section 4 of the California Constitution
gives the county clerk no right to serve as court clerk, but
instead creates an obligation to perform only those duties
not otherwise delegated: Zumwalt v. Superior Court.
In Zumwalt v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court set-
tled a "turf war" 2 between San Diego County's superior court and
the petitioner county clerk over control of the superior court clerk's
duties.3 The petitioner attacked a local superior court rule that
transfers the court clerk's duties from the county clerk to a court-ap-
pointed executive officer pursuant to Government Code section
17. 1d at 750-52, 781 P.2d at 545-47, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 511-13 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
18. I& at 747-48, 781 P.2d at 543-44, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring).
19. Id at 747, 781 P.2d at 543, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 167, 776 P.2d 247, 260 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1989). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Eagleson, with a concurring opinion by Justice Kaufman. Jus-
tice Mask wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Justice Broussard
joined.
2. This description was used by the court of appeal below in Zumwalt v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 821, 826, 244 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (1988), aff'd, 49 Cal. 3d at 180,
776 P.2d at 255, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (1989).
3. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 170-71, 776 P.2d at 248-49, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47. In
May 1987, the San Diego Superior Court adopted a local rule under which several
court-related duties and court employees were placed under control of a court execu-
tive officer. The county clerk, from whom the duties and employees were transferred,
sought a writ of mandate to prevent the changes and rescind the rule. The county
clerk alleged that the rule impermissibly infringed upon his duties. The court of ap-
peal summarily denied the petition. The state supreme court reviewed the petition
and instructed the court of appeal to issue an alternative writ. When the petition was
again denied, the supreme court granted review. Id
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69898. 4 The supreme court held: (1) California Constitution article
VI, section 45 does not create a separate court clerk's office with in-
herent rights or powers,6 and (2) as ex officio clerk of the superior
court, the county clerk is given the obligation to perform only statu-
tory court-related functions which the legislature has not otherwise
delegated. 7 Because all duties of the court clerk are statutory, and
can therefore be changed by subsequent legislation, the court found
that Government Code section 69898 validly authorizes a superior
court to transfer any or all court duties to an executive officer.8
In Zumwalt, the petitioner claimed that the state constitution as-
signed both the office and the "core" duties of the court clerk to the
clerk of the county.9  Because constitutional provisions are
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69898 (Deering 1989). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Any superior court may appoint an executive officer who shall hold office
at the pleasure of the court and shall exercise such administrative powers and
perform such other duties as may be required of him by the court.... (c) In
every superior court having an executive or administrative officer appointed
under the provisions of this section... that officer has the authority of a clerk
of the superior court.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
6. Zumwalt v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 167, 180, 776 P.2d 247, 255, 260 Cal. Rptr.
545, 553 (1989).
7. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 179-80, 776 P.2d at 254-55, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. See
also 2 A.L.R. DIGEST Clerks of Court § 8 (1985); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Clerks of Court §§ 21-
27 (1976); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 4 (1965 & Supp. 1989); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts § 51
(1983); 45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 265 (1978 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts § 285 (3d ed. 1985).
8. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 179-80, 776 P. 2d at 254-55, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
9. Id at 176-77, 776 P. 2d at 252-53, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51. The petitioner
claimed his "core" duties were: "receiving all filings; indexing the court files; maintain-
ing the records of the court; attending all court sessions and making a record of the
proceedings in the court minutes; and keeping the seal of the court." Id. Only the last
duty was addressed at length by the court. The opinion pointed out that the California
Constitution does not require courts to have a seal, therefore it was impossible that the
same constitution could mandate that the county clerk keep such a seal. The peti-
tioner also insisted that judgments must be authenticated by the county clerk to re-
ceive full faith and credit from other jurisdictions. The court disagreed, finding that
the county clerk's authorization would be an acceptable, although not exclusive means,
to satisfy the requirements of other jurisdictions. States may adopt their own stan-
dards for establishing authenticity of documents. Id. at 177-78, 776 P.2d at 253, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 551 (citing Price v. Price, 4 Ohio App. 3d 217, 447 N.E.2d 769 (1982); Murphy v.
Murphy, 581 P.2d 489 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Medical Adm'rs, Inc. v. Koger Properties,
Inc., 668 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)). See also 16 CAL. JuR. 3D Courts § 6 (1983 &
Supp. 1989); 40 CAL. JUR. 3d Judgments § 316 (1978 & Supp. 1989). Whether or not a
document authenticated by the court's executive officer will satisfy the Federal Rules
of Evidence's admissibility requirements was not a question before the court. Zum-
walt, 49 Cal. 3d at 179, 776 P.2d at 254, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
1079
"mandatory and prohibitory,"'1o the petitioner argued that any trans-
fer of those duties would be unconstitutional." After examining
state constitutional history, the court concluded that while the consti-
tution does establish the county clerk as ex officio clerk of the supe-
rior court, the duties of the court clerk have always been assigned by
statute.12 Thus, the court reasoned, because the legislature defines
these duties, it may also change or transfer them without violating
the constitution. Government Code section 69898 authorizes such
transfers, allowing the superior court of each county to appoint an
executive officer who will have "the authority of a clerk of the supe-
rior court."13 The local rule in Zumwalt gave the executive officer
the duties of the court clerk and other administrative positions
closely related to courtroom operation.' 4 The court announced that
section 69898 allows the complete transfer of a court clerk's duties,' 5
and therefore that the local rule was a proper exercise of power
granted by the legislature to the court.16 The supreme court disap-
proved cases which suggest that a total transfer of duties would lead
to a "destruction of the office" of court clerk.17 The court concluded
10. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 26. See also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 29-37
(1989).
11. Zumwalt v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 167, 176-77, 776 P.2d 247, 252-53, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 550-51 (1989).
12. Id, at 177, 776 P.2d at 253, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
13. Id. at 170 n.1, 776 P.2d at 248 n.1, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.1 (quoting CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 69898). See supra note 4.
14. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 170, 776 P.2d at 248, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 546. The peti-
tioner stated that 15 work classifications encompassing 121 employees would be
transferred.
15. Id at 179-80, 776 P.2d at 254-55, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. Justice Mosk's con-
curring and dissenting opinion addressed this issue. Justice Mosk felt that the local
rule was acceptable because it allowed the county clerk to retain several court related
functions. These tasks include maintaining indices of the parties in actions; issuing
process, notices, and summons; and accepting papers for filing. Id. at 184, 776 P.2d at
258, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). However, Justice
Mosk disagreed that all court clerk duties could be transferred to an executive officer.
He believed that treating the ex officio court clerk clause as a "default provision"
would violate the court's duty to give meaning to article VI, section 4, of the constitu-
tion. Id. at 182, 776 P.2d at 256-57, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (citing ITT World Communica-
tions, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 3d 859, 867, 693 P.2d 811, 817, 210
Cal. Rptr. 226, 232 (1985)). Based on a technical reading of Government Code section
69898, Justice Mosk argued that the code does not allow all court clerk duties to be
transferred: the statute states that a superior court may determine "which" of the
court clerk's duties will be transferred, instead of "any" or "all" of them. Zumwalt, 49
Cal. 3d at 183-84, 776 P.2d at 257-58, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69898(d)). Therefore, Justice Mosk would find
that the constitution creates a superior court clerk's office that may be diminished but
not destroyed. Id
16. Zumwalt v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 167, 179-80, 776 P.2d 247, 254-55, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 552-53 (1989).
17. Id. at 180 n.16, 776 P.2d at 255 n.16, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 553 n.16. Price v. Superior
Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 156, 230 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1986) and St. John v. Superior Court, 87
Cal. App. 3d 30, 150 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1978) were disapproved to the extent that they pro-
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that the constitution makes the county clerk available for the legisla-
ture to use as needed for court clerk duties without creating a sepa-
rate office with any inherent rights or powers. The title "ex officio
clerk of the superior court" confers only obligations; the county clerk
must only perform those statutory court-related duties which are not
otherwise delegated to an executive officer.18
The San Diego superior court local rule places all courtroom duties
and staff under the control of judges by means of their authority over
the court-appointed executive officer. This should serve the twin
goals of judicial economy and speedy administration of justice. It will
make day-to-day courtroom operation easier for the superior court by
permitting judges to choose compatible clerks and to adjust court-
room administrative procedures. The courts are likely to run more
smoothly if political skirmishes between the judges and the county
clerk are avoided. Several other counties have adopted similar rules
and submitted amicus briefs in support of the executive officer sys-
tem.19 However, whether conflict will arise in San Diego between
the respective bureaucracies of the county clerk and executive officer
remains to be seen. If significant conflict arises, it may offset any im-
provement in efficiency otherwise gained from the new system. To
those counties where county clerks still execute all duties of the su-
perior court clerk, Zumwalt sends a clear message: the county clerk
can either win the support of the bench or lose its court-related
powers.
ROBERT J. MILLS
hibited a complete transfer of the court clerk's duties from the office of the county
clerk.
18. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 179-80, 776 P.2d at 254-55, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Kaufman agreed with the majority, but went further to say
that there are no constitutional barriers preventing elimination of the county clerk's
office. The only remaining state constitutional reference to the county clerk is as ex
officio court clerk. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4; see also CAL. CONST. art XI, § 5 (1970 revi-
sion deleted mention of the county clerk's office). The concurrence argued that this
judicial reference alone should not force counties to maintain a clerk's office. There-
fore, Justice Kaufman would say that if there is a county clerk, and if the legislature
has assigned court-related duties to the county clerk or court clerk, and if any such
duties have not been delegated to an executive officer, then the county clerk would be
obligated to perform them. Zumwalt, 49 Cal. 3d at 180-81, 776 P.2d at 255, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 553 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 178 n.13, 776 P.2d at 254 n.13, 260 Cal. Rptr at 552 n.13. Fresno, Imperial,
Lassen, Madera, Mendocino, Orange, Riverside, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, and Solano
counties have adopted similar local rules in the interest of courtroom efficiency. The
court emphasized that its decision was based on constitutional construction rather than
upon the efficacy of local rules.
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III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Section 667 of the California Penal Code is designed to
increase an existing sentence by five years for every
prior conviction of a serious felony and requires a
formal division of the convictions, beginning with the
filing: In re Harris.
Section 667 of the California Penal Code adds five consecutive
years to a defendant's sentence for each prior conviction of a serious
felony.1 Section 667 is applicable only when the convictions are based
on "charges brought and tried separately." 2 In re Harris3 addressed
the question of whether two prior convictions arising out of a single
complaint were "brought" separately. 4 The court answered in the
negative, reasoning that the prior convictions must be entirely sepa-
rate from the date of filing through the final adjudication.5
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1990). This section provides:
HABITUAL CRIMINALS; ENHANCEMENT OF SENTENCE; AMENDMENT OF SECTION
(a) In compliance with subdivision (b) of Section 1385, any person convicted
of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in
this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes
all of the elements of a serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sen-
tence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement
for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The
terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively.
(b) This section shall not be applied when the punishment imposed under
other provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment. There
is no requirement of prior incarceration or committment for this section to ap-
ply.
(c) The Legislature may increase the length of the enhancement of sentence
provided in this section by a statute passed by a majority vote of each house
thereof.
(d) As used in this section "serious felony" means a serious felony listed in
subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.
(e) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to a person convicted of selling, furnish-
ing, administering or giving, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to
a minor any methamphetamine-related drug or any precursors of
methamphetamine unless the prior conviction was for a serious felony de-
scribed in subparagraph (24) of subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.
(f) The provisions of this section shall not be amended by the Legislature
except by statute passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal,
two-thirds of the membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes effec-
tive only when approved by the electors.
Id.
2. Id.
3. 49 Cal. 3d 131, 775 P.2d 1057, 260 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1989). Justice Mosk authored
the unanimous opinion of the court.
4. At trial, the defendant was convicted of both attempted robbery and robbery.
The trial court added ten years to the defendant's sentence, through application of sec-
tion 667, because he admittedly had two prior felony convictions. The trial judge held
that the two prior convictions were "brought" separately because each guilty plea
arose from a separate information. The appellate court affirmed. The defendant peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus upon finding that the two prior convictions stemmed
from a single complaint and preliminary hearing in municipal court. I& at 133-34, 775
P.2d at 1058-59, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
5. Id, at 136, 775 P.2d at 1060, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
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In its decision, the court analyzed the statutory phrase "charges
brought and tried separately" by looking to similar language set forth
in former Penal Code section 644.6 Section 644 was interpreted as ap-
plicable only when completely separate proceedings leading to dis-
tinctly different convictions could be identified.7 Because section 667
was based upon the prior section 644, the court presumed that section
667 would carry the same meaning.8 Ultimately, no evidence was
presented to rebut this presumption.9 The court granted the defend-
ant's writ of habeas corpus,lo holding that his two prior convictions
were not "brought" in separate proceedings and, therefore, the de-
fendant should have been subject to only one five-year enhancement,
not two."
Section 667 has the potential of adding many blocks of years to a
recidivist defendant's sentence.' 2 As the number of prior felony con-
victions increase, the number of sentence enhancements confronting
criminal defendants will increase accordingly. In re Harris held that
the separation of prior convictions begins at the filing stage and must
remain formally distinct throughout the entire adjudication.
BARRY J. REAGAN
6. Act approved Apr. 26, 1950, ch. 28, § 1, 1950 Cal. Stat. 470, repealed by Act ap-
proved Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, § 261.5, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5061, 5136, states in pertinent
part:
(a) Every person convicted in this State of [specified crimes] .... who shall
have been previously twice convicted upon charges separately brought and
tried, and who shall have served separate terms therefor in any state prison
and/or federal penal institution either in this State or elsewhere, of [specified
crimes] .... shall be adjudged a [sic] habitual criminal and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for life....
Harris, 49 Cal. 3d at 135 n.4, 775 P.2d at 1059 n.4, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 290 n.4 (emphasis
added).
7. Id. at 135, 775 P.2d at 1059-60, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91; see People v. Ebner, 64
Cal. 2d 297, 411 P.2d 578, 49 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1966) (defendant admitted two previous,
separate convictions).
8. Harris, 49 Cal. 3d at 135-36, 775 P.2d at 1059-60, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 137, 775 P.2d at 1061, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
11. Id.
12. For a discussion of habitual criminal statutes, see generally 39 Am. JUR. 2d Ha-
bitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders §§ 1-32 (1968); 22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal
Law § 1025T (Supp. 1985); 4 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Punishment
§ 631 (12th ed. 1976).
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B. In a criminal contempt action for maintaining a public
nuisance in violation of a Red Light Abatement Law
injunction, the owners and manager of a theater offering
live "adult" entertainment were entitled to a jury trial;
the trial court's alternative order allowing sentencing
under a statute that did not require a jury was invalid,
and each day the lewd conduct occurred constituted a
single violation: Mitchell v. Superior Court.
In Mitchell v. Superior Court,' the owners and manager of a thea-
ter featuring live sex shows appealed a contempt judgment for violat-
ing an injunction against lewd conduct on their premises.2 The
injunction was issued pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Law
(RLAL), codified as sections 11225-11235 of the Penal Code.3 The pe-
1. 49 Cal. 3d 1230, 783 P.2d 731, 265 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1989), rehg denied (1990).
Justice Eagleson wrote the plurality opinion joined by Justices Broussard and Kauf-
man. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurrence, and Chief Justice Lucas and Justice
Panelli each wrote separate concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Kennard did
not participate in the case.
2. Petitioners James and Artie Mitchell owned a San Francisco theater that fea-
tured adult films and live sex performances. Petitioner Vincent Stanich was the thea-
ter manager. In 1981, the business was declared a public nuisance and an injunction
was issued to prevent future lewd conduct on the premises. Id at 1237-38, 783 P.2d at
734-35, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48. In 1982, the petitioners were charged with multiple
violations of the injunction:
The conduct complained of can be put into two categories: off-stage conduct,
where performers permitted (if not encouraged) patrons to fondle genitals,
breasts and buttocks, to engage in digital intercourse and oral copulation in
return for tips; and secondly, on-stage conduct, where performers mastur-
bated, inserted dildos in their vaginas, and engaged in oral copulation with
other performers.
Id. at 1238, 783 P.2d at 735, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (quoting Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. 772328 (1982)). The superior court found the petitioners in contempt for 62
separate violations of the injunction. All three petitioners were given jail sentences of
six months. Additionally, the petitioner-owners were each fined $62,000 and the peti-
tioner-manager was assessed a $6,200 fine. Id. at 1238-39, 783 P.2d at 735-36, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 148-49.
The case was originally decided on appeal by the state supreme court on January 2,
1987, during the final week of the so-called "Rose Bird Court". Mitchell v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal. 3d 107, 729 P.2d 212, 232 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1987), vacated by 49 Cal. 3d 1230,
783 P.2d 731, 265 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1989) (the principal case), reh'g denied (1990). See 43
Cal. 3d iii (1987) (documenting the change in the membership of the court). The new
"Lucas court" promptly vacated that decision. Ironically, the supreme court's outcome
on rehearing three years later was nearly identical to the earlier decision. See Hager,
Sex-Show Sentences Disallowed, L.A. Times, Dec. 29, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 5 (discussion
of history of the case); California Supreme Court Survey, Constitutional Law: Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1021 (1987) (analysis of the Bird court's deci-
sion on the case).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11225-11235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The RLAL, origi-
nally enacted in 1913, is intended to abate nuisances such as buildings in which illegal
gambling, prostitution, or lewdness is permitted. Id. See 1913 Cal. Stat. 10; see also 18
CAL. JUR. 3D (Rev.) Criminal Law §§ 1701-1718 (1984 & Supp. 1989). Regarding in-
junctions, see generally 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contempt §§ 25, 43, 44 (1974 & Supp. 1989); 38
CAL. JUR. 3D Injunctions § 96 (1977 & Supp. 1989).
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titioners contended that they were unconstitutionally denied a jury
at their contempt hearing.4 They also attacked the trial court's alter-
native order, which directed that the petitioners be sentenced for
contempt under section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure5 if an ap-
pellate court found that the RLAL, unlike section 1218, carried a
right to a jury trial.6 The petitioners also challenged the finding of
sixty-two separate acts of contempt during a four-day period, denied
that the acts performed were lewd, and claimed that their efforts to
comply with the injunction were adequate.7
The California Supreme Court held that the petitioners had a state
constitutional right to a jury because RLAL contempt actions carry
penalties equivalent to misdemeanors.8 Since the petitioners were
denied a jury, the judgment against them was void. The lower court's
alternative sentencing order was rejected as a due process violation.9
Finally, the supreme court ruled that the RLAL allowed only one
contempt charge per day, that lewd conduct had occurred on the
4. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1236, 783 P.2d at 734, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The RLAL
does not specify whether contemners are entitled to a jury trial. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11229 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Regarding the right to a jury, see generally 17 Am.
JuR. 2D Contempt §§ 64, 78 (1964 & Supp. 1989); 47 Am. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 7-11, 54-55
(1969 & Supp. 1989); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 1-5 (1978 & Supp. 1989); 50 C.J.S. Juries
§§ 35, 39 (1947 & Supp. 1989); Kress & Kronfeld, Eighteenth Annual Review of Crimi-
nal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 77 GEO. L.J. 931,
960-64 (1989); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Right to Trial by Jury in Con-
tempt Proceedings, 45 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (lists acts constituting
contempt).
5. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1218 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Section 1218 is the
general penalty provision for California's civil contempt statutes. See also CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1209 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
6. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 1230, 1249, 783 P.2d 731, 742-43, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 144, 155-56 (1989) reh'q denied (1990).
7. 1I at 1236-39, 783 P.2d at 734-36, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 148-50.
8. Id., at 1241, 783 P.2d at 737, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The maximum imprisonment
for a misdemeanor is one year. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19.2 (West Supp. 1990). However,
unless otherwise indicated by a statute, the penalty for a misdemeanor may not exceed
six months in jail, a $1,000 fine, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1988). See gen-
erally 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1439-1441 (2d ed.
1989); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D (Rev.) Criminal Law § 3333 (1985 & Supp. 1989). All criminal
defendants charged with felonies or misdemeanors are entitled to a jury; only infrac-
tions which are not punishable by incarceration carry no right to jury trial. Mitchell,
49 Cal. 3d at 1240-41, 783 P.2d at 737, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 150. See also Mills v. Municipal
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 298-99 n.8, 515 P.2d 273, 280-81 n.8, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 336-37 n.8
(1973) (interpreting CAL. CONST. art I, § 16). The penalties imposed for contempt of a
RLAL injunction, like many misdemeanors, include a fine of $200 to $1,000, imprison-
ment from one to six months, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11229 (West 1982 & Supp.
1990). See also irfra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
9. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1252, 783 P.2d at 745, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 158. See also in-
fra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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premises, and that the petitioner-owners had failed to exercise their
power to prevent the injunction violations.10
In Mitchell, the supreme court used a historical analysis to find a
RLAL right to a jury. The court determined that the delegates at
the state's 1879 constitutional convention had expressly rejected the
federal standard that gives a jury trial right only for "serious" of-
fenses.l" Instead, the state constitution was drafted more broadly to
allow a jury trial whenever the accused faces imprisonment. 12 A de-
parture from this rule, found in sections 1209 and 1218 of the Califor-
nia Civil Procedure Code, allows for a maximum incarceration of five
days for civil contempt with no accompanying right to a jury.13 Be-
cause this provision antedated the 1879 constitution, the court has
historically treated it as an exception intended by the constitution's
drafters. 14 Although section 11229 of the RLAL is silent regarding a
jury, it mandates penalties of $200 to $1000 or incarceration for one to
six months, or both, for each violation.15 Contempt statutes with
similar penalties, such as section 166 of the Penal Code,16 describe
contemners as misdemeanants with an express jury right. Against
this constitutional and statutory backdrop, and in light of RLAL pen-
alties that are equal to many misdemeanors, the court recognized a
state constitutional jury trial right in RLAL contempt proceedings
and annulled the judgment against the petitioners.'7
The court then rejected the trial judge's alternative sentencing or-
der. The order provided for sentencing under section 1218 of the
10. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1236, 1254-55, 783 P.2d at 734, 746-47, 265 Cal. Rptr. at
147, 159-60. See also infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
11. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1241-44 n.10, 783 P.2d at 737-39 n.10, 265 Cal. Rptr. at
150-52 n.10. See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 1291-93 (1989) (discussing
the federal right to jury). See also supra note 4.
12. See supra note 8.
13. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Section 1209 is a gen-
eral contempt statute addressing, among other acts, "[d]isobedience of any lawful judg-
ment, order, or process of the court." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209(5).
14. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1244, 783 P.2d at 739, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 152. See, e.g.,
Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 477-78, 94 P.2d 983, 990 (1939) (no right to
jury for a section 1209 contempt action), cert. granted, 309 U.S. 649 (1940), rev'd on
other grounds, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11229 (West 1982).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 19 (sentence for misdemeanor criminal contempt can be six months in jail, a $1,000
fine, or both). See supra note 8.
17. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1244-45, 783 P.2d at 739-40, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53. By
finding a state constitutional jury trial right, the court did not decide whether the
sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution would require a jury in Mitchell. However,
the court opined that the lengthy jail terms and substantial fines involved might well
have met the federal definition of "serious" penalties requiring trial by jury. Id. See,
e.g., Girard v. Coins, 575 F.2d 160, 164 (8th Cir. 1978) (determining the "seriousness" of
a fine by examining its impact on the defendant). But see Blanton v. North Las Vegas,
109 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94 (1989) (a six month jail term and $1,000 fine does not trigger
the federal jury right).
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Code of Civil Procedure if an appellate court found that the denial of
a jury during the RLAL action had been improper. Section 1218 pro-
vides less severe penalties but carries no right to a jury.18 The court
acknowledged that prosecutorial discretion would have allowed the
petitioners to be charged under either the section 1218 general con-
tempt statute or the more specific RLAL provisions.19 However, sec-
tion 1218 was never mentioned in the lower court until the trial had
ended. The supreme court disallowed the order on due process
grounds, stating that the petitioners were denied "fair notice [in the
original declarations] of the nature of the penalties and proceedings"
against them.20
To aid the trial judge on remand, the court addressed the three re-
maining issues. The court disagreed with the finding of sixty-two
separate contempt violations during four days at the theater. The
RLAL defines a nuisance as a "building or place used for the purpose
of... lewdness."21 The court construed this language as focusing a
RLAL injunction on the premises where the RLAL violations oc-
curred rather than on the occupants' individual acts. Therefore, it
was not the acts themselves that violated the injunction, but the
maintenance of the theater where they occurred. The court con-
cluded that each day the nuisance existed thus constituted one spe-
cific punishable violation. The petitioners should have been charged
18. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1250-51, 783 P.2d at 743-44, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57. The
penalties under section 1218 may not exceed five days imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or
both. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). See also supra notes 5,
13, & 14 and accompanying text. The trial court's alternative order would have im-
posed a total jail term of six months on each petitioner; no fines would have been lev-
ied. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1249, 783 P.2d at 742-43, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
19. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1251-52, 783 P.2d at 744-45, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
Thus, section 11229 of the RLAL is not the exclusive remedy for violations of RLAL
injunctions. I&L The prosecutor is free to select among remedies, even if the choice
denies a defendant access to a jury. Id. However, the court noted that a general law
could not be chosen over a specific law with less severe penalties unless there was
clear legislative intent to allow such a selection. Id.
20. Id. at 1252-53, 783 P.2d at 745, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 158. Although substituting sec-
tion 1218 in place of the RLAL action would have resulted in less severe penalties for
the petitioners in Mitchell, the court was concerned about a case where the converse
might arise, that is, a defendant tried under one statute might be sentenced under a
more severe law. Therefore, the court announced that prosecutors must identify in
the initial declaration the contempt statute under which they are proceeding. Id. Fi-
nally, the court pointed out that the alternative order was void, regardless of notice,
because it resulted from a trial where the petitioners were unconstitutionally denied a
jury. Id,
21. Id, at 1246, 783 P.2d at 741, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11225) (italics omitted).
1087
with four acts of contempt rather than sixty-two.22 The court then
affirmed that the conduct on the premises was lewd as defined by
section 647(a) of the Penal Code,23 which prohibits certain acts "if
the actor knows or should know of the presence of persons who may
be offended."24 The petitioners argued that no violations occurred
because no patrons had been offended. The justices insisted that cus-
tomers were not "adequately warn[ed]" of the acts being performed;
apparently, the mere possibility that patrons would be surprised sat-
isfied the "offended person" requirement.25 The court remanded the
action against the petitioner-owners because they had failed to use
their authority to halt lewd acts at the theater.26 However, the ac-
22. Id. at 1246-48, 783 P.2d at 741-42, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55. See also Board of
Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 674-75, 227 P.2d 14, 16 (1951) (dictum declaring
that "[elach and every day a public nuisance is maintained is a separate offense.");
Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975)
(each day's contempt charge was the result of multiple violations). The court felt it
would be unreasonable to punish the petitioners for each individual act on the prem-
ises. If the petitioners had been sentenced to six months in jail for each of the 62 acts,
their terms would have run 31 years. This would clearly be disproportionate compared
to other nuisance statutes. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1248, 783 P.2d at 742, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 154. For example, the maximum incarceration for 62 acts of contempt under section
1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be less than one year. CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1218. See supra notes 5, 13, 14 & 18 and accompanying text. The court disap-
proved of Reliable Enterprises v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 604, 620-22, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 786, 796-97 (1984), to the extent that it found each individual act to be a punish-
able violation. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1248 n.13, 783 P.2d at 742 n.13, 265 Cal. Rptr. at
155 n.13. The Mitchell court suggested that other criminal statutes would provide
more appropriate means for prosecuting individual acts. Id at 1246 n.12, 783 P.2d at
741 n.12, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1990) (anyone who engages in lewd conduct in a public place is guilty of a
misdemeanor).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). See generally 17 CAL.
JUR. 3D (Rev.) Criminal Law §§ 841-845 (1984 & Supp. 1989); 53 C.J.S. Lewdness §§ 1-4
(1987 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, What Constitutes "Public Place" Within Meaning of
Statutes Prohibiting Commission of Sexual Act in Public Place, 96 A.L.R. 3D 692 (1979
& Supp. 1989); Annotation, Topless or Bottomless Dancing or Similar Conduct as Pub-
lic Offense, 49 A.L.R. 3D 1084 (1973 & Supp. 1989).
24. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1253, 783 P.2d at 746, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (quoting
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 256, 599 P.2d 636, 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330, 341
(1979) (interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a)). The forbidden acts include "the
touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast for the purpose of sexual arousal,
gratification, annoyance or offense ... [in public view]." Id
25. Id. at 1254-55, 783 P.2d at 746-47, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 159-60. The petitioners ar-
gued that their customers would not be offended, and were in fact paying a substantial
entrance fee for the purpose of seeing the sexual acts. The theater also contained signs
notifying visitors that the shows dealt "frankly and explicitly with sexual matters" and
asked patrons to leave if they might be offended. Id. The court agreed with the trial
judge's finding that the signs did not satisfactorily warn customers, because not "every-
one" who entered the premises would anticipate seeing the explicit acts committed
therein. Id. The court did not decide if signs could ever satisfy the burden of exclud-
ing persons who might be offended. Id.
26. 1& at 1255, 783 P.2d at 747, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The court believed that the
petitioner-owners could have complied with the injunction by directing their employ-
ees not to engage in lewd conduct. The petitioner-owners' "token" efforts to comply,
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tion against the petitioner-manager was dismissed because the court
did not find evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he could have
prevented the lewd conduct. 27
The supreme court's announcement of a jury trial right for RLAL
injunction violations, nearly eighty years after the law's adoption, is
unlikely to have widespread impact.28 However, it may cause prose-
cutors in such actions to balance the RLAL's stiff penalties against
the additional time and expense required for jury trials. The result
may be a shift to prosecution of RLAL contemners under unrelated
contempt statutes. The court's rejection of the alternate sentencing
order, and its adoption of a new requirement that the underlying con-
tempt statute be clearly identified in the initial declarations, should
protect RLAL defendants against unpleasant surprises. Additionally,
the limit of one contempt violation per day will prevent the RLAL's
imprisonment provisions from being applied in a Draconian manner.
While stating that the patrons in Mitchell were not sufficiently
warned of the acts being performed, the court offered little guidance
on how theater owners could adequately warn and exclude patrons
who might be offended by sexually oriented shows and materials.
Thus future cases may indicate that the acts described in Mitchell
such as posting warning signs and requiring employees to wear panties when off-stage,
were inadequate to show attempted conformity with the injunction. Id.
27. Id. at 1255-57, 783 P.2d at 747-48, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61. The trial court heard
testimony that the petitioner-manager was sometimes present on the premises, but
there was no substantial evidence that he had the authority to prevent the lewd acts.
Because the record failed to clearly show all the facts required to establish jurisdiction
over him, the judgment was annulled and could not be retried. Id. See Hotaling v. Su-
perior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506, 217 P. 73, 75 (1923) (requiring annulment of judgment);
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1978) (double jeopardy as a retrial bar). See
generally Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of
Proof in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 245
(1988) (comparing the burden of persuasion in civil and criminal contempt
proceedings).
28. In his concurrence, Justice Mosk criticized the plurality's view that
prosecutorial discretion extended to proceedings under a particular statute, solely to
deny the defendant a jury trial. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1257, 783 P.2d at 748-49, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 161-62 (Mosk, J., concurring). Chief Justice Lucas wrote briefly, disagreeing
with the plurality's analysis of the number of violations that occurred and the alterna-
tive order issue. Id. at 1258, 783 P.2d at 749, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 162 (Lucas, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenting). Justice Panelli disagreed with the court only about the
alternative sentencing order. He saw no possible prejudice to the petitioners by facing
sentencing under either statute. Mitchell, 49 Cal. 3d at 1258-59, 783 P.2d at 749, 265
Cal. Rptr. at 162 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting). Despite the fragmented deci-
sion, all six participating members of the court supported the right to a jury trial for
RLAL contempt actions.
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will always be legally offensive when performed in non-private
settings.
ROBERT J. MILLS
C. The "wanton disregard for human life" definition of
implied malice adequately informs the jury that second
degree murder requires a finding that the defendant was
subjectively aware of the life-threatening risk created by
his or her conduct: People v. Dellinger.
In People v. Dellinger,' the California Supreme Court upheld a
conviction for second degree murder under Penal Code section 187,
which provides that a conviction under any murder charge requires a
showing of malice aforethought.2 If the state is unable to prove ex-
press malice of "deliberate intent," malice may be implied if the cir-
cumstances attending the killing demonstrate "an abandoned or
malignant heart."3 Understandably, most juries would not be famil-
iar with this language, and when incorporated into a jury instruction,
the Penal Code's relatively vague definition does little to aid the av-
erage juror in determining the existence of malicious intent.4
The court has written several opinions attempting to arrive at a
definition that a layman could understand and apply, culminating in
People v. Watson 5 where the court combined the definitions set out
in two earlier cases.6 The instruction relied upon by the trial court in
1. 49 Cal. 3d 1212, 783 P.2d 200, 264 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1989). Justice Eagleson au-
thored the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Kaufman, and Kennard concurring. Justice Broussard dissented in a separate opinion.
2. Section 187 of the Penal Code states: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
1988) (emphasis added).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). In Dellinger, the defendant's actions sur-
rounding the death could be characterized as grossly negligent, but there remained a
question of fact as to his intent or awareness that his actions could be lethal. He
claimed that his stepdaughter had died after falling down the stairs in his apartment,
yet there was testimony that the defendant had hit her on at least one previous occa-
sion. An autopsy revealed a fractured skull and contusion of the spinal cord, but it was
not clear whether he could have inflicted the injuries with a blow from his hand. The
autopsy also revealed a potentially lethal dose of cocaine in her stomach and, while the
defendant maintained that he had not given the drug to her, he admitted giving her
wine that evening to "quiet her down." Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1216, 783 P.2d at 202,
264 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
4. Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1221, 783 P.2d at 205, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (1981).
5. 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
6. In Watson, the court held that second degree murder based on implied malice
occurs when "a person 'does an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous
to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.'" Id. at
300, 637 P.2d at 285, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citing People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 587,
414 P.2d 353, 363, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235 (1966)). The court then wrote: "Phrased in a
different way, malice may be implied when defendant does an act with a high
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Dellinger incorporated the Watson language virtually verbatim, pro-
viding in part that malice could be implied where a defendant's life-
threatening conduct was carried out with a "wanton disregard for
human life."7
The defendant in Dellinger argued that the "wanton disregard"
language did not adequately convey the requirement of section 187,
namely, that a defendant be subjectively aware of the life-threaten-
ing risk created by his or her conduct.8 The California Jury Instruc-
tions, Criminal ("CALJIC") defined malice aforethought by either
the wanton disregard standard or by the definition recited in People
v. Phillips.9 Because the language of the instruction used the dis-
junctive "or," the defendant in Dellinger argued that the jury may
have convicted him based upon the wanton disregard language alone,
merely finding his conduct to be "wanton" but not finding that he
was subjectively aware that his conduct was life-threatening.O
The court disagreed with this argument, concluding that a reason-
able jury would have interpreted the instructions as a whole, rather
than isolating the "wanton disregard" language from the rest of the
instruction." The court held that the instruction, read in its entirety,
makes it clear that a finding of subjective awareness is necessary for
a finding of guilt.12 More importantly, the court held that even if a
probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and
with a wanton disregard for human life." Id. (citing People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d
777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965)) (emphasis added). This is the
"wanton disregard for human life" or the "wanton disregard" definition of implied
malice.
7. Id. at 1217, 783 P.2d at 202, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
8. In Washington, the court held that a finding of implied malice requires a de-
termination by the finder of fact that the defendant subjectively appreciated the risk
to life created by his or her conduct. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44
Cal. Rptr. at 446. See generally 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW, Elements of Crimes § 107 (1988); 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 15-16 (1988).
9. See supra note 6. In Dellinger, the jury was instructed according to the 1983
revision of CALJIC No. 8.11, which provides in pertinent part:
Malice is implied when the killing results from an intentional act involving a
high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a
base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life or when
the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which
are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with con-
scious disregard for life.
CALJIC No. 8.11 (4th ed. rev. 1984) (emphasis added).
10. Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1214, 783 P.2d at 202, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
11. Id. at 1221, 783 P.2d at 205, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
12. Id. See also People v. Benson, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1223, 1230, 259 Cal. Rptr. 9, 14
(1989) (use of "or" instead of "phrased in another manner" in jury instruction did not
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jury were to consider the "wanton disregard" definition in isolation, -
the jury would recognize that it must find a subjective awareness on
the part of the defendant that his conduct was a threat to life.13
While upholding the validity of the instructions in Dellinger,14 the
court nevertheless recognized that the term "wanton" is not in com-
mon use by laypersons; therefore, it saw no reason to continue the
use of what it found to be obscure language in jury instructions. 5 On
that basis, the court voiced its approval of the 1988 revision of
CALJIC No. 8.11, which eliminates any reference to the "wanton dis-
regard" definition of implied malice.16
MATFHEW J. STEPOVICH
D. The second degree felony murder doctrine is applicable to
any defendant who commits a felony which, when
considering the specific felony in its abstract sense, is
determined to be inherently dangerous to human life
because it carries with it a high probability that its
commission will result in death, People v. Patterson.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Patterson' addressed
the issue of whether a defendant may be charged with second degree
felony murder2 after supplying cocaine to a person who dies from its
improperly enunciate two alternative and different tests for determining whether im-
plied malice existed).
13. Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1221, 783 P.2d at 205, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 864. See People
v. Rosenkrantz, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 1203, 244 Cal. Rptr. 403, 410-13 (1988) (upholding
instruction where only the "wanton disregard" definition was read to jury); but see
People v. Protopappas, 201 Cal. App. 3d 152, 164, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 922 (1988) (instruc-
tion was erroneous but harmless because the case was tried only on the theory of con-
scious appreciation of risk).
14. Justice Broussard dissented separately, maintaining that a reasonable jury
might believe that the instruction outlined two tests, and that the jury in Dellinger
may have relied solely upon the "wanton disregard" test in convicting the defendant.
Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1223, 783 P.2d at 207, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 848 (Broussard, J., dis-
senting). He pointed out that "wanton disregard" could encompass situations where a
defendant gave no thought at all to a risk and, thus, the jury could have convicted the
defendant even if it believed that he was not aware of the risks created by his conduct.
Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
15. Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d at 1221-22, 783 P.2d at 205, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
16. See CAIJIC No. 8.11 (4th ed. rev. 1988).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989). Justice Kennard wrote
the majority opinion. Chief Justice Lucas, joined by Justices Kaufman and Eagleson,
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, as did Justice Mosk, joined by Jus-
tice Broussard. Justice Panelli also wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Justice Panelli noted that the second degree felony murder doctrine was cre-
ated judicially. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 641, 778 P.2d at 567-68, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14
(Panelli, J., dissenting); see also 17 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 213 (1984). The court
defined second degree felony murder in People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388 P.2d 892, 36
Cal. Rptr. 620, cert denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964), as "[a] homicide that is a direct causal
result of the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life (other than
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ingestion.3 The court confirmed that second degree felony murder
may be found only where the felony charged is determined to be "in-
herently dangerous to human life."4 The court remanded the case
for a determination of whether furnishing cocaine is an "inherently
dangerous felony,"5 which is defined as one bearing a "high
the six felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189)." Id. at 795, 388 P.2d at 907, 36 Cal.
Rptr. at 635. The California Penal Code section 189 states in part:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explo-
sive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or ar-
mor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or at-
tempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act pun-
ishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of
murders are of the second degree.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1989). The Penal Code further defines as involuntary
manslaughter a death which results from "an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony
.... " Id. at § 192. Thus, the Penal Code addresses killings which occur in carrying out
both felonies amounting to first degree murder and crimes less than felonies amount-
ing to involuntary manslaughter, but leaves undefined those killings which occur in
the course of felonies outside the six mentioned in section 189. For a historical back-
ground on the development of second degree murder, see Pike, What Is Second Degree
Murder in California?, 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 112 (1936).
3. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 617, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197. The victim
and her friend had used cocaine daily for months prior to the night the defendant fur-
nished them with cocaine in his motel room. When the victim became ill, her friend
called an ambulance and the defendant remained with the two until paramedics ar-
rived. The victim never recovered, and died from acute intoxication.
4. For examples distinguishing those felonies which are inherently dangerous
from those which are not, see 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 214 (1984), and Annota-
tion, What Felonies Are Inherently or Foreseeably Dangerous to Human Life for Pur-
poses of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50 A.L.R. 3d 397 (1973 & Supp. 1989). For a
discussion of homicide liability for violation of drug laws resulting in death, see gener-
ally Weissman, Imposing Homicide Liability for Death-Producing Drug Law Viola-
tions, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 102 (1975).
5. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 625, 778 P.2d 549, 557, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195,
203 (1989). The lower court believed that the requirement that the felony be viewed
"in the abstract" when determining inherent danger to human life, demands consider-
ation of all the lesser offenses listed in the statute under which the defendant was
prosecuted. People v. Patterson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 165, 175-76, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 892
(1988). Finding that section 11352 of the Health and Safety Code included lesser of-
fenses not inherently dangerous to human life, such as the transportation of a con-
trolled substance, the appellate court held that the trial court properly dismissed the
second degree felony murder charge. Id. at 178, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94. The lower
courts did not determine whether the defendant's actual offense was inherently dan-
gerous.
Section 11352 of the Health and Safety Code provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, every person who transports,
imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away, or offers to
transport, import into this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or at-
tempts to import into this state or transport (1) any controlled substance spec-
ified in [the relevant sections] or (2) any controlled substance classified ...
[as] a narcotic drug, unless upon the written prescription of a [licensed doctor],
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probability" that death will result when the specific felony is viewed
in the abstract.6 The court explained that its requirement to consider
the felony "in the abstract" means consideration of the specific of-
fense-in this case, the furnishing of cocaine-where the statute
proscribes more than one primary element of crime.7 The court rea-
soned that viewing the felony in its abstract sense was imperative be-
cause the felony murder doctrine would be invoked only where a
death actually occurred, and if juries were permitted to weigh all the
facts surrounding only the death, they might unjustly be led to con-
clude that almost any crime was inherently dangerous.8
Without much harmony among its members, 9 the court's holding
creates a stricter definition of inherent danger to life, making it more
difficult to get a second degree felony murder conviction for death re-
sulting from the ingestion of drugs that have been furnished by the
accused. This, in turn, creates a new uncertainty as to whether a
statute's proscriptions should be viewed as a whole or severably.o
Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Panelli criticized the high threshold
established in this case. Because it is purely a judicial creation, the
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five
years.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(a) (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
6. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204. Justice Ken-
nard asserted that analogy to the implied malice element of second degree murder in
other cases compelled this definition. Id, at 626-27, 778 P.2d at 557-58, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
203-04. In his dissent, Chief Justice Lucas contended that by requiring a "high
probability of death," the court set the standard so high that it "will be impossible to
satisfy in any case arising under the [drug offense] statutes." Id at 628, 778 P.2d at 558-
59, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting). Stating that such definition is "un-
realistic, unwise and unprecedented" in light of recent supreme court cases requiring
only "a substantial risk that someone will be killed" or "an inherent danger to life," he
declared that the court succeeded only in silently reversing its own decisions and those
of the courts of appeals. I. at 628-29, 778 P.2d at 558-59, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (Lu-
cas, C.J., dissenting).
7. The court distinguished this case from other cases requiring consideration of
whether a violation of the statute as a whole was inherently dangerous to life, and
noted that those statutes proscribed one primary element of crime, such as "the prac-
tice of medicine without a license" or "escape" from prison. Id at 623-24, 778 P.2d at
555-56, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02. The court reasoned that section 11352 of the Health
and Safety Code proscribed many severable crimes which had been consolidated into
one statute solely for the purpose of convenience. Id at 624-25, 778 P.2d at 556, 262
Cal. Rptr. at 202. However, Justice Mosk argued in dissent that considering a felony in
the abstract requires consideration of the statute as a whole. Id. at 630-40, 778 P.2d at
560-67, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206-13 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
8. i. at 622, 778 P.2d at 554, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
9. Justice Panelli noted that this case created "some uneasiness" as the members
of the court had acted more like legislators than judges. Id. at 641-42, 778 P.2d at 567-
68, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Additionally, he was unsure
whether this second degree felony murder rule was constitutional. d.
10. I. at 630-40, 778 P.2d at 560-67, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206-13 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(noting, for example, that Penal Code § 4532 which makes escape from prison a felony,
also proscribes a number of lesser crimes which, when considered in light of the whole
statute, were not inherently dangerous to life).
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legislature may respond appropriately if it wishes to allow more vig-
orous prosecution of deaths attributable to the supply aspect of drug-
related deaths.
DAwN SOLHEIM
Iv. DEATH PENALTY LAW
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court decided only six death penalty cases
between July and December of 1989.' Compared to the Lucas
court's2 first two years, this represents a substantial reduction in the
number of death penalty cases reviewed.3 This decrease, which may
be predominantly attributed to the October 17, 1989 earthquake,
marks a significant setback in the court's attempt to reduce its back-
1. People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200, 776 P.2d 285, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583, moditfed,
49 Cal. 3d 698A (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990); People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d
502, 778 P.2d 129, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2576 (1990); People v.
Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 777 P.2d 121, 261 Cal. Rptr. 348, modified, 49 Cal. 3d 956A
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1938 (1990); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d 957, 782 P.2d
608, 264 Cal. Rptr. 367, modified, 50 Cal. 3d 133A (1989); People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d
1170, 783 P.2d 211, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1989); People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 782 P.2d
627, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1989).
2. Chief Justice Lucas was elevated from his position as California Supreme
Court Associate Justice in March, 1987, after voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird
from the bench in the 1986 election. The Associate Justices on the court during the
entire survey period were: Justices Stanley Mosk, Allan E. Broussard, Edward A.
Panelli, David N. Eagleson, and Marcus M. Kaufman. Justice Joyce L. Kennard, who
succeeded Justice John A. Arguelles, was a member of the court for four of the cases
reviewed. Justice Arguelles was on the court for two of the cases, one for which he
wrote the majority opinion: Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 777 P.2d 121, 261 Cal. Rptr. 367.
3. Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas did not preside over any supreme court cases
until March of 1987. Following are the number of death penalty cases reviewed in
each of the following six-month periods: July-Dec. 1987: 20; Jan.-June 1988: 19; July-
Dec. 1988: 26; Jan.-June 1989: 21. See California Supreme Court Survey-Death Pen-
alty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 451 (1989) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law 1]; Califor-
nia Supreme Court Survey-Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1165 (1989)
[hereinafter Death Penalty Law II]; California Supreme Court Survey-Death Penalty
Law III, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 537 (1990) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law 111].
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log of death penalty cases. 4 The court affirmed the death sentence in
all six of the cases, continuing its conservative approach and exten-
sive use of the "harmless error" doctrine.5 The court closely fol-
lowed the traditional rule that "error is not reversible unless it is
prejudicial. "6
The only reversible error during this period occurred in the case of
People v. Lang.7 In Lang, the trial court severed a count of conceal-
able weapon possession by a felon from the charges of murder and
robbery.8 Although the supreme court reversed the weapon convic-
tion, the death sentence was based on the other charges that were
upheld.9
This survey will discuss the single finding of reversible error,10 as
well as defense arguments that were rejected by the court. These ar-
guments encompass jury selection issues," prosecutorial miscon-
duct,12  a defendant's prior murder conviction as a special
circumstance,13 instructional errors,14 ineffective assistance of coun-
4. See Uelmen, Mainstream Justice, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, July 1989, 37-41. See
also L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at A3, col. 1. ("[D]espite a record output of 88 death
penalty decisions by the [Lucas court] justices since 1987, they still face a staggering
backlog of 185 such cases. That exceeds the capital caseload that existed in 1987 when
Lucas replaced former Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird .... )
The State Building in San Francisco, which houses both the state supreme court and
the First District Court of Appeal, suffered severe damage due to a 1989 earthquake.
Plaster fell from the walls in many places and the walls buckled and cracked through
the cinder blocks in others. Because of the damage and fear of asbestos danger, the
court relocated its courtroom and the justices' chambers resulting in delays in hearing
and deciding cases. L.A. Daily Journal, Oct. 24, 1989, at 4, col. 2.
5. The court employed the harmless error doctrine in all six cases, emphasizing
the reasonable doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
The United States Supreme Court, in Chapman, "approved the application of the
harmless error test to constitutional errors in criminal trials ... the reviewing court
must decide first whether constitutional error occurred and then whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error occurred and then whether, beyond a reasonable doubt,
the error affected the outcome of the trial." Comment, Harmless Error and the Death
Penalty, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 740, 742-743 (1987). See generally TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARmLEss ERROR (1970); Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional
Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16-36 (1976);
Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
421 (1980); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
6. 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 324 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
7. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 782 P.2d 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386; see infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
8. Id. (the defendant's motion to sever the charges was granted by the trial court
prior to the commencement of the trial on the capital charge).
9. Id. at 1046, 782 P.2d at 664, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
10. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
13. See i.ura notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
14. See infa notes 100-48 and accompanying text.
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sel,15 and proportionality review.' 6 This survey will also cover two
related topics: the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony in a first
degree murder case, 17 and the aborted attempt to carry out Califor-
nia's first execution in 23 years.S
II. IMPACT OF SCHEDULED END TO EXECUTION HIATUS
IN CALIFORNIA
The affirmance of recent death penalty sentences was dramatized
when the execution of Robert Alton Harris was scheduled for April
3, 1990.19 He was to be the first person sent to California's gas cham-
ber since 1967.20 Harris had made numerous appeals to both the state
and federal supreme courts during the decade after his conviction,
and had apparently exhausted his options.21 In an eleventh hour ap-
peal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, how-
ever, attorneys for Harris argued that Harris had been denied his
right to competent psychiatric examination during his trial.22
Judge John T. Noonan, presiding over the hearing, issued a stay of
execution for Harris on March 30, 1990, holding that Harris had es-
tablished "substantial grounds upon which relief might be
granted."23 Noonan's order emphasized the defendant's right to com-
15. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infira notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
19. See L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 1. When asked about possible implica-
tions of the execution upon future death penalty cases, California Attorney General
John Van de Kamp stated "[i]mplementation of the death penalty in California is a
giant step closer." Id.
20. L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 4. The last man to die in the gas chamber
was Aaron C. Mitchell in 1967.
21. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981). Harris' conviction was one of only four death
sentences upheld by the Bird court in the early 1980's. Four subsequent appeals to
both the California and United States Supreme Courts were rejected. L.A. Times,
Apr. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
22. Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1990). Harris claimed that, due
to a lack of funds, he was denied thorough psychiatric assistance during his trial in
1979, despite evidence of mental disturbance that could have affected his actions. Har-
ris alleged that competent assistance would have produced a strong mitigating factor
for his crimes. L.A. Times, March 31, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
23. Id. at 727 (emphasis in original). Attorneys for the state lost their United
States Supreme Court appeal to overturn the Ninth Circuit's stay of execution. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the stay on April 2, and sent the case to a three-
judge appeals panel in accordance with Judge Noonan's order. 110 S. Ct. 1799 (1990).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy dissented, asserting that the
stay should be overruled. Id. at 1799-1800.
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petent psychiatric assistance. "The Supreme Court has stated that
'when the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant
to his criminal capability and to the punishment he might suffer, the
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's
ability to marshal his defense.'"24 The stay for Harris halted a
drama of theatrical proportions within California's criminal justice
system. 25
However, on August 29, 1990, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals denied Harris' petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds of incompetent psychiatric assistance at trial.26
The split panel held that Harris had no right to psychiatric assistance
at the guilt phase of his trial under Ake v. Oklahoma, because he had
not previously raised a sanity defense.27 The justices also found that
Harris had no right to psychiatric assistance during the penalty phase
of his trial because the prosecution had not offered psychiatric evi-
dence to establish his dangerousness. 28
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that Harris had received
state-funded psychiatric assistance at both the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial, even though such assistance was not constitution-
ally required.29 The court also concluded that the "new constitu-
tional rule" announced in Ake should only be applied on collateral
review if it fell within two narrow exceptions. 30 Harris' claim was
not found to fall within either exception.31 Additionally, Harris'
claim of newly discovered evidence of his alleged brain disorders was
rejected, because he had not alleged that the disorders were un-
known to the psychiatric community at the time of trial or that his
psychiatrists had failed to consider them.32
Some observers believed that Harris' impending execution might
lead to heightened scrutiny of California's death penalty laws.33 Cap-
24. Har-is, 901 F.2d at 726 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985)).
25. California Governor George Deukmejian granted Harris' request for a clem-
ency hearing at which Harris would have been allowed to argue why his life should be
spared. When Deukmejian stated that he would personally preside over the hearing,
Harris withdrew the request. The clemency hearing, originally scheduled for March
27, 1990, was cancelled. Additionally, Mother Theresa unsuccessfully attempted to
contact Governor Deukmejian in the plea for Harris' life. L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1990, at
A2, col. 4.
26. Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1990). The opinion was written by
Judge Brunetti and joined by Judge Alarcon. Judge Noonan wrote a concurring and
dissenting opinion.
27. Id at 617-18.
28. 1d. at 619 (citing Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 763-64 & 763 n.5 (1985).
29 Id. at 620.
30. Id at 621 (citing Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989)).
31. 1d at 621-22.
32. Id.
33. It has been suggested that a commitment to carry out the death penalty may
reduce the number of death penalty verdicts in the trial courts. See Death Penalty
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ital punishment has instead received resounding support from both
the United States Supreme Court and the population at large.3 4 This
may be due in part to the atrociousness of the crimes involved. Har-
ris' brutal murder of two San Diego teenagers horrified citizens
throughout California. In order to steal the boys' car, Harris and his
brother kidnapped the sixteen year olds from a fast food restaurant
and drove them to a secluded lake area.3 5 There, as the victims
begged for their lives, Harris shot one boy in the back and fired three
shots at point-blank range into his head after the boy fell.36 Harris
then followed the sounds of frightened screams to find the other boy
crouched behind some bushes, where Harris shot him four times. 37
Harris exhibited neither hesitation nor remorse. He laughed after
killing the boys, and then ate the remnants of their lunches. After
noticing a piece of flesh hanging on the end of his gun barrel, Harris
commented on the shot to the boy's head and flicked the skin out
into the street.38 The egregiousness of Harris' crimes made him the
"perfect" murderer for the resumption of capital punishment in Cali-
fornia. His execution, however, has been postponed indefinitely.39
Whether Harris will be the person that ends California's self-im-
posed hiatus from executions remains unclear. Law enforcement au-
thorities and death penalty foes agree that the question is no longer
if, but when an execution will occur. Judge Noonan's favorable re-
sponse to Harris' claim, however, may lead death penalty appellants
to raise issues not addressed in their initial appeals. This may thus
set off a new round of appeals by inmates on death row, further post-
poning any executions in California.
Law II, supra note 3, at 1202; Kaplan, Death Mill USA, NAT'L. LAW J., May 8, 1989, at
38, col.1.
34. See Powell, Capital Punishment, HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1989). Retired United
States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued in favor of a more efficient
process in death penalty cases that would avoid endless delays caused by "multi-
layered appeals." Id For an overview of this proposal, see Death Penalty Law III,
supra note 3, at 539-40.
35. People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d at 944-45, 623 P.2d at 243-44, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 683-
84.
36. Id.
37. Id Harris was subsequently convicted of two counts of first degree murder
and was sentenced to die. Most of the evidence against him was provided by the testi-
mony of his brother, Daniel Harris, who was present at the time of the crimes. L.A.
Times, Apr. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
.38. L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
39. See L.A. Daily Journal, Aug. 30, 1990, at 20, col. 3.
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III. GUILT PHASE
A. Jury Issues
Two death penalty defendants in the cases being reviewed herein,
claimed that their jury trial rights were violated. Although the
claims differed, they are treated here within a single broad
category.40
In People v. Bell,41 the defendant claimed a violation of his consti-
tutional right to a "trial by an impartial jury drawn from a represen-
tative cross-section of the community," 42  based on an
underrepresentation of blacks in the jury pool.43 The court decided
that the defendant had failed to make the prima facie showing of
"systematic exclusion" required by Duren v. Missouri.44 The court
conceded that blacks were consistently underrepresented, 45 but it re-
fused to accept that fact alone as proof of systematic exclusion.46 The
court refused to find systematic exclusion because the jury pool selec-
tion criteria were neutral with regard to creed, color, and religion.47
Justice Broussard wrote in a dissenting opinion, that evidence of
underrepresentation of blacks over a period of time should force the
40. For an examination of jury issues in earlier death penalty cases, see Death
Penalty Law I, supra note 3, at 453-54; Death Penalty Law II, supra note 3, at 1181-84;
Death Penalty Law III, supra note 3 at 542.
41. 49 Cal. 3d 502, 778 P.2d 129, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989). In Bell, the defendant used
a gun to rob and kill a jewelry store manager. He was convicted of first degree mur-
der, robbery, and the attempted murder of a store employee who was present during
the robbery. Id. at 513-15, 778 P.2d at 132-33, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5. The majority opin-
ion was written by Justice Eagleson and was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Panelli, Kaufman. Justice Arguelles concurred and dissented. Justices Mosk and
Broussard wrote separate dissenting opinions.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; CAL CONST. art. I, § 16.
43. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 778 P.2d at 139-40, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
44. Id. (citing 439 U.S. 357 (1979)). The Duren three-prong test states:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section require-
ment, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group
in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-
representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process.
See id.; 439 U.S. at 364. See generally Comment, Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1557-88 (1988).
45. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 524, 778 P.2d at 139, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The court ad-
dressed similar jury issues in the recent cases of Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 49
Cal. 3d 713, 781 P.2d 547, 263 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1989) (vicinage requirements) and Wil-
liams v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 736, 781 P.2d 537, 263 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1989) (jury
selection and formation). The court in Williams employed the Duren test but did not
reach the third prong, which was the issue in Bell. See Williams, 49 Cal. 3d at 746, 781
P.2d at 543, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
46. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 524, 778 P.2d at 139, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 11. Duren defines "sys-
tematic" as "inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized." Duren, 439
U.S. at 366.
47. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 524, 778 P.2d at 139, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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prosecution to rebut a presumption of unconstitutional discrimina-
tory exclusion.48 Justice Broussard maintained that a defendant who
proves "systematic underrepresentation of a cognizable class has ful-
filled the three Duren prongs and made out a prima facie case." 49
In People v. Lang,50 the defendant's bench trial conviction on a
weapons count was reversed when the supreme court found that he
had not expressly waived his right to a jury trial.51 The trial court
had severed the weapons charge from the murder and robbery counts
that led to the death sentence at a separate jury trial. At the subse-
quent weapons count trial, the judge incorrectly believed that the de-
fendant had waived his jury trial right.52 The supreme court held
that no express waiver had occurred, and set aside the weapons con-
viction.5 3 However, the reversal of this severed count had no effect
on the court's affirmance of the death penalty.54
B. Predominant Issues
The majority of guilt phase issues appealed by the death penalty
defendants involved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. These
48. Id at 565-66, 778 P.2d at 169, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
The majority addressed this assertion, stating: "Unlike Justice Broussard we do not
understand the United States Supreme Court to have created such a minimal burden
that a defendant need demonstrate only that underrepresentation has occurred over a
period of time." Id. at 524, 778 P.2d at 139, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
49. Id. at 565-66, 778 P.2d at 168, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion discussing a clearly hearsay state-
ment put before the jury by the prosecutor. Justice Mosk did not believe that this
statement passed the "reasonable doubt" harmless error standard set forth in Chap-
man. Id at 557-62, 778 P.2d at 162-65, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 34-37 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chapman and the harm-
less error doctrine.
50. 49 Cal. 3d 991, 782 P.2d 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1989). In Lang, the defendant
killed a deer hunter, then stole his wallet and recreational vehicle. The defendant was
convicted of murder, robbery, and possession of a concealable firearm by a convicted
felon. The possession count was severed entirely from the murder and robbery counts
that led to the death sentence.
51. Id at 1028-29, 782 P.2d at 651-52, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The majority opinion in
Lang was written by Justice Kaufman. The court was unanimous regarding the rever-
sal of the possession count. The court noted that the prosecutor had conceded "the va-
lidity of defendant's argument." Id at 1046, 782 P.2d at 664, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
52. Id,
53. Id at 1029, 782 P.2d at 652, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 411. There are three ways that a
defendant's right to a jury trial can be waived: failure to appear at trial, express con-
sent, or noncompliance with requirements. There cannot be "waiver by implication."
7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial § 102 (1985) (citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 631).
54. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1046, 782 P.2d at 664, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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issues ranged from improper direct examinationm5 to misconduct dur-
ing closing argument.5 6 The California Supreme Court quickly dis-
missed most of these arguments on the grounds that defense counsel
had not made the objections during trial at the time of the actual
misconduct.5 7 The court stated that if an objection and an admoni-
tion of the jury had been made immediately, any possible harm or ef-
fect of the misconduct could have been cured. 58 The court thus
reaffirmed the principle that a defendant who fails to object at trial
has waived the objection.59
In People v. Jackson,60 the supreme court did not decide whether
an objection was waived when not raised at trial, because the court
found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.6 ' The defendant in
Jackson was convicted of murdering a police officer. The officer had
been called when the defendant, under the influence of PCP, was
causing a loud disturbance in a neighborhood street. The defendant
thereupon shot the officer who was attempting to calm him.62 The
court found that it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to point out
at trial that the defendant had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor PCP
55. See People v. Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 777 P.2d 121, 261 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1989). In
Carrera, the defendant and an accomplice robbed and killed a married couple who
were motel owners. The defendant was convicted of capital murder. Id, at 300, 777
P.2d at 124, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 351. On appeal, he contended that the prosecutor had
elicited tainted testimony during direct examination, because the testimony directly
contradicted the same witness' earlier statements at the separate trial of an accom-
plice. Id. at 315, 777 P.2d at 134, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
56. See id. at 319-20, 777 P.2d at 137, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The defendant claimed
that the prosecutor asserted certain facts during closing argument that had not been
proven, including purported confessions by the defendant that the defendant
threatened witnesses in order to silence them, and that the killings were premeditated.
The defendants in three of the other death penalty appeal cases under review herein
alleged that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred during the cross-examination of
witnesses. See People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 1191, 783 P.2d 211, 221-22, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 852, 862 (1989); People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 531-34, 778 P.2d 129, 145-47, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 17-19 (1989); Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1040-41, 782 P.2d at 660, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 419-
20.
57. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
58. See Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d at 317, 777 P.2d at 135, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 362; Lang, 49
Cal. 3d at 1041, 782 P.2d at 660, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 419; Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 535, 778 P.2d at
147, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
59. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 535, 778 P.2d at 147, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The Bell court ex-
plained its standard for reviewing defense objections that were not raised at trial:
[Tihe initial question to be decided ... is whether a timely objection and
admonition would have cured the harm. If it would the contention must be
rejected... ; if it would not the court must then and only then reach the issue
whether on the whole record any harm resulted in a miscarriage of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution.
Id (citing People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 34, 609 P.2d 468, 487-88, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 20-21
(1980)).
60. 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 783 P.2d 211, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1989).
61. Id. at 1192, 783 P.2d at 221, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
62. Id, at 1181-82, 783 P.2d at 214-15, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
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charges after being charged with the murder of the police officer.
The defendant unsuccessfully argued to the California Supreme
Court that the prosecution had implied that the guilty pleas were en-
tered merely to fabricate an "under the influence" defense to the
murder charge.63
In analyzing these prosecutorial misconduct questions, the Lucas
court made extensive use of the "harmless error" doctrine.64 In
People v. Bell, the court ruled that the improper admission of a
clearly hearsay statement 65 did not reach the height of reversible er-
ror, as defined in Chapman v. California.66 The court was "satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] instance of prosecutorial mis-
conduct alone did not affect the verdict," because the evidence
presented through hearsay was supported by other "uncontradicted
testimony." 67
Thus, the supreme court is not quick to find reversible error
caused by prosecutorial misconduct. However, the court's analysis of
these arguments is very thorough, both for the guilt and penalty
phases of the trial.6 8 Although, the court may be the only check on
misbehavior by a prosecutor,69 the court has nevertheless made it
clear that defense counsel must raise these objections at trial and re-
quest an immediate admonition of the jury; otherwise, the issue may
be waived on appeal. 70
63. Id. at 1191-1192, 783 P.2d at 221, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
64. See Comment, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINoLOGY 457, 470-75 (1983) (discussing advantages of instituting automatic
reversal for deliberate misconduct); see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing harmless error doctrine).
65. See Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 532-33, 778 P.2d at 145, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The prosecu-
tor introduced a hearsay statement indicating that the defendant had been in posses-
sion of the murder weapon. The person who originally made the statement was
unavailable for cross-examination by the defense. The supreme court referred to this
action by the Bell prosecutor as "particularly egregious." Id.
66. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
67. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 534, 778 P.2d at 146, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
68. Of the four cases wherein prosecutorial misconduct was alleged during the
guilt phase, in all but Jackson the same allegations were made regarding the penalty
phase of the trials.
69. See Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1365 (1987).
70. See, e.g., Bell, 49 Cal. 3d at 535, 778 P.2d at 147, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 19; Lang, 49
Cal. 3d at 1040-41, 782 P.2d at 660, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
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C. Hypnotically-Enhanced Testimony
The case of People v. Hayes71 involved a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole. Although the jury chose not to impose the
death penalty, the defendant's successful appeal, based on the im-
proper use of hypnotically enhanced testimony,72 will be analyzed to
make the discussion of the Lucas court's approach to guilt phase ar-
guments more complete.
In Hayes, the supreme court disagreed with the trial court's deci-
sion to admit witness testimony that was enhanced by hypnosis.73
The court relied on the holding in People v. Shirley 7 that "testimony
of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring
his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible."75 The Shirley
court declared such testimony to be inadmissible based on the incom-
petence of the witness and the inherent unreliability of hypnotically-
enhanced testimony. "[A]t the present time the use of hypnosis to re-
store the memory of a potential witness is not generally accepted as
reliable by the relevant scientific community."76
The Hayes court rejected outright the prosecution's contention that
the victim's testimony should be admitted under the harmless error
doctrine.77 The court stressed that the witness' identification of the
defendant was not made until after she had undergone hypnosis,7 8
and was therefore inadmissible posthypnotic testimony under
Shirley.79
The supreme court reversed and remanded the conviction in
Hayes, but stated that the admission of prehypnotic statements is not
completely restricted. "[A] witness is permitted to testify to events
that the trial court finds the witness both recalled and related to
others before undergoing hypnosis."8 0 Therefore, although the court
71. 49 Cal. 3d 1260, 783 P.2d 719, 265 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1989). In Hayes, the defendant
and another assailant entered and burglarized the married victims' home, then killed
the husband and raped the wife. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder,
burglary, rape, and forcible oral copulation. He was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Id.
72. 1& at 1274-75, 783 P.2d at 728, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
73. Id at 1269, 783 P.2d at 725, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
74. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982). The defendant in Shirley
was convicted of rape. The California Supreme Court reversed the guilty verdict,
based on the defendant's contention that the victim's testimony was fully established
only after she had undergone hypnosis to aid her memory. Id at 70, 641 P.2d at 806,
181 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
75. Id at 66, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
76. Id at 66, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272. (emphasis in original).
77. Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d at 1269-1270, 783 P.2d at 725, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
78. Id at 1270, 783 P.2d at 725, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
79. Id
80. Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d at 1273, 783 P.2d at 727, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 140 (emphasis ad-
ded) (citing State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); State v. Patterson, 213
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reversed the conviction on inadmissible evidence grounds, it was
clear that a retrial of the defendant would not require the exclusion
of the witness' entire testimony.8 1
IV. ISSUES CONCERNING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The California Supreme Court did not reverse any of the trial
court special circumstance findings in the six death penalty cases.8 2
However, the supreme court in People v. Andrews8 3 did give much
consideration to the treatment of a defendant's prior murder convic-
tion in Alabama as a special circumstance. In Andrews, the defend-
ant argued that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of
another jurisdiction's law.84 The defendant further asserted that his
constitutional equal protection rights85 would be violated by using his
Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d 500 (1983); People v. Hughs, 59 N.Y. 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983)).
The court in Shirley discussed several restrictions on the general rule of inadmissi-
bility of hypnotically-restored memory:
[A] previously hypnotized witness is not incompetent in the strict sense of
being unable to express himself comprehensibly or understand his duty to tell
the truth [as required by the California Evidence Code], or of lacking the gen-
eral capacity both to perceive and remember .... Accordingly, if the prosecu-
tion should wish to question such a witness on a topic wholly unrelated to the
events that were the subject of the hypnotic session, his testimony as to that
topic would not be rendered inadmissible by the present rule.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (emphasis in original).
The Evidence Code discusses witness competency as follows:
A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is: (1) Incapable of expres-
sing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either
directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him; or (2) In-
capable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 (a) (West Supp. 1990).
81. Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d at 1272-73, 783 P.2d at 727, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 140 (statements
made by victim prior to the hypnosis that were not discussed during the hypnotic ses-
sions would be admissible).
82. Few special circumstance issues were raised in these cases. Jackson, Hunter,
and Bell did not include special circumstance discussions, and Lang considered special
circumstance issues only within the guilt-phase discussion. See People v. Lang, 49 Cal.
3d 991, 1008, 782 P.2d 627, 637, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 396 (1989).
83. 49 Cal. 3d 200, 221-25, 776 P.2d 285, 297-300, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 596-99 (1989).
The majority opinion in Andrews was written by Justice Kennard, and was joined by
Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard, Panelli, Eagleson, and Kaufman. Justice
Mosk concurred with the majority on the special circumstance finding, but wrote a
separate opinion explaining his disagreement with the majority's analysis.
84. Id. at 221-22, 776 P.2d at 298-99, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. The other jurisdic-
tion's law appears irrelevant since the California Penal Code clearly states that: "[A]n
offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in California would be
punishable as first or second degree murder shall be deemed murder in the first or
second degree." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (a)(2) (West 1988).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I. § 7.
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prior murder conviction as a special circumstance.8 6
In 1967 at the age of sixteen, Andrews was convicted of murder in
Alabama. This prior conviction was found to be a special circum-
stance in the California trial wherein he received the death sen-
tence.8 7 The defendant was twenty-eight years old at the time of the
California conviction. However, the supreme court did not discuss
the length of time between the two crimes as a possible factor in the
analysis of the special circumstance.88
In addressing the defendant's arguments, the supreme court first
interpreted the provision of section 190.2 of the California Penal
Code,89 which applies to treatment of convictions in foreign jurisdic-
tions.90 The court found that the statute did not require the trial
court to "determine whether the guilt ascertainment procedures of
that jurisdiction afforded the same procedural protections as those in
California."91 As a result of this finding, the court dismissed the de-
fendant's assertion that the Alabama offense must "without doubt
have been punishable as murder in California" to be grounds for a
special circumstance finding.92 Instead, the supreme court held that
the offense may be considered a special circumstance if it could have
been punishable as murder in California.93 The court concluded that,
because California does allow certain sixteen year olds to be tried as
adults, the defendant's murder conviction in Alabama could have
been paralleled in California courts if the offense had been commit-
ted within California's jurisdiction.94
86. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
87. Id. at 221, 776 P.2d at 298, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597. In Andrews, the defendant
went to an apartment where two men and one woman were to help him obtain illegal
drugs. The defendant robbed and killed the men, and then raped and killed the wo-
man. The defendant was convicted of capital murder. Id. at 206-08, 776 P.2d at 287-89,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87.
88. See id. at 221-25, 776 P.2d at 297-300, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 596-99.
89. The present section 190.2, which defines findings of special circumstance in
first degree murder cases, was added by voter initiative in 1978. However, subdivision
(a)(2) of the death penalty statute, which specifically allows prior murder convictions
to be findings of special circumstance, is identical to subdivision (c)(5) of former sec-
tion 190.2 of the death penalty statute passed by the Legislature in 1977. See Andrews,
49 Cal. 3d at 222, 776 P.2d at 298, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West
1988).
90. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597. ("[It would
have been possible for him to have been convicted of murder as an adult [in Califor-
nia]. The offense thus 'would be punishable' as murder if committed in California,
within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2).") (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 222, 776 P.2d at 298-99, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
92. Id. at 222, 776 P.2d at 298, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597. The court did find the defend-
ant's offense to be punishable as murder in California: "Any minor between the ages
of 16 and 18 who commits murder in California, and has been found unfit to be treated
as a juvenile, can be tried and convicted as an adult and thus be liable to punishment
as a murderer." Id. at 222, 776 P.2d at 298, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
94. Id. at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 598. However, the court refused to
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The defendant in Andrews claimed that treating the prior convic-
tion as a special circumstance was a denial of equal protection, be-
cause a sixteen year old facing trial as an adult in California is
entitled to a fitness hearing prior to trial.95 In Alabama, the defend-
ant did not receive such a hearing.96 The California Supreme Court
concluded that, although the two states followed different proce-
dures, there was no denial of equal protection by giving the Alabama
conviction equal weight in California for purposes of a special cir-
cumstance finding.97 "[A]s long as the guilt ascertainment process in
the foreign jurisdiction is not in and of itself constitutionally flawed,
there is no constitutional bar against treating a murder conviction
from a foreign state in the same manner as a California conviction
for the same offense."98 Because they found no such "constitutional
flaw," the majority upheld the special circumstance finding.99
V. PENALTY PHASE
A. Boyde v. California: Implications for California Supreme Court
Reviews of Death Penalty Cases
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Boyde v. Cali-
fornialOO has been heralded as the ruling that "eliminates [the] last
sweeping challenge to [the] California [death] statute."01 In that
case, the Court held that jury instructions required by section 190.3
of the California Penal Code (formerly CALJIC 8.84.1) do not violate
express a view on the "validity of a prior-murder special-circumstance finding which is
based on the conviction of defendant under the age of 16 in a jurisdiction which per-
mits such a minor to be tried as an adult." Id. at n.19 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 598. This equal protection argu-
ment was also flatly rejected by Justice Mosk's concurrence. He stated that section
190.2(a)(2) specifically allows for equal treatment of murder convictions from different
jurisdictions that use completely different processes. Id, at 235-36, 776 P.2d at 307-08,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting). ("[W]hat defendant seems to
be attempting to raise is, strictly speaking, a claim of denial of due process... he fails,
however, to adequately support such a point.").
96. Id. at 223, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
97. Id. at 224, 776 P.2d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990) (affirming People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25,
250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988)). The defendant in Boyde was convicted of murdering a clerk
at a 7-Eleven store in Riverside, California. The defendant contended on appeal that
the jury was not instructed on the possibility of considering mercy and the defendant's
background as mitigating factors. Id. at 1194; see also Death Penalty Law II, supra
note 3, at 1173.
101. L.A. Times, March 6, 1990, at A-3, col. 1.
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a defendant's rights, because a reasonable juror would understand
that the instructions permit the consideration of factors such as sym-
pathy and the defendant's background.102 The Boyde decision also af-
firmed the California Supreme Court's earlier ruling that "the jury
was adequately informed as to its discretion in determining whether
death was the appropriate penalty."103
In Boyde, the defendant's principle argument was that the jury in-
structions given in accordance with section 190.3104 misled the
jury.105 The defendant asserted that the jury misunderstood its duty
102. 110 S. Ct. at 1198-99; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); infra note
104.
103. See Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1195 (quoting People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 541, 726
P.2d 516, 531, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 849 (1985)).
104. Section 190.3 provides the basis for instructions on the jury's responsibility in
determining both aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding whether to sen-
tence a convicted murderer to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role. It provides, in part:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which in-
volved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the
defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for
his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the sub-
stantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not defendant at the time of the offense the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to he requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or
defect, or the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard
and considered the arguments of the counsel, the trier of fact shall consider,
take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the
trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the miti-
gating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating cir-
cumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall
impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1985) (emphasis added).
105. People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 255, 758 P.2d at 49, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 108; see in-
fra notes 113-23 and accompanying text for a description and analysis of the history of
such instructional errors.
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in determining the appropriate sentence, resulting in a "mere
mechanical counting" of factors. 06 In addressing this argument, the
United States Supreme Court focused on the likelihood of an im-
proper imposition of the death penalty by the jury. 0 7 The Court con-
cluded that the jury instructions'0 8 did not remove from the jury's
consideration such relevant circumstances as the defendant's back-
ground and character, and the jury's own sympathy for the defend-
ant.109 The Court emphasized the context in which the instructions
were given: both the prosecutor and the defense counsel stated that
other factors could be considered in mitigation, and that the weighing
process gave broad discretion to the jury." 0
Thus, the Supreme Court's opinion in Boyde approved of Califor-
nia's statutory and judicial treatment of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in death penalty cases. Chief Justice Lucas had stated
previously: "We believe we have made substantially accurate law in
the death penalty field.""' The United States Supreme Court agreed
in the Boyde decision." 2
106. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1195. See also People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 253, 758 P.2d
at 48, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
107. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1197. Specifically, the opinion stated: "We think the
proper inquiry... is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied
the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally
relevant evidence." Id. at 1198.
108. In Boyde, the instructions given were CALJIC 8.84.1, stated as follows:
In determining which penalty is to be imposed on [each] defendant, you
shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of
the trial of this case, (except as you may be hereafter instructed]. You shall
consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applica-
ble: ....
CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 8.84.1 (West 4th 1979) (the instruction has since undergone
several revisions). Instructions as to aggravating and mitigating factors were then
given according to section 190.3 of the California Penal Code. See supra note 104 for
text of section 190.3.
109. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1198-1201.
110. Id.
111. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 2; see also Death Penalty Law I, supra note
3, at 452.
112. The state supreme court followed the United States Supreme Court's Boyde
decision in affirming death sentences in three of the six cases reviewed. See People v.
Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 783 P.2d 211, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852; see also supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text (analyzing Jackson); People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200, 776 P.2d
285, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583; see also supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text (analyzing
Andrews); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d 957, 782 P.2d 708, 264 Cal. Rptr. 367; see infra
notes 130-40 (analyzing Hunter). The Boyde decision has thus been credited with a
"cloud that has hung over more than 100 convictions." L.A. Times Mar. 6, 1990, at A3,
col. 1 (describing a statement by California Attorney General John Van de Kamp).
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B Instructional Errors
1. Brown error
The foregoing discussion of Boyde provides an introduction to pen-
alty phase jury instruction issues on appeal. In 1985, the California
Supreme Court held in People v. Brown 11 3 that instructions based on
CALJIC 8.84.2,114 created the possibility of misleading the jury."i5
However, the California court's opinions reviewed during this survey
period involving Brown error allegations'1 6 emphasized that the stan-
dard CA.JIC 8.84.2. instructions were not given in isolation.17
Therefore, the court in these cases ruled that there was no possibility
of a misinformed jury. 18 In asserting this, the California court
stressed a proposition fully endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court in the Boyde decision: given the context of the instructions, a
113. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd on other grounds
sub. nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
114. The instruction states:
If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you deter-
mine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
CALJIC 8.84.2 (West 4th ed. 1979).
115. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 536-37, 726 P.2d at 528-29, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47. The
court in Brown reversed the death sentence, based on the defendant's claim that the
jury was misinformed as to its actual discretion in sentencing. The court held that it is
error to give an antisympathy instruction at the penalty phase of a capital trial in con-
junction with CALJIC 8.84.2. Id. The court specifically asserted that a jury might mis-
understand the scope of its discretion in the penalty phase of the trial. In cases
following Brown, the court said: "Our concerns [are] twofold and interrelated: that a
juror might understand his function as (i) merely the 'counting' of factors and then (ii)
reaching an 'automatic' decision, with no exercise of personal responsibility for decid-
ing, by his own standards, which penalty was appropriate." Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 984-
85, 782 P.2d at 624, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (quoting People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 256,
753 P.2d 669-688, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 732 (1988)).
116. See Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1208, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (defendant
claimed instruction was erroneous because it called for a "mechanical application of
the weighing process"); Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d at 228-29, 776 P.2d at 302-03, 260 Cal. Rptr.
at 601-602 (defendant asserted that the instruction misrepresented the scope of jurors'
sentencing discretion); Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 985, 782 P.2d at 624, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 383
(defendant specifically pointed to prosecutor's comment that the jury's duty was a
"simple... balancing test" in asserting that the jury was misled as to their actual sen-
tencing discretion).
117. See Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1208, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (court
stated that both the prosecutor and defense counsel had informed the jury of its dis-
cretion in weighing each factor); Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d at 229, 776 P.2d at 303, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 602 ("[the prosecutor] never told the jury to engage in a mechanical counting
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances") (emphasis added); Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at
985, 782 P.2d at 625, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (court pointed out that the prosecutor told
jurors that a single mitigating factor could outweigh multiple aggravating factors, de-
pending on the importance the jury gave to each).
118. In the cases discussing Brown error, the court stated that counsels' arguments
were important factors when considering whether a reasonable jury could have been
misled about its duty in determining the sentence.
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"reasonable juror" would not have been misled.119 The Court in
Boyde emphasized that "Ulurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths
parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning .... Differences
among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in
the deliberative process, with common sense understanding of the in-
structions in light of all that has taken place at the trial .... "120
The California Supreme Court follows the Boyde analysis in re-
viewing appeals alleging Brown error:
A majority of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, upon reviewing our
Brown decision, stressed the necessity of analyzing the record ineach case to
determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in con-
junction with prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its re-
sponsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence of the case.
1 2 1
Thus, as in Brown,122 severe implications of possible error in jury
instructions may lead to a death penalty reversal. However, given
the California and the United States Supreme Courts' strict attention
to all statements made by prosecution and defense counsel, the odds
for a successful Brown error appeal are weighed heavily against the
defendant.123
2. Factor (k) Error
Two of the death penalty appeal cases in this survey that claimed
Brown error also alleged factor (k)124 instructional error.125 Factor
119. See Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1208, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872; Andrews,
49 Cal. 3d at 228-29, 776 P.2d at 303-04, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 601; Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 986,
782 P.2d at 625, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
120. Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990).
121. People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 777, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 107
(1987).
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
123. In most cases, instructions specifically state that the jury has discretion to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In Hunter, the court pointed to
an instruction given in addition to the standard CALJIC 8.84.2 that specified the dis-
cretion given to the jury in weighing each factor:
In weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, you are not to merely
count the numbers on each side. You are instructed rather, to weigh and con-
sider the factors. One mitigating or aggravating circumstance may be suffi-
cient to support a decision that death is or is not the appropriate punishment
in this case. The weight you give to any factor is for you, individually, to de-
cide. The particular weight of such opposing circumstances is not determined
by the relative number, but rather by their relative convincing force on the
ultimate question of punishment.
Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 985, 782 P.2d at 624, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
124. "Factor (k)" refers to section 190.3(k) of the California Penal Code. The factor
(k) instruction allows a jury to consider in mitigation "[a]ny other circumstance which
extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
CAL PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988); see supra note 104 and accompanying text
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(k) error is also known as Easley error, referring to the case holding
that "factor (k) could in some situations unduly limit the jury's con-
sideration of evidence relating to the general character, family back-
ground, or other aspect of the defendant." 12 6 In the cases alleging
factor (k)/Easley error, each defendant sought reversal because the
jury was not instructed that it could consider any aspect of a defend-
ant's background or character as a possible mitigating
circumstance.12 7
The defendants in both People v. Jackson and People v. Hunter ar-
gued that the language in section 190.3(k) of the Penal Code 128 limits
the mitigating factors that a jury may consider, particularly with re-
gard to a defendant's background and character.129 The court dis-
agreed with this claim in both cases, pointing to prosecution and
defense counsel statements made during trial.130 The majority opin-
(quoting California Penal Code § 190.3); see People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163, 680
P.2d 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1984) (death penalty reversed because the jury was in-
structed explicitly that it could not consider sympathy or pity in mitigation); see also
Death Penalty Law I, supra note 3, at 459-462, and Death Penalty Law II, supra note 3,
at 1174-76 (discussing previous appeals alleging factor (k) error).
125. See People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 1207, 783 P.2d 211, 231, 264 Cal. Rptr.
852, 872 (1989); Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 989-90 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386; see
infra notes 141-45 (facts of Hunter).
126. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1207, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (citing People
v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983)). The supreme court in
Jackson approved of the trial court's additional instructions given pursuant to the sug-
gestion in Easley. Id. The instructions given were as follows:
As to those factors that you find to be mitigating, they are only examples of
some of the factors that you may consider in determining punishment of this
case. You should pay careful attention to them and give them the weight to
which you find them to be entitled. You are not required to limit your consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances to these factors. You may also consider
other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant as reasons for not
imposing the death sentence. Any mitigating circumstance, standing alone,
may be sufficient to support a decision that life without the possibility of pa-
role is the appropriate punishment, provided that the mitigating circumstance
or circumstances outweigh(s) any aggravating circumstance or circumstances.
Id. (the jurors were also instructed that they could consider sympathy or pity in miti-
gation) (emphasis in original).
127. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1207, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872; Hunter, 49
Cal. 3d at 989-90, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
129. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1207, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872 ("[d]efendant
[asserts] the jury was not instructed that it might consider as a mitigating factor any
aspect of defendant's character or record"); Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 989-90, 782 P.2d at
627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386 ("defendant maintains that the court's instructions improp-
erly limited the jury's consideration of his mitigating background and character
evidence").
130. Jackson, 49 Cal. 2d at 1207, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872; Hunter, 49
Cal. 3d at 989-90, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386. In Hunter, the jury heard a
modified factor (k) instruction that expressly permitted the consideration of factors
"including but not limited to the defendant's character, background, history, mental
condition, and physical condition." Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 989, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal.
Rptr. at 386.
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ions in Jackson 131 and Hunter132 stressed that these statements pre-
vented any possible misinterpretation of the instruction. Relevant
statements cited by the supreme court included the Jackson defense
counsel's marked reference to the "impoverished environment" in
which the defendant was raised133 and the prosecutor's remark in
Hunter addressing the defendant's background as "potentially miti-
gating evidence."134 The court in both cases thus rejected claims that
a reasonable juror could have mistakenly assumed that background
and character were not mitigating factors. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that in light of all the evidence admitted, including the state-
ments made during the trial,135 there was no factor (k)/Easey error
in Jackson or Hunter.136
Again, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Boyde
supports the California Supreme Court's position. In Boyde, the
United States Supreme Court found no legitimate basis for the al-
leged factor (k) error: "Even were the language of the [factor (k)] in-
struction less clear than we think, the context of the proceedings
would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of peti-
tioner's background and character could be considered in mitiga-
tion."'13 7 The Court ruled that background and character clearly are
factors that may "extenuate the gravity of the crime" and, therefore,
their possible use in mitigation is clearly allowed by the factor (k)
instruction.138
The California Supreme Court also employed the controversial fac-
tor (k) instruction as the saving remedy for other defense claims
based on instructional error. In People v. Hunter, the defendant ad-
ditionally contended that his emotional problems 139 would not consti-
tute "extreme mental or emotional disturbance," as described in
131. Justice Panelli wrote the opinion of the court in Jackson. Justice Mosk con-
curred separately, and was joined by Justice Broussard.
132. Justice Kaufman wrote the opinion of the unanimous court in Hunter.
133. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1207, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
134. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 990, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
135. See Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d at 1207-08, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872;
Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 989-90, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
136. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1208, 783 P.2d at 231, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 872; Hunter, 49 Cal.
3d at 990, 782 P.2d at 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
137. Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1199 (1990).
138. Id,
139. In Hunter, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for
the premeditated killing of his father and stepmother. The defendant claimed that he
was emotionally disturbed because of mental and physical abuse inflicted by his father.
Testimony by a psychiatrist attested to the possible effect of such abuse. Hunter, 49
Cal. 3d at 987-88, 782 P.2d at 625-26, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
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section 190.3(d) of the California Penal Code.140 The defendant thus
claimed that the jury may not have considered this "lesser" distur-
bance in mitigation, because of the lack of such a specific instruc-
tion.141 Justice Kaufman, writing for a unanimous court, disagreed
with the defendant's assertion. The opinion stressed the importance
of the factor (k) instruction which was given, because it allows the
jury to consider a broad range of factors in mitigation of a crime.142
Therefore, any emotional disturbance that would not be categorized
as "extreme" for purposes of section 190.3(d) could still be regarded
as a mitigating factor under the "catchall" provision of section
190.3(k).143
The defendant in People v. Lang 4 4 also argued that the lack of a
specific instruction to ensure consideration of background and char-
acter in mitigation established reversible error. However, he addi-
tionally challenged the trial court's definitions of "aggravating" and
"mitigating."145 The supreme court rejected these arguments, again
asserting that the inclusion of section 190.3(k) instructions allowed
jurors to consider many factors that were not specifically identified
in the instructions.146
Thus, the cases reviewed in this survey period suggest that both
Brown and factor (k)/Easley claims may be in decline. The court's
emphasis on viewing jury instructions in the context of the entire
trial makes it difficult for defense attorneys to successfully attack the
language of section 190.3 instructions.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In People v. Lang, the defendant's attorney acceded to his client's
140. 1& See supra note 104 and accompanying text (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 which was given in the case).
141. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 987-88, 782 P.2d at 626, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
142. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d at 987-88, 782 P.2d at 626, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 385 ("this 'catch-
all' provision is sufficient to permit the penalty jury to take into account a mental con-
dition of the defendant which, though perhaps not deemed 'extreme,' nonetheless
mitigates the seriousness of the offense"). The court also emphasized the defense
counsel's statements regarding the jury's ability to consider the defendant's emotional
disturbance in mitigation. Id
143. Id
144. 49 Cal. 3d 991, 782 P.2d 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1989).
145. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1035, 782 P. 2d at 656-57, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 415-416. The de-
fendant based his argument on the definition of "mitigate" given to the jury ("to make
less severe or painful; to cause to become less harsh or hostile"). The defendant
claimed that this definition implied that only factors which "pertain directly to the
crime" could be considered in mitigation, thus ruling out background and character.
IS
146. Id at 1036-37, 782 P.2d at 657, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The jury heard a modified
factor (k) instruction that allowed consideration of "any... circumstance which exten-
uates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and
any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." I&
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request not to call the defendant's grandmother as a character wit-
ness. 14 7 Although this agreement resulted from the defendant's ex-
press request, the defendant claimed on appeal that it was the result
of an ineffective counsel. The court, focusing upon the defendant's
role, rejected this as a grounds for reversal.4 8 The court asserted
that it was "not on any antecedent act or omission of counsel" that
defendant based his claim, but on defendant's own action.149
Although the court conceded that the presentation of mitigating evi-
dence was important, it pointed out that other mitigating evidence
had been presented at trial. 5 0 After determining that evidence
presented at trial of the defendant's good behavior during incarcera-
tion could have been considered in mitigation,151 the court refused to
label as "ineffective" the attorney's decision to follow his client's
wishes.152
The court additionally explained that even if the counsel's action
was inappropriate, the "invited error" doctrine would prevent a re-
versal. 5 3 This theory distinguishes between an error produced solely
by the justice system and one that is actually instigated by the
party. 5 4 The doctrine "operates to estop a party from asserting error
147. 49 Cal. 3d at 1029, 782 P.2d at 652, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The grandmother was
to have testified regarding the defendant's background and emotional state. "Counsel
stated that defendant, to his credit as a human being... did not want to put his elderly
grandmother through that kind of experience of the emotional trauma of having to
come [to the trial] and testify." Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 1032-33, 782 P.2d at 654, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
149. Id. The court asserted that counsel had not acted unreasonably in refusing to
call the defendant's grandmother: "While selection of defense witnesses is generally a
matter of trial tactics over which the attorney, rather than the client, has ultimate con-
trol ... it does not necessarily follow that an attorney acts incompetently in honoring a
client's request not to present certain evidence for non-tactical reasons." Id. at 1031,
782 P.2d at 653, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
150. Id. at 1030, 782 P.2d at 653, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
151. Id. ("[Iln the present case, some mitigating evidence was presented, in the
form of the jail officer's testimony to defendant's good conduct while incarcerated
pending trial.")
152. Id. at 1033, 782 P.2d at 654, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The court stated: "To require
defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be
inconsistent with an attorney's paramount duty of loyalty to the client and would un-
dermine the trust, essential for effective representation, existing between attorney and
client." Id. at 1031, 782 P.2d at 653, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing Bonnie, The Dignity of
the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1380-89 (1988); Carter, Maintaining Systemic In-
tegrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to' Present Mitigating
Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 130-45 (1987)).
153. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1031-32, 782 P.2d at 654, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (citing People
v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 549-50 n.3, 591 P.2d 63, 65-66 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-43 (1979)).
154. See 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 301-306 (1985 & Supp.
1989).
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when the party's own conduct has induced its commission."' 55 The
court thus found no error since the challenged actions resulted from
the defendant's specific request.156
D. Proportionality Review
A final issue that continues to be a frequent basis for appeal of
death penalty cases is the assertion that the lack of intercase propor-
tionality violates federal eighth amendment rights.157 Intercase pro-
portionality review involves contrasting the penalties given to
different defendants convicted of similar crimes. Four of the six
cases reviewed herein included proportionality claims, all of which
were rejected by the court. 5 8
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Pulley v. Harris '5 9
concluded that the eighth amendment does not require intercase pro-
portionality review in California's death penalty cases. The Pulley
court stated that, "[tihere is... no basis in our cases for holding that
comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required
in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the defend-
ant requests it.... We are not persuaded that the eighth amendment
requires us to take that course."16 0
In People v. Andrews, the California Supreme Court focused on the
brutality of the defendant's acts to determine that the death sentence
was not a disproportionate punishment.' 6 ' Similarly, the majority in
People v. Carrera stressed that, "[t]here is nothing in this death sen-
tence disproportionate in any sense to the culpability of a defendant
found guilty of the deaths of two victims from multiple stab wounds
in the course of a robbery." 62 The court, therefore, rejected the two
155. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1031-32, 782 P.2d at 654, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
156. Id. at 1032, 782 P.2d at 654, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
157. The eighth amendment provides: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. const.,
amend, VIII (emphasis added); see Death Penalty Law II, supra note 3, at 1199-1201
(discussion of previous proportionality claims). For an analysis of proportionality and
the eighth amendment, see Bradley, Proportionality in Capital and Non-Capital Sen-
tencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 1433 (1985).
158. See People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200, 776 P.2d 285, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1989),
modified, 49 Cal. 3d 698A (1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990); People v. Bell, 49
Cal. 3d 502, 778 P.2d 129, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2576 (1990);
People v. Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291, 777 P.2d 121, 261 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1989), modified, 49
Cal. 3d 956A (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1938 (1990); People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991,
782 P.2d 627, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1989).
159. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
160. Id. at 50-51.
161. 49 Cal. 3d at 234, 776 P.2d at 307, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 605; see supra note 87 and
accompanying text for a description of the defendant's crimes in Andrews.
162. 49 Cal. 3d at 346, 777 P.2d at 156, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 383; see supra note 55 and
accompanying text describing the defendant's crimes in Carrera.
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claims that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crimes
committed.
The defendants in three of the cases raising disproportionality
claims alleged that California's "disparate sentence" law violated
their equal protection rights because it treats capital defendants dif-
ferently than noncapital defendants. 163 The disparate sentence stat-
ute provides for the review of noncapital cases by the Board of Prison
Terms to ensure intercase sentencing proportionality. 164
The court rejected all three claims, citing its decision in People v.
Allen,165 which stated that "equal protection does not require 'dispa-
rate sentence' review of death sentences under section 1170, subdivi-
sion (f)."166 The court in Allen enumerated three reasons why such a
review is not constitutionally required: (1) it is primarily the jury's
duty to determine sentencing in first degree murder cases, and that
responsibility should not be usurped by review long after the jury has
been discharged; (2) the disparate sentence law is intended to prevent
a penalty beyond the "normal range" given for similar crimes; be-
cause the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole are
the only two sentences for first degree murder, neither is beyond the
narrow "normal range;" and (3) "nonquantifiable" factors such as
the defendant's background and character must be allowed to play a
major role in capital sentencing.167
Although the supreme court has emphatically rejected claims that
intercase proportionality was constitutionally required for capital
cases, it has been suggested that such a review might legitimize death
sentences by ensuring their consistent and evenhanded application.168
163. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d at 234, 776 P.2d at 306-07, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05; Bell, 49
Cal. 3d at 553, 778 P.2d at 160, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 32; Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1043, 782 P.2d at
662, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 421. Section 1170(f) of the Penal Code, the "disparate sentence"
statute, grants comparative sentence review to noncapital defendants. See Andrews, 49
Cal. 3d at 234 & n.27, 776 P.2d at 307 & n.26, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 605 & n.26 (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(f)).
164. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (West 1984).
165. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
872 (1987).
166. See, e.g., Lang, 49 Cal. 3d at 1043, 782 P.2d at 662, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (citing
Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1285-88, 729 P.2d at 155-57, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 889-91).
167. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1286-88, 729 P.2d at 156, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
168. See Comment, A critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality
Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REV. 719, 741 (1988). ("The proportional-
ity question remains essentially a legal problem of how much inconsistency a court is
willing to tolerate in its capital sentencing system.") The article contends that the dis-
parate sentencing statute, presently applied only in noncapital cases, should also apply
to capital sentencing.
1117
However, the court is reluctant to displace any of the jury's responsi-
bility in determining the appropriateness of the death sentence for
first degree murder.169
VI. CONCLUSION
The affirmance of all six death penalty appeals reviewed in this
survey period reflects the Lucas court's continuing emphasis on view-
ing the totality of a case when determining whether flaws at trial
constitute reversible error. This was evident in the California
Supreme Court's analysis of jury instruction issues, where it ex-
amined instructions in the context of all that was said by the defense
and prosecution during the trial.
The guilt phase of the trial in the cases reviewed provided only one
reversal, on a severed count which did not result in the reversal of
the defendant's death sentence. In reviewing claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, the court emphasized the lack of objection by defense
counsel at the time of the misconduct. The court deemed any such
lack of objection as a waiver of the objection.
While the special circumstance phase of trial triggered a lengthy
analysis on only one claim of error, the penalty phase allowed the
Lucas court to elaborate on its interpretation of Brown and factor (k)
instructional errors. The court emphasized the "reasonable juror"
standard,170 and, in a timely approval of the Lucas court's approach
to such claims, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court approach in Boyde v. California,17 1 using a
very similar analysis.
In employing a thorough review of the entire trial and not merely
of the alleged errors, the Lucas court continued its dependence on
the "harmless error" doctrine. In doing so, the court was emphatic in
its stance that when the crimes are particularly egregious and the ev-
idence is overwhelming, minor procedural flaws during the trial will
not lead to a reversal of a jury's death sentence.
The death penalty has become a timely issue and groups on both
sides are voicing their opinions in a more organized and effective
way. The Lucas court's reaction to this significant public awareness
will become much more evident in future death penalty reviews.
Although Robert Alton Harris may not be the man that will end the
execution hiatus in California, his scheduled execution nonetheless
set the stage for a climax that will occur. The implementation of the
death penalty in California is imminent. The impact of an actual
death at the hands of the criminal justice system in California may
169. See supra note 100-58 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
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bring to the foreground legitimate issues on appeal that were not in-
troduced in appeals immediately following the trial.
STATHY PANOPOULOS
ROBERT J. MILLS
V. EVIDENCE LAW
A. The required affidavit showing "good cause"for the
discovery of peace officer personnel records pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1043(b) may be based on
information and belief: City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Pitchess v. Superior
Court ' and the subsequent codification of that decision in the Califor-
nia Penal2 and Evidence Codes3 allow a defendant to seek discovery
of the personnel records of a peace officer if the information sought
is both relevant and material to the litigation of his case.4 Section
832.85 of the Penal Code defines "personnel records," while section
1. 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974). The court in Pitchess
stated:
[A]n accused in a criminal prosecution may compel discovery by demonstrat-
ing that the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the
facts and a fair trial. The requisite showing may be satisfied by general allega-
tions which establish some cause for discovery other than "a mere desire for
the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their
investigation of the crime."
Id. at 536-37, 522 P.2d at 309, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (citations omitted). Motions follow-
ing this decision were called "Pitchess motions." See generally 2 B. WITmIN, CALIFOR-
NIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence § 1641 (3d ed. 1986).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832.7-.8 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1990).
3. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1043-45 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1990).
4. The discovery of a police officer's personnel records are governed by sections
1043 and 1045 of the California Evidence Code. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (re-
garding privileges for "official information"). For discussion of a defendant's right to
discovery of a peace officer's personnel records, see generally B. JEFFERSON, JEFFER-
SON'S SYNOPSIS OF CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 42.2 (1985); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVI-
DENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §§ 1642-47 (3d ed. 1986); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 2850-51 (1985); Comment, Review of Selected 1978 California Legisla-
tion, 10 PAC. L.J. 247, 431-33 (1975); Annotation, Accused's Right to Discovery or In-
spection of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of,
Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R. 3D 1170 (1978).
5. Section 832.8 states in pertinent part:
As used in Section 832.7, "personnel records" means any file maintained
under that individual's name by his or her employing agency and containing
records relating to:
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832.76 states that those records are "confidential" and subject to dis-
covery pursuant only to procedures set forth in sections 10437 and
10468 of the Evidence Code. Evidence Code section 1043(b) requires
that the motion seeking discovery of the personnel records contain,
inter alia, an affidavit showing both good cause for need of the infor-
mation as well as its materiality to the case.9 The issue in City of
Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court 10 was whether "good cause" under
section 1043(b) requires that the affidavit be based on the affiant's
personal knowledge, or whether the affidavit could be based merely
on information and belief.11 The supreme court ruled that an affida-
vit for a showing of good cause may be based solely on information
and belief.12 The court also held that the type of information sought
need not be particularized nor based on personal knowledge; how-
ever, the request must be made with sufficient specificity so as to pre-
(d) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline;
(e) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or
transaction in which he participated, or which he perceived, and pertaining to
the manner in which he performed his duties; or
(f) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.8 (Deering 1986).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (Deering Supp. 1990).
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (Deering Supp. 1990).
8. Section 1046 provides:
In any case, otherwise authorized by law, in which the party seeking disclo-
sure is alleging excessive force by a peace officer in connection with the arrest
of that party, the motion shall include a copy of the police report setting forth
the circumstances under which the party was stopped and arrested.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1046.
9. Section 1043(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a motion for discovery of peace
officer personnel records shall include:
(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is
sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace officer whose
records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of
the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or dis-
closure shall be heard,
(2) A description of the type of records or information sought,
(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, set-
ting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency
identified has the records or information from the records.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(b).
10. 49 Cal. 3d 74, 776 P.2d 222, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1989). Justice Kaufman wrote
the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Kennard concurring. Chief
Justice Lucas dissented in a separate opinion. Justice Panelli dissented in a separate
opinion in which Justice Eagleson concurred. Id
11. Id. at 78, 776 P.2d at 223, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 521. The defendant was charged
with brandishing a knife and resisting arrest. The police report confirmed the use of
force to subdue the defendant. Defense counsel moved for discovery of all prior com-
plaints of excessive force or violence with respect to the arresting officers. The motion
was based on the police report and counsel's affidavit on information and belief.
12. Id. at 89, 776 P.2d at 231, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
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vent a "fishing expedition" by the defendant.13
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Underlying the supreme court's decision is the basic proposition
that an accused has a fundamental right to a fair trial. As part of a
fair trial, the accused must be given an intelligent defense in light of
"all relevant and reasonably accessible information."i4 Another fun-
damental right at issue, however, is the peace officer's right of pri-
vacy. The court determined that the criminal defendant's need for
relevant information, and the peace officer's need to protect confi-
dential information, were each sufficiently safeguarded by sections
1043 and 1045 of the Evidence Code.' 5
The California Supreme Court noted that the United States
Supreme Court previously stated that "'the value of averments on
information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized.' "16
By this, the California Supreme Court rejected the notion that an af-
fidavit is presumed to be based on personal knowledge, and held that
information and belief alone are sufficient to support the affidavit.17
After deciding that an affidavit based on information and belief is
sufficient in a variety of contexts, the court then determined that sec-
tion 1043 itself did not require an affidavit based on personal knowl-
edge.' 8 Most persuasive to the court was the fact that the legislature,
when drafting section 1043, considered and rejected a requirement of
personal knowledge with respect to the affidavit.'9 The court con-
cluded that the legislative history and case law2O pointed convinc-
ingly to the acceptability of an affidavit on information and belief in
13. Id at 92-93, 776 P.2d at 233-34, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32.
14. Id at 84, 776 P.2d at 234-35, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (quoting Pitchess, 11 Cal. 3d
531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974)) (emphasis added).
15. City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 94, 776 P.2d at 234-35, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
16. 1& at 87, 776 P.2d at 229, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 527 (quoting Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 34 (1921)).
17. City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 88, 776 P.2d at 230, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
18. Md at 88-89, 776 P.2d at 230-31, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29.
19. Id at 89, 776 P.2d at 231, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 529 (discussing legislative history).
20. For case law prior to the enactment of section 1043, see Kelvin L. v. Superior
Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 823, 133 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1976); In re Valerie E., 50 Cal. App. 3d
213, 123 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975). For case law subsequent to the enactment of section
1043, see Jalilie v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 487, 250 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987); Larry
E. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 25, 239 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1987); see also People v.
Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 658, 700 P.2d 446, 214 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1985) (section 1043(b) does not
require a personal affidavit from defendant; an affidavit from counsel is sufficient).
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this context. 21
The court then dismissed the "catch 22" reasoning that the affiant
must demonstrate personal knowledge of the particular items of in-
formation sought.22 Section 1043 requires only a "description of the
type of information sought."23 The section also states that the affida-
vit must be based "upon reasonable belief" that the governmental
agency "has the records or information from the records."2 4 More-
over, the legislature expressly rejected an early draft of the bill con-
taining a description of the "particular" records and information
sought, while requiring only a description of the "type."25 The court
concluded that "[i]n requiring only a 'reasonable belief' that the gov-
ernmental agency has the 'type' of information sought, the statute
says what it means and means precisely what it says." 26
The court, however, was mindful of the privacy concerns of a peace
officer, and the possibility of using the discovery tool as a means of
harassment, annoyance, or oppression. 27 The court noted that the
legislature went beyond the court's holding in Pitchess when enacting
section 1045 of the Evidence Code which governs the procedure by
which personnel records are made discoverable.28 The section not
only provides for in camera viewing of the information, but also sets
guidelines for what information is discoverable and how the informa-
tion may be used.2 9 With these statutory safeguards, the court deter-
mined that the peace officer's legitimate privacy concerns were not
sacrificed in favor of the needs of the accused. 30
B. Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Lucas, in a separate dissenting opinion, stated his
concern over the unforeseeable abuses and demands for discovery
that the majority's holding might permit.3 1 In what appears to be a
note to the legislature, he stated that the legislature "retains the au-
thority to review this decision and take appropriate responsive
21. City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 89, 776 P.2d at 231, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
22. Id. at 90, 776 P.2d at 231, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 529. Following the appellate court's
reasoning, an accused would need to know the name of a prior complainant in order to
discover the name of that prior complainant.
23. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
24. Id. at § 1043(b)(3). The court found it persuasive that the legislature did not
include the standard phrase "information and belief," but adopted the lower standard
of "reasonable belief." City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 93 n.9, 776 P.2d at 234 n.9, 260
Cal. Rptr. 532 n.9.
25. City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 92, 776 P.2d at 233, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
26. Id. at 92-93, 776 P.2d at 233, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
27. l at 84, 94, 776 P.2d at 227, 234, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 525, 532.
28. Id. at 94, 776 P.2d at 234, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
29. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045 (Deering 1986).
30. City of Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 94, 776 P.2d at 234, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
31. Id. at 95, 776 P.2d at 235, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 533 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
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action."3 2
Justice Panelli dissented for several reasons. Contrary to the ma-
jority's analysis, he stated that the legislative intent was to limit ac-
cess to personnel files.33 One basis for this conclusion was the fact
that the attorney general originally drafted the bill to protect the
rights of law enforcement officers.34 The focus of his concern was
that the court's holding would increase the ease with which an ac-
cused could gain access to the confidential personnel files of law en-
forcement agencies.3 5
III. CONCLUSION
The court concluded that the legislature created a "fair and worka-
ble balance" between the defendant's right to a fair trial and to ac-
quire information relevant to his defense on the one hand and, on the
other, the peace officer's right to be protected from an unwarranted
invasion of confidential information.36 Section 1043 allows the de-
fendant to seek confidential information as long as it is relevant and
material to the pending litigation. Section 1045 protects the peace of-
ficer by imposing procedural limitations on disclosure. The court's
decision appears to have little or no effect on the "pro forma"
method of discovery of peace officer personnel records currently used
in California.37 In fact, the court simply affirmed the established
practice previously approved by all courts of appeals addressing the
issue prior to the decision here granted review.38
JOHN M. BOWERS
32. Id, (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
33. Id at 96-98, 776 P.2d at 236-37, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 96, 776 P.2d at 236, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 534 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 101-02, 776 P.2d at 240, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
36. Id at 94, 776 P.2d at 234, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
37. Id, at 95, 776 P.2d at 235, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 533 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice
Panelli equated the "fill in the blank" motion used by the defense to a "fishing expedi-
tion." Id
38. See City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1669, 236 Cal. Rptr.
155 (1987). The court of appeal in the instant case had relied on this recent, prior deci-
sion from its jurisdiction, which has now been overruled. For previous lower court de-
cisions in line with the supreme court's analysis, see City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 86, 776 P.2d 222, 229, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527.
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B. A psychologist's expert opinion based on standardized
written personality tests regarding the good character of a
criminal defendant need not satisfy Kelly/Frye
requirements for new scientific evidence. The opinion is
admissible, and its exclusion possibly prejudicial, if such
testimony meets traditional requirements of expert
opinion: People v. Stoll.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Stoll' determined that,
in order to be admissible to show the defendants' good character, a
psychologist's expert opinion testimony based partially on standard-
ized written personality tests2 need not meet the Kelly/Frye test of
general acceptance in the field. That test is normally required of ex-
pert testimony based on procedures novel to science and the law.4
1. 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989). Justice Eagleson deliv-
ered the opinion of the court in which Justices Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, and Kennard
concurred. Chief Justice Lucas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Kaufman
concurred.
In Stoll, two defendants, who were both convicted of several counts of lewd and las-
civious acts with children, had attempted to present the testimony of a psychologist
who would have testified that the female defendant's personality profile displayed no
"possibility for sexual deviation" and that the male defendant had tested "within the
range of normal heterosexuality." Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1150-51, 783 P.2d at 706, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 119. The psychologist deduced these findings from personal interviews with
the defendants, professional comparisons with others similarly charged, and two writ-
ten standardized personality tests with "built-in validity scales" to assure the defend-
ants' veracity. Id. at 1149, 783 P.2d at 705, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 118. The trial court
excluded the expert testimony on Kelly/Frye grounds, reasoning that the defense had
proven neither that such personality profiles of child molesters were generally ac-
cepted in the field of psychology, nor that a defendant who tests within "normal" lim-
its has not sexually harmed children. Id. at 1150-51, 783 P.2d at 706, 265 Cal. Rptr. at
119, see infra note 3 for a discussion of the Kelly/Frye test.
2. The expert in Stoll relied primarily on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI) which has existed for 37 years and consists of 566 true-false ques-
tions. The psychologist also relied on the more recent Millon Clinical Multiaxial In-
ventory (MCMI) which was copyrighted in 1976. Id. at 1147, 783 P.2d at 704, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 117.
3. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (enunciating the test for
determining whether a new scientific technique has "gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs" and applying it to exclude expert testimony re-
garding a systolic blood pressure test used for detecting lies); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.
3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (expressly adopting the test used in Frye
and clarifying additional requirements that the burden fall on the proponent of the ev-
idence, that the method be shown reliable by expert testimony, that the testifying wit-
ness be properly qualified as an expert, and that proper scientific procedures be used
in administering the technique). For an explanation of the Kelly/Frye test and its ap-
plication by the California Supreme Court, see Carter, Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in California: Retire Kelly-Frye and Return to a
Traditional Analysis, 22 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1103 (1989).
4. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1161, 783 P.2d at 714, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 127. But see Annota-
tion, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Criminal Defendant's Propensity To-
ward Sexual Deviation, 42 A.L.R. 4th 937 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (listing cases from other
states where exclusion of such expert testimony was upheld); 31 AM. JUR. 2D Expert
and Opinion Evidence § 192 (1989).
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The court further held that exclusion of such expert testimony un-
fairly prejudiced the jury5 by withdrawing from its consideration evi-
dence relevant to the defendants' good character as specifically
allowed by section 1102 of the California Evidence Code.6
Although the California Supreme Court previously established that
the Kelly/Frye rule extends to new scientific procedures based solely
upon psychological evidence,7 the court in Stoll found the rule inap-
plicable to the personality tests used by the defendants' expert here.8
The court reasoned that personality tests cannot be considered new
scientific techniques because they have been used for years in the
psychological and legal fields, and that a jury would not erroneously
interpret them to be incapable of error.9 The court asserted that the
5. See generally 1 B. WITrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 483 (3d ed. 1986) (stating
that reversible error may be committed when expert opinion testimony is wrongfully
excluded).
6. Stoll, 49 Cal. at 1153, 783 P.2d at 708, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 121. Section 1102 in its
entirety states:
In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant's character or a trait of his
character in the form of an opinion or evidence of his reputation is not made
inadmissible by Section 1101 if such evidence is:
(a) Offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in conformity with such
character or trait of character.
(b) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the defendant
under subdivision (a).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102 (West 1966); see also 17 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 617
(1984) (opinion or reputation evidence of a defendant's good character is admissible to
prove that his conduct was in accordance with such character).
7. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-67, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
272-73 (1982) (Kelly/Frye rule applies to hypnosis and precludes admission of a witness'
testimony after hypnotic sessions).
8. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1157-59, 783 P.2d at 711-12, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. The
majority criticized the dissent's assertion that the use of the personality tests to prove
that these defendants could not have committed the charged offenses, rather than sim-
ply to opine a defendant's mental state, warranted the application of Kelly/Frye. Id, at
1158, 783 P.2d at 712, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 125. See also id, at 1167, 783 P.2d at 718, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 131 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
The court also distinguished this case from People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). In Bledsoe, an expert's testimony that a rape victim
was suffering from "rape trauma syndrome" was offered to prove that the alleged rape
had occurred. The Bledsoe court held this admission to be erroneous because the the-
ory of rape trauma syndrome, although generally accepted and admissible for the pur-
pose of debunking popular misconceptions regarding the actions of rape victims after
such a trauma (e.g., to explain why rape victims do not always report a rape immedi-
ately), was not generally accepted for the purpose of proving that a rape had occurred.
Id, at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58. The Stoll court dismissed any
analogy by asserting that in Bledsoe, the court merely assumed as did both parties that
KellyFrye applied and then applied it. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1161, 783 P.2d at 714, 265
Cal. Rptr. at 127.
9. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1156-57, 783 P.2d at 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The policy of
Kelly/Frye is to prevent jury "blindsid[ing]" produced by testimony based upon either
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proper test for admissibility is whether the testimony meets "tradi-
tional limits" on expert opinion set forth in section 801 of the Califor-
nia Evidence Code.1O The court then reversed the convictions of the
defendants, claiming that the exclusion of the expert opinion in this
case was prejudicial.1 The court considered that the victims had
challenged the defendants' credibility, and the defense had little to
rely on to boost its credibility except for personal denials. The court
concluded that the jury might have been influenced by an expert's
opinion favorable to the defendants.12
The court attempted to clarify the use of the Kelly/Frye test with
regard to psychological techniques and to allow criminal defendants
more opportunity to prove their "good character" through the use of
expert opinion testimony interpreting such personality tests. By
holding the exclusion of such expert testimony prejudicial because
the child victims varied in the specifics of their accounts of the sexual
abuse,13 and because the defendants chose to rely on their own deni-
als and alibis, the court may have succeeded only in burdening child
victims while bestowing favor on the criminals who abused them.'4
DAWN SOLHEIM
an unrecognized technique or one which "appears in both name and description to pro-
vide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay
to the jury." Id The court concluded that the personality tests would not be mislead-
ing because the expert was willing to concede that at least one "admitted" child mo-
lester had tested within the normal range of the primary test and that, as to
psychotically disturbed test-takers, the test was wholly invalid. Id at 1159, 783 P.2d at
712, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
10. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1154, 783 P.2d at 708, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The court de-
clared that the psychologist's testimony met the requirements of section 801 because
his testimony could inform the jurors of the defendants' good personality traits which
they could not otherwise deduce from the defendants' testimony. Id. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 801 (West 1966).
11. People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1161-63, 783 P.2d 698, 714-15, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111,
127-28 (1989).
12. Id.; cf People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)
(evidence on "rape trauma syndrome" improperly admitted but not prejudicial).
13. The court downplayed the fact that four child victims gave the same account
of a group sex event in which all four children and all four defendants were naked in
one room while various acts were committed on their persons. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d at 1143,
783 P.2d at 701, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 114. Instead, the court placed great weight on the
children's disagreement as to the exact date and part of the house in which the events
took place and the identity of the photographer(s) who took pictures as the offenses
were committed. Id. at 1143-44, 783 P.2d at 701-02, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15. Further,
the court focused on the inconsistencies between the preliminary interview testimony
and the trial testimony given by two children regarding the female defendant, who
was their mother. Id at 1145, 783 P.2d at 702, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
14. The children had only each other as witnesses and may understandably have
been confused as to specifics, especially in view of their young age (between six and
nine years old at the time of trial) and the trauma of the events as they occurred.
Chief Justice Lucas, in dissent, emphasized this along with the fact that the children
were subjected to prolonged cross-examination of their character for truth, while the
defendants could freely bring in "experts" who used scientific-sounding methods to say
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VI. INSURANCE LAW
When an insurer breaches its duty to make a good faith
settlement attempt, expert witnesses and attorneys
retained by the insurer are not liable as civil
conspirators because the duty applies exclusively to the
insurer, not to its agents: Doctors' Company v. Superior
Court.
In Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court 2
decided that an insurer's expert witnesses and retained attorneys
cannot be held liable as civil conspirators when they are involved in
the insurer's failure to make a good faith settlement effort 3 as re-
quired by section 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code. 4 The court re-
that the offenders could not have committed the sexual acts. Id. at 1168, 783 P.2d at
718, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the expert's offer of
proof included statements that the tests he used were more than 70% accurate and
that built-in "validity scales" ensured that no deviant traits could intentionally be
concealed).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 39, 775 P.2d 508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1989).
2. Justice Kaufman wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.
3. In the underlying action, the insurer defended a third party claim by Jose
Antonio Valencia, the real party in interest. Valencia had brought a medical malprac-
tice claim against M.F. Osman, M.D. The plaintiff offered to settle before trial for the
$500,000 policy limit but, over the objections of Dr. Osman and his personal attorney,
the carrier refused to settle. At trial, the plaintiff won a $2 million judgment. Valen-
cia then filed a claim charging that the insurer had failed to make a good faith settle-
ment effort. See infra note 4. A second action claimed that the insurer, its expert
witnesses, and its retained attorneys conspired to present misleading testimony at trial,
thus justifying the insurer's failure to settle. Both complaints alleged that this conduct
denied Valencia the benefits of a fair settlement. The trial court denied the defend-
ants' demurrers to the conspiracy complaint. When the court of appeal rejected the
defendants' petition for a writ of mandate, the supreme court granted review. The
opinion in Doctors' Co. focuses on the conspiracy action; the first cause of action
against the insurer alone was not contested before the court.
The plaintiff brought his actions pursuant to Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), which created a private cause of
action for violations of section 790.03. Royal Globe was prospectively overruled by
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304-05, 758 P.2d 58, 68-69, 250
Cal. Rptr. 116, 126-27 (1988) (holding that only the Insurance Commissioner may bring
an action under section 790.03). The claims in Doctors' Co. were filed during the in-
terim between Royal Globe and Moradi-Shalal. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 43, 775 P.2d
at 510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 185. See generally California Practicum, The Overruling of
Royal Globe. A "Royal Bonanza"for Insurance Companies, But What Happens Now?,
16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989); Recent Cases, Insurance-Insurer Bad Faith-
Third-Party Claims Against Insurers Disallowed in California, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1086
(1989).
4. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). This section declares
that "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear" is a prohibited, unfair
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solved a conflict among the appellate courts 5 by holding that the
statutory duty applied only to the insurer.6 The expert witnesses and
attorneys acted only as agents of the carrier and, therefore, could not
be held liable as civil conspirators. 7
In Doctors' Co., the plaintiff argued that the expert witnesses and
attorneys retained by the insurer should be liable under section
790.03 because they had conspired with the insurer to cause a breach
of the insurer's duty.S The court followed Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co. ,9 however, and found that such collusion would not create a cause
of action under this statute' o because, as agents of the insurer, any
efforts by the witnesses and attorneys to induce a breach of duty
were privileged." The court did not suggest that torts had not been
insurance practice. Id. See generally 6 B. WrImQN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§§ 1159-1170 (9th ed. 1988); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 410 (1977 & Supp.
1989).
5. Compare Wolfrich Corp. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1206,
1211, 197 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1983) (attorneys may be liable for conspiring to breach an
insurer's duty), with Grenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d
1032, 1038-39, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486-87 (1973) (attorneys and other agents not liable
for insurer's breach of duty).
6. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d 39, 46, 775 P.2d 508, 512, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (1989);
see also CAL. INS. CODE § 790.01 ("[t]his article applies to... insurers... [insurance]
agents, brokers, solicitors... as well as all other persons engaged in the business of
insurance.").
7. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 45, 775 P.2d at 511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (quoting
Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (1963) (agents
and employees acting on behalf of a corporation do not wrongfully conspire with their
principals unless they also act for individual benefit)). See generally 16 AM. JUR. 2D
Conspiracy § 49 (1979 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Liability of Independent or Public
Insurance Adjuster to Insured for Conduct in Adjusting Claim, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 900, 908
(1986 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Civil Conspiracy to Deny FiArst-Party Insurance Ben-
efits, 49 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 473 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
8. The court disregarded the plaintiff's argument that the witnesses and attor-
neys were independent contractors rather than agents. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 46
n.4, 775 P.2d at 512 n.4, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 187 n.4. Instead, the defendants were found to
be agents and independent contractors because they worked on behalf of their princi-
pal but controlled their own physical performance. Id.; see also City of Los Angeles v.
Meyers Bros. Parking Sys., 54 Cal. App. 3d 135, 138, 126 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546 (1975).
9. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038-39, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486-87 (1973). In
Gruenberg, an insurer's lawyers and other agents were not liable for conspiring to
breach the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing.
10. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 45, 775 P.2d at 511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (quoting
Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 576, 510 P.2d at 1038-39, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87). Because the
agents committed no civil wrong under § 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code, they
could not be held liable for conspiracy. See Mox Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677-78, 262
P. 302, 303 (1927); accord Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 784, 598 P.2d 45,
51-52, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398-99 (1979) (the essence of conspiracy is finding the conspir-
ators to be joint tortfeasors, individually liable for all damages resulting from a civil
wrong); see also Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 631, 498 P.2d 1063, 1074, 102
Cal. Rptr. 815, 826 (1972) (even "atrocious" conspiracies are not actionable without a
civil wrong). See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw § 44 (9th ed.
1988).
11. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d 39, 45, 775 P.2d 508, 511, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (1989)
(quoting Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 576, 510 P.2d at 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 487). See gener-
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committed by the agents, but found that the plaintiff could not pro-
ceed against the expert witnesses and attorneys by using a statute
aimed exclusively at the insurer.12 The court's holding expressly dis-
approved WoUfrich Corp. v. United Services Automobile Ass'n,13
which had allowed recovery against an attorney for conspiracy to vio-
late this statute.14
The Doctors' Co. decision is limited to situations where agents or
employees are working on behalf of a principal, and where the duty
violated is owed solely by that principal. In cases where agents are
also acting for individual gain,15 where agents are charged with ac-
tual fraud,16 or where attorneys violate their own duties to a plain-
tiff,1 7 the court's holding in Doctors' Co. does not apply. The Doctors'
Co. decision will also not protect corporate officers or directors who
are involved in a corporation's tortious activities.'8
Finally, the court noted that this case was unusual because the
duty imposed by the Insurance Code is explicitly limited to insur-
ers.19 Had the court permitted the conspiracy action to proceed, this
ally Annotation, Liability for Procuring Breach of Contract, 26 A.L.R. 2D, 1227, 1270-
71 (1952, Later Case Service 1981 & Supp. 1989).
12. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 44, 775 P.2d at 510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
13. 149 Cal. App. 3d 1206, 1211, 197 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1983). In finding a lawyer
liable for conspiracy to violate § 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code, the Wofrich court
distinguished its tort claim from the contract issue in Gruenberg. I&
14. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 49, 775 P.2d at 514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The Doc-
tor's Co. court believed that the Wobfich court misunderstood the rationale of
Gruenberg and erroneously distinguished the two cases. The Gruenberg court dis-
missed conspiracy claims against agents because the duty breached was owed exclu-
sively by the insurer; it was irrelevant whether the claims were based in tort or
contract. Id. at 45-46, 775 P.2d at 511-12, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
15. Id. at 46, 775 P.2d at 512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 187; see also Black v. Sullivan, 48
Cal. App. 3d 557, 568-69, 122 Cal. Rptr. 119, 127 (1975) (civil conspiracy arose when an
attorney with a personal interest in the matter induced a violation of a duty owed ex-
clusively by his principal).
16. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d 39, 48, 775 P.2d 508, 513, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1989);
see also Younan v. Equifax, 111 Cal. App. 3d 498, 510-11, 169 Cal. Rptr. 478, 485-86
(1980) (agent's liability for conspiracy to commit actual fraud exists outside the in-
surer's exclusive duty of good faith and fair dealing).
17. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 47, 775 P.2d at 513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 188; see also
Barney v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 966, 982, 230 Cal. Rptr. 215, 224
(1986) (an attorney who represented both the insurer and the insured violated his own
fiduciary duty to the insured by facilitating a bad faith settlement).
18. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 48, 775 P.2d at 513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 188; see also
Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 723, 785, 598 P.2d 45, 52, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399
(1979) (officers and directors who use a corporation to defraud customers may be per-
sonally liable as civil conspirators).
19. Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d at 48, 775 P.2d at 514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 189; see, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(g) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) (unlawful for "any person" to
aid or encourage acts prohibited by the Fair Employment & Housing Act); CAL.
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would have resulted in substantial broadening of the statute. Anyone
working with a carrier that failed to make a good faith settlement ef-
fort might have faced liability for conspiracy to violate the statute,
thus contradicting the clear language of the Insurance Code. Because
the Doctors' Co. rule is so narrowly drawn,20 it may serve primarily
to discourage attempts to extend limited statutes through civil con-
spiracy theories. Thus, plaintiffs may be better served by tort actions
such as actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in their suits
against agents and employees involved in the breach of a principal's
exclusive duty.
ROBERT J. MILLS
VII. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
A. A judge may be removed from office for willful
misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
Furthermore, the combination of investigatory and
adjudicative functions of the Commission on Judicial
Performance does not deny due process, and any delay
caused in commencing disciplinary proceedings does not
violate due process where the judge has prior notice of
the investigation and suffers no actual prejudice:
Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance.
In Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court agreed with the findings and recommendation of
the Commission on Judicial Performance,2 and ordered the removal
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25189.2 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989) ("any person" who vio-
lates the Hazardous Waste Management Act is civilly liable).
20. The impact of the opinion is further restricted by the elimination of a private
cause of action under § 790.03 of the Insurance Code mandated by Moradi-Shalal. See
supra note 4.
1. 49 Cal. 3d 826, 782 P.2d 239, 264 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1989). A unanimous opinion
was submitted "by the court."
2. The Commission on Judicial Performance derives its power to recommend dis-
ciplinary action against judges to the California Supreme Court from article 6, section
18(c), of the California Constitution. The section states in relevant part:
On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance the Supreme
Court may... censure or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6
years prior to the commencement of the judge's current term that constitutes
willful misconduct in office ... or conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c).
Judicial discipline is governed by CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 and CAL R. OF CT., tit.
III, Rules 901-22 (West 1990). See generally 40 CAL. JUR. 3D Judges §§ 62-83 (1978 &
Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN CAL. PROC. 3D Courts §§ 23-43 (1985 & Supp. 1989); 46 AM.
JUR. 2D Judges §§ 18-19 (1969 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Power of Court to Remove or
Suspend Judge, 53 A.L.R. 3D 882 (1973 & Supp. 1989). For a history of judicial disci-
pline in California and discussion of the proceedings of the Commission of Judicial
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of Municipal Court Judge Kenneth Lynn Kloepfer from office. The
Commission found that Judge Kloepfer had committed five acts of
willful misconduct 3 and twenty acts of conduct prejudicial 4 to the ad-
ministration of justice.5 Kloepfer's conduct lacked appropriate judi-
cial temperament, thereby violating Canon 3(A)(3) of the California
Code of Judicial Conduct.6 Rejecting Kloepfer's due process claims,
the court held that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory
functions of the Commission did not deny judges due process and
that delay in formal notice to judges due to investigation of numerous
complaints is not prejudicial. 7
Judge Kloepfer argued that because the Commission performed all
of the investigatory, accusatory and adjudicatory functions of the dis-
ciplinary proceedings, it was not a neutral forum, and thus he was de-
nied due process.8 The supreme court rejected this argument because
the Commission appointed special masters to investigate the charges
and then reviewed the findings independently. Thus, no unaccept-
able bias was established.9 The court further held that formal notice
Performance see Frankel, Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judges for Cause in Cali-
fornia, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 72 (1962); Comment, Judicial Discipline in California: A
Critical Re-Evaluation, 10 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 192 (1976).
3. "Willful misconduct" occurs when the judge knows, or should know, that he
acts beyond his authority "for reasons other than the faithful discharge of his duties."
Kloepfer, 49 Cal. 3d at 832, 782 P.2d at 241, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (quoting McCullough
v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d 186, 191, 776 P.2d 259, 261, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 557, 559 (1989)). To meet the requirement of bad faith, the judge need only show
a general disregard for the legal system; he need not necessarily act against anyone in
particular. Id. (quoting McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 191, 776 P.2d at 261, 260 Cal. Rptr. at
560).
4. "Prejudicial conduct" occurs when a judge creates a negative public impression
of the judiciary, even though acting in good faith. Id.
5. During 1981-1985, the Commission determined that Judge Kloepfer had: (1)
on ten occasions behaved in a rude and abusive manner toward attorneys, court report-
ers, witnesses, and litigants during court proceedings; (2) on five occasions failed to
protect criminal defendants' rights; (3) on five occasions abused the contempt power
and his authority to make orders to show cause and issue bench warrants; (4) on three
occasions failed to remain objective in a case before him or disqualify himself; and (5)
on two occasions abused his power to make fee orders. Id. at 839-64, 782 P.2d at 246-62,
264 Cal. Rptr. at 107-23.
6. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(3) (Cal. Compendium of Prof.
Resp. Pt. IV(B) 1989). Canon 3(A)(3) states that: "Judges should be patient, dignified,
and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom judges
deal in their official capacity .... Id.
7. Kloepfer, 49 Cal. 3d at 836-37, 782 P.2d at 243-44, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
8. Id. at 833-35, 782 P.2d at 241-43, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03. Kloepfer was unable
to provide any authority for this position.
9. Id. at 834-35, 782 P.2d at 242, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 103. The supreme court relied
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975), where it stated that "[tihe contention that the combination of investigative and
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was necessary only after the informal investigation of all of the
charges, not after each one individually.10
In reviewing each of the formal charges against Judge Kloepfer,
the court affirmed the Commission's findings, holding that his con-
duct had been willful and prejudicial." Consequently, the California
Supreme Court found that the Commission's recommendation of re-
moval from office was fully supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence.12 The court then considered whether any mitigating
circumstances existed to offset the nature and number of the wrong-
ful acts.13 Because of a continued pattern of willful misconduct and
prejudicial conduct, the evidence failed to show that Judge Kloepfer
had, or could, overcome his lack of judicial temperament. The court
ordered his removal from the bench in order to protect the public as
well as the reputation of the judicial system.14
JEANETTE E. RIENSCHE
B. The supreme court removed a judge for committing acts
of willful misconduct: McCullough v. Commission on
Judicial Performance.
In McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance,' the
supreme court ordered Bernard P. McCullough removed as judge of
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in adminis-
trative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators .. "
Id at 47. Risk of actual bias or prejudgment caused by conferring investigative and
adjudicative power on the same individual must be proven. Id Even if the Commis-
sion is prematurely aware of the investigation reports, this is not sufficient bias to as-
sert the Commission's impartiality. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 519-20, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974).
Furthermore, other similar challenges to administrative procedures have been denied
in contexts where the investigative and adjudicative functions were much more closely
aligned. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 8.2 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp.
1989); 1 C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6.8 (1985); B. SCHWARTZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 495 (2d ed. 1983).
10. Kloepfer, 49 Cal. 3d at 837, 782 P.2d at 244, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
11. Id at 838-64, 782 P.2d at 245-62, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 106-23. For an analysis of the
charges, see supra note 5. In only one incident did the supreme court depart from
complete agreement with the Commission by finding only prejudicial conduct, not
willful misconduct. See Kloepfer, 49 Cal. 3d at 859-60, 782 P.2d at 258-59, 264 Cal. Rptr.
at 119-20.
12. Id. at 864, 782 P.2d at 262, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
13. "The number of wrongful acts is relevant to determining whether they were
merely isolated occurrences or, instead, part of a course of conduct establishing 'lack of
temperament and ability to perform judicial functions in an even-handed manner.'"
Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 29 Cal. 3d 615, 653, 630 P.2d 954, 975,
175 Cal. Rptr. 420, 441 (1981) (quoting Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 707, 537 P.2d 898, 918, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 798 (1975)).
14. Kloepfer, 49 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 782 P.2d at 262-63, 264 Cal Rptr. at 123-24.
1. 49 Cal. 3d 186, 776 P.2d 259, 260 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1989).
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the Justice Court of the San Benito Judicial District, San Benito
County,2 after finding that he committed four acts of willful miscon-
duct3 and one act of persistent failure to perform his judicial duties.4
The Commission on Judicial Performance5 had recommended Mc-
Cullough's removal based on the findings of three special masters ap-
pointed by the supreme court.6 McCullough petitioned the supreme
court for review7 of the Commission's recommendations.8
Agreeing with the special masters, the supreme court found that
2. The court acted under the authority of CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c), which pro-
vides for the removal of judges engaging in "willful misconduct in office, persistent
failure or inability to perform the judge's duties ... or conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." McCullough, 49
Cal. 3d at 191, 776 P.2d at 261, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 559. See CAL. JUR. 3D Judges § 62 (1978
& Supp. 1989); 46 AM. JuR. 2D, Judges § 19 (1969 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Power of
Court to Remove or Suspend Judge, 53 A.L.R. 3D 889-92 (1973 & Supp. 1989); 2 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 23, 27 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
3. The court defined willful misconduct as acts by a judge "(1) which he knows,
or should know, are beyond his authority; (2) for reasons other than the faithful dis-
charge of his duties." McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 191, 776 P.2d at 261, 260 Cal. Rptr. at
559. The actions must be taken in bad faith, but they need not be intended to harm a
particular individual. Instead, the focus is on the judge's "disregard for the legal sys-
tem." Id. Prejudicial misconduct differs from willful misconduct in that the former
need not involve bad faith. Rather, it involves conduct that "adversely affects public
opinion of the judiciary." Id.; see Comment, Judicial Discipline in California: A Criti-
cal Re-evaluation, 10 Loy L.A.L. REV. 192, 224-27 (1976); Comment, Judicial Miscon-
duct in California, 11 U. SAN FERNANDO L.R. 43, 51-53 (1983); 2 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 33-36 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
4. McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 199, 776 P.2d at 563, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
5. The Commission on Judicial Performance [hereinafter the Commission], cre-
ated in 1960 and known as the Commission on Judicial Qualifications until 1976, oper-
ates pursuant to California Rules of Court. The Commission investigates complaints
against judges. CAL. RuLEs OF COURT, rule 904 (1989). If good cause is found, the
Commission initiates formal proceedings. Id. at rule 905. The Commission may con-
clude its formal inquiry by making a recommendation to the supreme court for either
private reprimand, public censure, removal, or retirement of the judge. Id. at rule 917
(1989). See CAL. JuR. 3D Judges § 63-83 (1978 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 26-31, 36 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
6. The supreme court appoints special masters or examiners, who are judges, to
conduct formal hearings when, as in this case, requested by the Commission. CAL.
RULES OF COURT, rule 907 (1989). The report of the special masters is then used by the
Commission to decide whether it will recommend action be taken by the supreme
court. CAL. RuLEs OF COURT, rule 912 (1989).
7. The request for supreme court review is made pursuant to CAL. RULES OF
COURT, rule 919(b) (1989).
8. The supreme court, which conducts an "independent evaluation" of the record
in reaching its determination, stated that the proper standard of review is whether
there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support the Commission's recommendation.
McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d 186, 190-91, 776 P.2d
259, 261, 260 Cal. Rptr. 557, 559 (1989) (citing Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Perform-
ance, 45 Cal. 3d 518, 530, 754 P.2d 724, 730, 247 Cal. Rptr. 378, 384 (1988)). See also CAL.
JUR. 3D Judges § 82 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
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McCullough committed willful misconduct when he: (1) violated a
defendant's right to a fair trial by telling the jurors that he wanted
them to enter a guilty verdict, an action clearly exceeding McCul-
lough's judicial authority;9 (2) used his judicial power to benefit a
personal friend;10 and (3) denied legal representation to the defend-
ants in two separate cases in violation of their sixth amendment right
to counsel. In one case, neither the defendant nor her attorney were
present, while in the other, the attorney was absent from the court-
room. 1 The court characterized the judge's action in the former case
as "willful misconduct" despite the Commission's characterization of
it as prejudicial conduct.12 In addition to finding willful misconduct,
the supreme court agreed with the Commission that the judge per-
sistently failed to perform his judicial duties in neglecting to sign a
judgment order for more than six years after granting a motion.13
The court dismissed contentions that the Commission violated the
judge's right to confidentiality,14 and that he had been the victim of a
vendetta by the local district attorney's office.' 5 While removing him
9. McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 776 P.2d at 262, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (citing
Gonzalez v. Commission of Judicial Performance, 33 Cal. 3d 359, 657 P.2d 372, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 880).
10. After speaking with a friend about pending charges the day before arraign-
ment, Judge McCullough then continued the case for two years before finally dis-
missing it. The court called this a "casebook example of willful misconduct."
McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 194, 776 P.2d at 262, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 561; see CAL. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT, canon 2B (personal relationships influencing judicial conduct); Id at canon
3C(1)(a) (disqualification when personal bias raises question of impartiality).
11. 49 Cal. 3d at 194-96, 776 P.2d at 264-65, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63; see also Cannon
v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 695-98, 537 P.2d 898, 909-12,
122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 789-92 (1975) (judge must respect defendant's sixth amendment
right to legal counsel).
12. McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 195, 776 P.2d at 265, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 563. While
prejudicial conduct is considered less severe than willful misconduct, either one consti-
tutes grounds for removal from office under the state constitution. See supra notes 2
& 3.
13. McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 197, 776 P.2d at 265-66, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64
(1989). The court found the judge's action to be particularly egregious because he had
been publicly censured in April of 1987 for his neglect in this matter and several
others. Despite the censure, Judge McCullough waited 11 more months before he
signed the judgment. Id. (citing In re McCullough, 43 Cal. 3d 534, 535, 734 P.2d 987,
988, 236 Cal. Rptr. 151, 152 (1987)).
14. Id. at 198, 776 P.2d at 266, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 564. A prosecutor was present
when McCullough was served with notice of the Commission proceedings against him,
and a newspaper article on the proceedings was published the next day. The court
noted that these facts do not show that the Commission violated its rules of confidenti-
ality. Id. The Commission is allowed to issue statements to the media in certain cir-
cumstances, and there was no evidence in this case that the Commission had provided
the newspaper with the published information. Id; see CAL. JUR. 3D Judges § 65 (1978
& Supp. 1989).
15. McCullough, 49 Cal. 3d at 198, 776 P.2d at 266, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 564. The court
stated that the friction between the district attorney's office and McCullough would be
significant only if it could be used to discredit the testimony of those who testified at
the hearing. Id.
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as a judge, the supreme court's order allowed McCullough to practice
law, provided he pass the state Professional Responsibility
Examination.1S
PAUL J. MCCUE
VIII. PROBATE LAW
California Probate Code section 910 impliedly empowers
courts to award probate attorneys compensation from the
estate for time spent asserting and defending their own
fee claims: In re Estate of Trynin.
The California Supreme Court in In re Estate of Trynin' decided
whether Probate Code section 910,2 which authorizes a court to order
from an estate additional "just and reasonable" attorneys' fees for ex-
traordinary services, 3 also implicitly authorizes the court to allow
fees for time and costs reasonably spent defending their own fee
claims.4 The lower court believed that claims which benefited only
the attorneys' private interests, and did not enhance the estate, were
not compensable and thus left them without authorization to award
such fees.5 The supreme court,6 however, determined that an attor-
16. Id. at 198-99, 776 P.2d at 267, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Friends had testified at
Judge McCullough's hearing to his good character, and the San Benito County Bar As-
sociation backed him with an amicus curiae brief. Furthermore, he was elected to the
judicial post twice. In addition to these favorable factors, the supreme court noted that
as a practicing attorney, Judge McCullough will not have "access to the power that he
abused as a judge." Id.
1. 49 Cal. 3d 868, 782 P.2d 232, 264 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1989).
2. CAL. PROB. CODE § 910 (West 1990) provides:
Attorneys for executors and administrators shall be allowed out of the estate,
as fees for conducting the ordinary probate proceedings, the same amounts as
are allowed by the previous article as commissions to executors and adminis-
trators; and such further amount as the court may deem just and reasonable
for extraordinary services.
This section further states that extraordinary services may also include the services of
paralegals working for the attorney. Id.
3. See B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Wills & Probate §§ 358, 363 (8th
ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984) (discussing compensation for, and listing of, extraordinary serv-
ices); see also 25 CAL. JUR. 3D Decedents' Estates §§ 971-73 (1976).
4. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 871, 782 P.2d at 232-33, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
5. Estate of Trynin, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044, 252 Cal. Rptr. 787, 788-89 (1988)
(court distinguished cases allowing compensation for extraordinary services which
benefited the estates, such as services aiding trustees to recover their fees, services op-
posing a petition for appointment of a guardian, and services rendered in defending the
accountings of administrators and executors).
6. Justice Kaufman authored the unanimous opinion of the court.
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ney's "right to full and fair compensation" 7 necessarily included the
right to compensation for the time reasonably spent asserting and de-
fending his own fee claims.8
In Trynin, co-administrators of the decedent's estate contested
their attorneys' fee claims for their extraordinary services rendered
in the litigation and appeal of a creditor's estate-threatening claim.9
The fee claim hearings spanned ten weeks, consuming seven half-day
sessions, and ended in the trial court's award of several thousand dol-
lars for each attorney's extraordinary services. The attorneys then
petitioned the trial court for time and expenses involved in defending
their fee claims.'0 The trial court denied their petitions and the
court of appeal affirmed.11 The supreme court reversed, reasoning
that attorneys would be dissuaded from performing the extraordi-
nary services necessary to fully protect decedents' estates if their fees
could be watered down by the expense of defending fee claims.12
Although the court discussed several issues under which attorneys'
fees, including fee-litigation fees, had been properly assessed against
the opposing party, the court stated that the mere fact that a statute
authorizes attorneys' fees for extraordinary services is not sufficient
7. This "right" is derived from Estate of Byrne, 122 Cal. 260, 54 P. 957 (1898),
modified, 54 P. 1015 (1898), wherein the court stated that "[e]very attorney should be
fully and fairly paid for his services." Id at 266, 54 P.2d at 960. In Byrne, the court
acknowledged that the compensation the attorney had received was "extremely mea-
ger, and far less than the sum we should have been willing to approve," but the court
noted, on rehearing, that there were no proper grounds for reversal absent a clear
abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. at 268, 54 P.2d at 1015. However, in Trynin,
the lower court was clearly in error for refusing to consider the attorney's request for
additional compensation for costs incurred in defending his fees. However, the
supreme court stated that if a trial court hears the evidence and determines that the
attorney has been fully and fairly compensated for all services, the court would not be
abusing its discretion in denying the fees. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 880, 782 P.2d at 239,
264 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
8. 49 Cal. 3d at 880, 782 P.2d at 239, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
9. The estate was valued at $409,000, and the creditor claimed $738,000. Pachter,
Gold & Shaffer represented the co-administrators in a jury trial that resulted in a re-
duced recovery by the creditor of $125,000 plus costs. The co-administrators then en-
gaged attorney Eckardt to prosecute an appeal, which successfully reversed the
judgment. Eckardt subsequently made a motion for withdrawal as counsel because the
co-administrators refused to cooperate in the payment of his fees. The court granted
the motion. The co-administrators later persuaded Eckardt to aid them in the retrial.
However, a settlement was successfully negotiated just prior to retrial. Two months
later, both Pachter, Gold & Shaffer and Eckardt petitioned the court for compensation
for the extraordinary services rendered in opposing the creditor's claim. The co-ad-
ministrators hired other attorneys to contest these fee claims. Id at 871-72, 782 P.2d at
233, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
10. The trial court awarded the law firm of Pachter, Gold & Schaffer $49,980.54
and attorney Eckardt $5,364.09. The attorneys then respectively requested $61,360.25
and $23,210.00 for costs incurred in defending their initial fee claims. Estate of Trynin,
205 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1042, 252 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787-88 (1988).
11. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 872, 782 P.2d at 233-34, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
12. Id at 871, 782 P.2d at 233, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
1136
[Vol. 17: 1045, 1990] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to warrant fee-related fees.13 The court distinguished this case from
the statutory fee-shifting cases14 and the common-fund and common
benefit cases.'5 Section 910 of the Probate Code states that fees for
extraordinary services must be paid out of the estate pursuant to
statutory authority and court approval.16 Thus, compensation from
the estate is the attorneys' only means of recovery for services per-
formed. In providing authority for the payment of such fees from de-
cedent's estate, the court analogized a probate attorney to a
testamentary trustee,17 a guardian of an estate,' 8 and bankruptcy
counsel,19 all of which were allowed compensation from the estate
for their fee-litigation fees.
Thus, the court vested broad discretion in the trial courts to hear
fee claims for fee-litigation and to approve or deny the claims as they
saw fit.20 With this grant of discretion, the California Supreme Court
reiterated its confidence in the lower court's ability to stop superflu-
ous litigation over fee claims.21
DAWN SOLHEIM
13. Id. at 876, 782 P.2d at 236, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
14. Id. at 876-77, 782 P.2d at 236-37, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98. These cases serve to
shift the burden of paying the prevailing party's attorney fees to the losing party. Id.
at 872, 782 P.2d at 236, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
15. For a discussion of the fund method of paying attorney fees, see Dawson, Law-
yers-and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1597 (1974)
(theory of extracting attorney fees from funds accumulated through successful litiga-
tion has become an "escape route" from the American rule requiring parties to bear
their own litigation costs).
16. In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 877, 782 P.2d 232, 237, 264 Cal. Rptr. 93,
98 (1989).
17. Id. at 877, 782 P.2d at 237, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (citing In re Griffith's Estate, 97
Cal. App. 2d 651, 656, 218 P.2d 149, 152-53 (1950)) (trustee entitled to reimbursement
for payment of attorney fees from corpus of the trust).
18. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 877-78, 782 P.2d at 237, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (citing Riley v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 305, 310-12, 316 P.2d 956, 959-60 (1957)) (payment of attorney
fees taken as a charge against the ward's estate).
19. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 878-79, 782 P.2d at 237-38, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99 (citing
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 660-62 (9th Cir. 1985) (attorney fees paid out of
bankrupt estate)).
20. Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d at 880, 782 P.2d at 239, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See also supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
21. In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 879, 782 P.2d 232, 238-39, 264 Cal. Rptr.
93, 99-100 (1989).
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IX. PROPERTY LAW
The interests of the beneficiaries of a deed of trust are
not affected by the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien upon
the trust property when notice of the suit to foreclose is
given to the trustee but not to the beneficiaries: Monterey
S.P. Partnership v. W.L. Bangham, Inc.
California courts have long recognized the difference between
deeds of trust and traditional trusts,' and thus have refused to apply
general principles of trust law to the relationships created under
trust deeds.2 In Monterey S.P. Partnership v. WL. Bangham, Inc.,3
the court further emphasized this distinction by holding that service
to the trustee of a deed of trust does not satisfy notice requirements
insofar as the beneficiaries are concerned.4 Therefore, any default
judgment obtained in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action when the
trustee is served, but not the beneficiaries, is ineffectual as against
the beneficiaries' interests, or those of their successors and
assignees.5
In Monterey, the court focused on the nature of deeds of trust. As
an instrument that operates as a security interest, a trust deed is the
1. A deed of trust is an instrument "taking place and serving the uses of a mort-
gage, by which the legal title... is placed in one or more trustees, to secure ... repay-
ment of... money.., or... performance .... " BLACK LAw DICTIONARY 373 (5th ed.
1979). A trust is a "right of property ... held by one party for the benefit of another."
Id. at 1352.
2. See, e.g., Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, 196 Cal. App. 3d 948, 242
Cal. Rptr. 251 (1987); Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 270 Cal. App. 2d 543, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 529 (1969); Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 20
P.2d 940, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933).
3. 49 Cal. 3d 454, 777 P.2d 623, 261 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas au-
thored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Panelli, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Ken-
nard. Justice Mosk concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Kaufman.
Justice Broussard dissented separately.
4. Id. at 457, 777 P.2d at 624, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 588. In 1982, W. L. Bangham, Inc.
("Bangham") secured a mechanic's lien against property it had improved, and filed an
action to foreclose the lien later that same year. Bangham took no further action until
January of 1984, when it recorded a lis pendens on the property. Additionally, Bang-
ham did not serve the complaint until May 3, 1984, when it served Western Mutual
Corporation ("Western"), the trustee under a deed of trust that named Oak Knoll
Partnership as the trustor, and some 252 persons as beneficiaries. Bangham served
Western as a "doe" defendant, but failed to serve the beneficiaries, although they were
named parties. On May 4, 1984, Western executed a planned trustee's sale, and Monte-
rey eventually purchased the property. Monterey filed this action to establish clear ti-
tle to the property, which was clouded by a sheriff's deed Bangham received when it
purchased the property at a public sale ordered subsequent to Bangham's obtaining a
default judgment in the suit to foreclose the mechanic's lien. Monterey moved for
summary judgment for lack of notice, which the trial court granted. The appellate
court reversed, holding that notice requirements to the beneficiaries of a deed of trust
were satisfied by providing actual notice to the trustee. See id. at 464, 777 P.2d at 629,
261 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
5. Id.
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equivalent of a mortgage and not a traditional express trust.6 While
the trustee of an express trust is required to act in the best interests
of the beneficiary, the duties imposed upon the trustee of a deed of
trust are limited only to those stipulated in the instrument.7 The
court indicated that the deed of trust in Monterey, like most such in-
struments, did not impose any obligation upon the trustee either to
defend a suit on the beneficiaries' behalf or to provide them with no-
tice.8 Although the trustee of an express trust may be authorized to
defend certain actions against the trust,9 the court found the question
of authorization inapplicable to the situation in Monterey.1O Here,
the issue was not whether the trustee was authorized to defend, but
whether the beneficiaries were bound by a default judgment when
the trustee did not defend. The court also rejected the argument that
the trustee of a deed of trust was analogous to the trustee of an ex-
press trust, due to the obvious differences between the two types of
trusts."
6. Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 657, 20 P.2d at 944. Numerous authors have com-
mented that a deed of trust is virtually indistinguishable from other mortgage instru-
ments, even though denominated as a trust. See M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND
CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 6.1 (4th ed. 1984); G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 99-100 (2d ed. 1981); 3 R. POW-
ELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 439 (Cum. Supp. 1990); Comment, Applications of
the Distinction between Mortgages and Trust Deeds in California, 26 CALIF. L. REV.
206 (1938); Comment, Comparison of California Mortgages, Trust Deeds and Land Sale
Contracts, 7 UCLA L. REV. 83 (1960); see also 55 AM. JuR. 2D Mortgages §§ 15-31 (1971);
27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust §§ 3, 9 (1987); 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages § 1 (1978 &
Supp. 1989); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 603 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Fleisher v. Continental Auxiliary Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 136, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 137 (1963); see also 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 59 (1987); Annotation, Duty
and liability of trustee under mortgage, deed of trust, or other trust instrument, to
holders of bonds or other obligations secured thereby, 90 A.L.R. 2D 501 (1963).
8. Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 462, 777 P.2d at 627-28, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 591-92. See
generally 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 299 (1949).
9. A trustee of an express trust is required to "take reasonable steps to defend
actions that may result in a loss to the trust." Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 462, 777 P.2d at
628, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (quoting CAL. PROB. CODE § 16011 (West Supp. 1990)). Addi-
tionally, section 369 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the trustee of an express
trust to sue on behalf of the beneficiaries. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 369 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1990). The appellate court reasoned that this provision impliedly authorized the
trustee of a deed of trust to defend actions need citation to appellate court reasoning.
10. Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 462, 777 P.2d at 627, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
11. Id. at 462, 777 P.2d at 628, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 592. The court discussed various
differences between the two types of trusts, including the fact that a trustee of an ex-
press trust must consent to being so named, while the trustee of a deed of trust need
not consent. Id. (citing Burns v. Peters, 5 Cal. 2d 619, 55 P.2d 1182 (1936)). Addition-
ally, the court pointed to the discretionary powers of an express trustee, and the fidu-
ciary duties imposed upon such persons. Id. at 462-63, 777 P.2d at 628, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
592.
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In holding that actual notice must be given to the beneficiaries of a
deed of trust, the court again demonstrated that a deed of trust is lit-
tle more than a mortgage instrument, and the real parties in interest
must be given the opportunity to defend any action adversely affect-
ing these interests. Although this holding may place a substantial
burden on claimants seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien,12 this
burden is offset by the legal importance of notice in our justice sys-
tem' 3 and the practical purpose of ensuring the deed of trust as a via-
ble method of mortgaging property. 14
MARK G. KISICKI
x. TAX LAW
A. The test for determining whether improvements are
taxable fixtures is whether, considering "annexation,
adaptation and other objective manifestations of
permanence," a reasonable person would find the item to
be a permanent part of the real estate, which is
primarily a legal determination requiring a de novo
standard of review: Crocker Nat'l Bank v. City & County of
San Francisco.
The supreme court in Crocker Nat? Bank v. City and County of
San Francisco,' enunciated a uniform test for classifying fixtures for
12. For example, Justice Mosk indicated that the claimant of the mechanic's lien
in Monterey would be required to ascertain the identities and addresses of 252 benefi-
ciaries, which is a substantial burden on the ordinary artisan for whom the mechanic's
lien remedy is intended. Id. at 464, 777 P.2d at 629, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). However, Chief Justice Lucas, in the majority opinion, noted that per-
sonal service is not required, as the Code of Civil Procedure specifies several alterna-
tives. Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 461 n.4, 777 P.2d at 627 n.4, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 591 n.4
(citing CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 382, 416.90, 415.50 (West 1973 & Supp. 1990)).
13. Constitutional implications exist in the wake of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), regarding notice prior to the taking of property. See Leen, Galbraith & Gant,
Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange Bedfellows?, 48 WASH. L. REv. 763 (1973).
14. This policy is self-evident; however, the use of trust deeds is not confined to
standard real estate transactions, but extends to corporate finance. Many corporations
pledge property through a deed of trust as security for bond issues. See 4A R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 574 (Cum. Supp. 1990). The desirability of such a fi-
nancial arrangement would be greatly diminished if creditors of the corporation might
lose their secured interest without being given the chance to defend against adverse
claims.
1. 49 Cal. 3d 881, 782 P.2d 278, 264 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1989). Justice Mosk authored
the unanimous opinion of the court. Crocker National Bank had received exemption
on its personal property and taxation on its real property. Thus, classification of its
data processing equipment as fixtures, within the definition of real property, substan-
tially increased the bank's taxes over six years. When Crocker's refund request was
denied, litigation was instituted, wherein the City of San Francisco alleged that
Crocker's action was barred on procedural grounds. Although the trial court dismissed
the procedural grounds, it held for the city in finding that the equipment was properly
classified as fixtures.
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taxation purposes and determined that an independent standard of
review is required on appeal. The dispute in Crocker centered upon
the city's classification of a bank's electronic data processing equip-
ment as fixtures which are taxable within the definition of improve-
ments,2 and the city's refusal to refund the bank's six years of taxes
paid on such property.3 The trial court upheld the city's classification
and the court of appeal, believing the classification to be a factual de-
termination, applied the substantial-evidence standard of review and
affirmed.4
The supreme court addressed the issues of classification and stan-
dard of review. Working toward achieving a uniform, "workable"
rule that would promote efficiency by clarifying classification to both
taxpayer and tax assessor,5 the court held that the proper test6 is
"whether a reasonable person would consider the item to be a perma-
nent part of the property, taking into account annexation,7 adapta-
tion,8 and other objective manifestations of permanence."9 Under
this policy of uniformity, the court found that uniform taxation could
2. See S. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 104(c), 105(a) (West 1987) (for purposes of
property taxation, "real property" includes improvements, and improvements include
fixtures); see also B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation § 128 (9th ed.
1989).
3. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 884-85, 782 P.2d at 279, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
4. Id at 885, 782 P.2d at 279, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
5. See Horowitz, The Law of Fixtures in California-A Critical Analysis, 26 S.
CAL. L. REv. 21, 57 (1952); see also Trabue Pittman Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 29
Cal. 2d 385, 397-98, 175 P.2d 512, 520-21 (1946) (emphasizing the need for uniformity in
taxation and advocating the application of the same rules in determining fixtures for
taxation purposes as those used for determining fixtures in business, property, and
probate law).
6. See generally 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Property Taxes § 8 (1979) ("In determining
whether an article is a fixture or an object affixed to the realty, factors to be consid-
ered are the manner of its annexation, its adaptability to the use and purpose for
which the realty is used, and the [apparent] intention of the party making the
annexation.").
7. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d 881, 890, 782 P.2d 278, 282, 264 Cal. Rptr. 139, 143 (1989)
(annexation requires consideration of whether attachment to the real property is ac-
complished by means of cement, bolts, and other permanent means, indicating a per-
manent fixture, or by easy to disconnect standardized plugs or other means allowing
ready mobility); see also San Diego Trust & Say. Bank v. San Diego, 16 Cal. 2d 142, 105
P.2d 94 (1940) (bank vault door with frame cemented into a concrete vault found to be
a fixture).
8. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 890, 782 P.2d at 282, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Adaptation
includes consideration of whether the building or equipment was designed or changed
to accommodate the other. However, minor design implementations and changes such
as extra air conditioning units or power outlets made specifically for the equipment
are not enough to prove permanence and do not transform the equipment into fix-
tures. See also Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 3d
924, 136 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977). The Queen Mary, incapable of sailing and surrounded by
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be achieved only by proper classification, and that proper classifica-
tion would be better achieved by independent review.10
The court reasoned that the classifying of fixtures was a mixed
question of law and fact involving primarily the sifting of legal prin-
ciples in a factual context, thus demanding de novo review." The
court concluded that a reasonable person would not consider the
bank's data processing equipment a permanent part of the real estate,
and that the court of appeal erred in employing the substantial-evi-
dence standard of review.
The court in Crocker selected a test which would avoid arguments
over particular languagel 2 and yet provide a clear-cut framework
within which trial courts can determine whether items are fixtures
for purposes of taxation. This determination is primarily legal and
a rock dike with no outlet, was a fixture because the surrounding area and the boat
were specifically adapted to each other. Id at 935-37, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
9. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 782 P.2d at 281, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court
expressly declined the bank's invitation to use the holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 3d 877, 207 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1984). Allstate held
that general purpose standard computers, cable-attached to components or other com-
puters, when put in "general purpose office buildings" and connected to the realty by
means of plugs to outlets in the building's walls are not real property, even if their use
is necessary to the building's business and some structural accommodations are em-
ployed, such as "movable partitions or flooring, supplemental air conditioning units
and 220-volt wiring." Crocker at 892 n.2, 782 P.2d 284 n.2, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.2
(quoting Allstate, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 891-92, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94). The Crocker
court believed uniformity would best be achieved by a more flexible test that they
claimed was implicitly recognized in Allstate. In rejecting Allstate's specific language,
the Crocker court was probably influenced by the parties' quibbling in the lower courts
over whether the bank was a "general purpose office building." The court further de-
clined to determine whether Allstate was controlling at all in the present case.
Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 892 n.2, 782 P.2d at 284 n.2, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.2.
10. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 888, 782 P.2d at 281, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 142. Prior to enun-
ciating this test, the court reviewed the "well settled" California test concerning fix-
tures in other areas of law. That test, also in three parts, is the same except for the
third factor which is "the intention with which the annexation is made." Id, at 887, 782
P.2d at 281, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court noted that this third factor was the con-
trolling one, with the first two factors being subsidiaries of the third. Id, The court
then replaced the intention factor with "other objective manifestations of perma-
nence" when determining fixtures for taxation purposes. Id. at 887-88, 782 P.2d at 281,
264 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court did not state whether this substitute factor would re-
tain the same controlling weight as the third factor in the previous test.
"Objective manifestations" include consideration of the owner's "constructive" in-
tent to make the items in question a permanent part of the building. As the court
noted, "[w]ere mere weight and necessity for business purposes sufficient, then circus
elephants would be fixtures." Allstate, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
Thus, this third factor allows for consideration of all the circumstances surrounding
the placement of the items in question within the building.
11. Crocker, 49 Cal. 3d at 888, 782 P.2d at 281, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 142. If the determi-
nation primarily involved applying "experience with human affairs," the question
would be factual and would require the substantial-evidence standard of review.
12. See supra note 9.
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will not prohibit appellate courts from independently reviewing the
trial court's classification.
DAWN SOLHEIM
B. A tax assessor's demand for information is subject to
prepayment judicial review prior to payment of a tax if
the assessee can show that the information sought is "not
reasonably relevant" to the proposed tax: Union Pacific
R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the California Constitution requires payment of a con-
tested tax prior to judicial review under Article XIII, section 32
("section 32"),' the California Supreme Court modified this blanket
proscription in Dupuy v. Superior Court,2 subjecting the mandate of
section 32 to the protective provisions of the federal due process
clause.3 In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization,4
the court held that the State Board of Equalization (the "Board")
"may compel the disclosure of information if: (1) its inquiry is au-
thorized; (2) the requests are specific; and (3) the information sought
is reasonably relevant to the inquiry."5 Thus, according to Western
Oil, if an assessee contends that a demand for information by the
Board infringes upon a federal constitutional right, the section 32
prepayment requirement does not apply and the superior court has
jurisdiction to determine the matter.6
Applying the reasoning of Western Oil the California Supreme
1. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 32. Section 32 states:
No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against
this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax.
After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to
recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the
Legislature.
Id. Thus, the taxpayer must first pay the tax and then seek an action in refund.
2. 15 Cal. 3d 410, 541 P.2d 540, 124 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1975).
3. Id. at 418, 541 P.2d at 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 905. In Dupuy, the court held that
the forced sale of property seized for tax purposes without the benefit of a hearing was
a violation of the due process clause. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 44 Cal. 3d 208, 745 P.2d 1360, 242 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1987). In Western Oil, the
court determined that because a demand for information is "the first step in the as-
sessment and collection of taxes," section 32 also applies to the State Board of Equali-
zation. Id. at 213, 745 P.2d at 1362-63, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
5. Id. at 214, 745 P.2d at 1363, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
6. Id. at 213-14, 745 P.2d at 1363, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
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Court held in Union Packfi RR Co. v. State Be of Equalization7
that a tax assessee has a right to prepayment judicial relief if the as-
sessee can show that the information sought is not "reasonably rele-
vant" to the proposed tax.8 Furthermore, if the trial court
determines that the assessee is not required to disclose such informa-
tion, it has the authority to prohibit the imposition of any penalty as-
sessment for such nondisclosure.9
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Disagreeing with the Board's interpretation of Western Oil 10 the
court rejected the notion that judicial review prior to payment of the
disputed tax is allowed only when there is "no conceivable basis" for
that tax." In Union Paciftc,12 the court concluded that a conceivable
basis for a tax, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude judicial re-
view prior to tax payment.' 3 The court reasoned that such an inter-
pretation ignores the requirement of "reasonable relevance" imposed
by the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 4 Thus, the court held that the general prepayment require-
ment of section 32 does not apply to the Board's demands of an as-
sessee for information which infringes upon federally protected
constitutional rights. Therefore, "if the assessee can show that the
information is not reasonably relevant to a proposed tax," the as-
7. 49 Cal. 3d 138, 776 P.2d 267, 260 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1989). Justice Eagleson wrote
the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kaufman,
and Kennard. Justice Mosk dissented in a separate opinion, joined by Justice
Broussard.
8. Id. at 147, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
9. Id. at 156, 776 P.2d at 278, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 576. The court also held that sanc-
tions imposed against the Board were proper because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in applying the sanctions. Id. at 158, 776 P.2d at 279-80, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 577-
78. For further discussion of remedies for wrongful taxation, see 72 AM. JuR. 2D State
and Local Taxation §§ 1059-1154 (1974 & Supp. 1989); 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Property Taxes
§§ 200-211 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
10. The Board relied on one sentence in Western Oil: "'If the Board has no con-
ceivable basis in law or in fact for assessing a tax on a given piece of property, then it
cannot constitutionally demand information from a taxpayer that would be relevant
only to such a tax.'" Union Pacific, 49 Cal. 3d at 146, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at
569 (quoting Western Oil, 44 Cal. 3d at 214, 745 P.2d at 1363, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 337) (em-
phasis in original).
11. In responding to a demand by the Board for the disclosures of its 1983 Strate-
gic Plan, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific") submitted only those por-
tions of the plan relating to currently held assessable properties. Union Pacific
withheld the balance of the plan relating to information about the company's
strengths, weaknesses, and future acquisitions.
12. Id. at 146-47, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
13. Id. at 147, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
14. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 202-09 (1946) (discussing the application of the fourth amendment to
"constructive" searches).
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sessee is entitled to judicial relief prior to payment of any tax.15
The court also held that an assessee who makes an appropriate
showing of nonrelevance has a right to prepayment judicial relief
from any penalty levied as a result of the nondisclosure.16 The court
empowered the trial court to temporarily abate an assessment until it
makes a determination of the relative merits of a judicial challenge.17
The court determined that the information demanded by the Board
in Union Pacifc regarding future acquisitions was not reasonably
relevant to the assessment process' s because the Board was unable to
demonstrate how the future acquisition of property could affect the
fair market value of existing property.19 While the court acknowl-
edged that portions of the withheld plan were arguably relevant,20
the court decided that the Board was not entitled to any of the undis-
closed information 2' for two reasons: (1) Union Pacific contended
that such information was not relevant, and (2) the Board failed to
request an in camera inspection of the documents to determine
relevance.
The court expressly held that relief is appropriate "if the assessee
15. 49 Cal. 3d at 147, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
16. Id. at 156, 776 P.2d at 278, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 155, 776 P.2d at 277, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
19. Id. at 148, 776 P.2d at 272, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 570. Union Pacific's property is
annually assessed pursuant to CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 19. See also CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 721 (West 1987). The Board is also required to assess the property at its fair
market value. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1. "'It [fair market value] is a measure of de-
sirability translated into money amounts, and might be called the market value of
property for use in its present condition.'" 49 Cal. 3d at 148, 776 P.2d at 272, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 570 (quoting De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 562,
290 P.2d 544, 554 (1955)) (citation omitted) (brackets and emphasis in original).
Notwithstanding the Board's concession that it had the authority to assess only ex-
isting property, the Board contended that information concerning future acquisitions
would affect the current value of existing property and was therefore reasonably rele-
vant. The court disagreed, pointing out that the Board's own regulations required that
the income approach (the authorized method of valuation of property) be applied only
to existing property. Id. at 149, 776 P.2d at 273, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 571; see CAL. CODE
REGs. tit. 18, § 8(c) (1989); see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 723 (West 1987) (unit val-
uation used to value assessee's properties operated as a unit in a primary function;
nonunitary property valued by the Board through consideration of current market
value information of comparable properties provided by the assessor). The court
stated that the Board "confused the concept of future income with that of future prop-
erty." Union Pacific, 49 Cal. 3d at 149, 776 P.2d at 273, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 571 (emphasis
in original).
20. 49 Cal. 3d at 153 & n.13, 776 P.2d at 275-76 & n.13, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74 &
n.13. The cost of potentially taxable replacement track and rolling stock was included
within the withheld portions of the plan. Id.
21. Id.
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can show that the information is not reasonably relevant to the pro-
posed tax."22 The only "showing" made by Union Pacific was its rep-
resentation that the information was not reasonably relevant.23
Thus, the court appeared to create a rebuttable presumption of
nonrelevance. After a showing of nonrelevance by the assessee based
on the assessee's own assertion, the court shifted the burden of proof
to the Board to prove that the information was relevant. The court
stated that just because "a particular future acquisition may be rele-
vant does not mean that all possible future acquisitions are rele-
vant."24 In other words, had the Board requested only the relevant
portions of the plan, as opposed to the entire plan, the Board may
have been successful in obtaining the information.
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent 25 concluded that such a result was unacceptable for
several reasons.2 6 Requiring the Board to prove the actual relevance
of information sought as opposed to its possible relevance makes sec-
tion 32 of article XIII a "nullity" according to the dissent. 27 The pur-
pose of section 32 is to ensure an unabated collection of taxes during
the litigation process.28 The dissent stated that by requiring actual
relevance before requiring payment of a tax or penalty, the majority
contravened the purpose of section 32, rendering it useless.29
The concern over the impairment of the Board's ability to obtain
information from taxpayers was critical to this conclusion. The dis-
sent disagreed with the majority's elevated standard of proof which
required the Board to establish actual relevance.3 0 Rather, the dis-
sent would apply the "reasonable relevance" test of federal cases,
thus holding that the government need show only that the material
had "potential" relevance.31 To meet this burden, the government
must show that the information "'might throw some light upon the
22. Id. at 147, 776 P.2d at 271, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 569 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 153 n.13, 776 P.2d at 276 n.13, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.13.
24. Id. at 153, 776 P.2d at 276, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
25. Justice Mosk authored the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Broussard.
26. Id. at 159-66, 776 P.2d at 280-85, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 578-83 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 159, 776 P.2d at 280, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal-
ization, 27 Cal. 3d 277, 283, 611 P.2d 463, 467, 165 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1980) (delay in the
collection of taxes could interrupt essential public services). Justice Mosk stated that
"[blecause any delay in collection [of taxes] may cause serious detriment to the public,
courts have been 'extremely reluctant' to interfere in the taxation process before the
taxpayer pays the levies assessed." Union Pacific, 49 Cal. 3d at 160, 776 P.2d at 280,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Pacifc Gas, 27 Cal. 3d at 282, 611
P.2d at 466, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 125).
29. Union Pacic, 49 Cal. 3d at 159, 776 P.2d at 280, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. at 161, 776 P.2d at 281, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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correctness of the taxpayer's return' or 'illuminate any aspect of the
return.' "32 Under the "might be relevant" test, the dissent would
haved denied the trial court jurisdiciton to allow Union Pacific's re-
fusal to disclose the information sought by the Board.33
The dissent also took exception to the majority's denial of an in
camera inspection simply because the Board had not initially re-
quested one.34 The dissent stated that California law does not re-
quire a request for an in camera inspection, but permits such an
inspection made on the court's own motion.35 If confidential infor-
mation is critical to a trial court decision, and the trial court fails to
order such an inspection, appellate courts have either held such fail-
ure to be erroneous or remanded the case and ordered the inspec-
tion.36 The dissent concluded that the Union Pacific case should
have been remanded to the trial court for a determination of the rel-
evance of the plan's undisclosed portions.
III. CONCLUSION
Where previously a taxpayer was required to pay a tax or penalty
and then seek redress in an action for refund, the taxpayer may now
assert that the information sought by the Board is irrelevant in
whole or in part, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the Board to
32. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting in part United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813-15 (1984)) (emphasis provided by the court). Justice Mosk rea-
soned that:
Because the burden on the government would be too great if it were required
to prove the relevance of material which it does not have by the standards ap-
plied to the admissibility of evidence at trial, it need not prove that the infor-
mation is actually relevant in any technical, evidentiary sense.
Id. at 160, 776 P.2d at 281, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 159, 776 P.2d at 280, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 165, 776 P.2d at 284, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). "If some parts of the plan are irrelevant, the solu-
tion is not to deny discovery of the entire plan but to require the court to examine the
plan in camera so that it may separate the relevant from the irrelevant parts of the
plan." Id. at 164, 776 P.2d at 283, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see City of
Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 94, 776 P.2d 222, 234-35, 260 Cal. Rptr.
520, 532-33 (1989) (in camera inspection required by statute); Valley Bank of Nev. v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 542 P.2d 977, 980, 125 Cal. Rptr 553, 556 (1975) (in
camera inspection accommodates considerations of disclosure and confidentiality); In
re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 438, 467 P.2d 557, 572-73, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 844-45 (1970)
(court should take precautions to protect confidentiality); El Dorado Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 342, 346, 235 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (1987) (court
should examine information in camera and disclose only relevant material); Sad-
dleback Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 209, 204 Cal. Rptr.
598, 600 (1984) (in camera hearing must be held to protect both parties).
36. See cases cited supra note 35.
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establish that the information is relevant. If the information is not
relevant, or if the Board fails to expressly request an in camera in-
spection of the information or fails to meet the higher standard of
proof, the taxpayer may bar the government from further inquiry.
This decision may encourage resistance to Board subpoenas by tax-
payers.37 In light of the opportunity to avoid payment of taxes or
penalties during years of litigation,38 this fear does not appear to be
without basis.
JOHN M. BOWERS
XI. TORT LAW
Notice to public health care entities of intention to sue
triggers statutes requiring public entities to notify
claimants of claim deficiencies or to waive all defenses
as to such deficiencies: Phillips v. Desert Hospital District.
In Phillips v. Desert Hospital District,' the California Supreme
Court declared that notice of intention to bring suit for monetary
damages against a public entity for alleged professional health care
negligence triggers government codes requiring the public entity to
notify the claimant of any claim deficiencies.2 Failure to notify the
claimant results in a waiver of all defenses as to the claim's
defectiveness.3
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs' notice,
although insufficient to meet the claim requirements of the Tort
37. Union Pacific, 49 Cal. 3d at 165, 776 P.2d at 285, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
38. For example, Union Pacific was contested for five years. Id. at 166, 776 P.2d at
285, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
1. 49 Cal. 3d 699, 780 P.2d 349, 263 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1989). Justice Kaufman au-
thored the opinion of the unanimous court.
2. Id. at 701-02, 780 P.2d at 351, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 121. See California Tort Claims
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 900-915.4 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990). The particular provi-
sions at issue deal with notice of insufficiency of claim and accrual. Id. at §§ 910.8, 911,
and 911.3. See also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts 222-25, 260-62
(9th ed. 1988); 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Government Tort Liability §§ 88-100 (1988 & Supp.
1989).
3. Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 711, 780 P.2d at 357, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The plaintiffs'
attorney sent a letter to the defendant hospital announcing the plaintiffs' intention to
sue for monetary damages on charges of medical malpractice. When the hospital failed
to respond after three months, the plaintiffs filed their complaint. The hospital de-
murred because the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs had complied with the
requirements of the Tort Claims Act for claim presentation against a public entity.
The demurrer served as the first notification to the plaintiffs that the defendant was a
public, not private, hospital. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought to comply with the stat-
ute, but their original notice of intention to sue had been sent too late to comply fully.
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer and dismissed the plaintiffs' com-
plaint. The appellate court affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs' notice did not
substantially comply with the Act's requirements for presenting a claim.
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Claims Act (the Act), could trigger the notice and defense-waiver
provisions of the Act.4 The court held that if the notice satisfied the
purpose of the Act, which is to furnish the public entity with enough
information to allow it to investigate claims that can possibly be set-
tled without litigation,5 then the notice and defense-waiver provisions
were triggered.6 The court reasoned that the legislature designed the
waiver provisions to spur public entities to investigate claims
promptly and notify claimants of their findings, so that claimants
could complete their claims.7 Thus, upon notice by the claimant, the
public health care entity must inform the claimant of any insufficien-
cies in content or timeliness under the Act, or else waive any de-
fenses because of those insufficiencies.8
The court provided greater protection to claimants while enforcing
the heavy burden placed upon public entities by the defense-waiver
provision. Although the provisions may originally have been
4. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 911.3 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990). This section currently
provides, in part:
(a) When a claim that is required by section 911.2 to be presented not later
than six months after accrual of the cause of action is presented after such
time without the application provided in section 911.4, the board or other per-
son designated by it may, at any time within 45 days after the claim is
presented, give written notice to the person presenting the claim that the
claim was not filed timely and that it is being returned without further action
(b) Any defense as to the time limit for presenting a claim described in subdi-
vision (a) is waived by failure to give the notice set forth in subdivision (a)
within 45 days after the claim is presented ....
The six month provision was added in 1987 to extend the previous 100-day limit,
although this case arose prior to that amendment. Id.
5. Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 706, 780 P.2d at 353-54, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24 (citing
City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 455, 525 P.2d 701, 706, 115 Cal. Rptr.
797, 802 (1974), annotated in 76 A.L.R. 3D 1223 (1977)); see 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal
Corporations § 739 (1971) (adequacy of notice must be determined by language and
purpose of the statute). Specifically, the court noted that a claim is sufficient to trigger
defense-waiver provisions "if it discloses the existence of a 'claim' which, if not satis-
factorily resolved, will result in a lawsuit against the entity." Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at
709, 780 P.2d at 356, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
6. Id. at 711, 780 P.2d at 357, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Based upon its interpretation
of the relevant statutes, the court purposely avoided all of the plaintiffs' theories in
estoppel. Id. at 711-12, 780 P.2d at 357-58, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
7. Id. The court approved Foster v. McFadden, 30 Cal. App. 3d 943, 106 Cal. Rptr.
685 (1973), in determining that the controlling issue is the notice the public entity actu-
ally receives, not the intention of the claimants. Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 710-11, 780 P.2d
at 356-57, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. Although the plaintiffs in Phillips did not intend
their notice to operate as a claim under the Act because they did not know that the
defendant was a public entity, the public entity received sufficient notice to accomplish
the Act's purpose. Id. at 709-10, 780 P.2d at 356, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
8. Id. at 702, 780 P.2d at 351, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
1149
designed to aid the claimant who filed his claim without the aid of a
lawyer, the court made no distinction on that basis.9 Furthermore,
the court did not appear to be swayed by the severity of the plain-
tiff's injuries in this case,' 0 but instead afforded all claimants the ad-
ded benefit of notice by the public entity.
DAWN SOLHEIM
9. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, the consultant for the California Law Revision
Commission which authored sections 910.8 and 911 of the California Government
Code, asserted that requiring public entities to notify claimants of claim insufficiencies
was necessary because nonlawyers often write claims; however, the Foster court specif-
ically noted that this extra protection extended equally to claimants whose claims
were filed by lawyers. Foster, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 947-48, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
10. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant hospital negligently performed a
medically unnecessary bilateral mastectomy and reconstructive surgery, which re-
sulted in disfigurement, gangrene, and other complications.
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